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and then spent three years in New Guinea managing a 
plantation. In 1984 he graduated with a BA from the 
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Introduction 
A light drizzle pattered down on the 20 soldiers waiting to 
board the Qantas aircraft en route to war. It was May 1966 
and I was 24 years old. I had joined the army 9 months before 
in order to help stop the "communist aggressor from the 
north" from pushing over the dominoes on the march to 
Australia. 
Wearing a set of jungle greens, with slouch hat perched 
jauntily on my head, I felt both proud and apprehensive as I 
climbed on board. Once this flight started, I thought, my life 
would be changed forever. I had a wistful feeling about join-
ing a long list of family forebears who had made this trip to 
war before me. I was entering the unknown, but determined 
to acquit myself well enough to be an equal partner in their 
circle. The mysterious, melodious word SIGH . . . GONE 
kept sounding in my head. It conjured up images of adven-
ture. 
After a 24 hour stopover in Manila we boarded an Air 
France plane for the flight to Vietnam. It was an eerie feeling 
flying over the Vietnamese countryside and realising enemy 
troops might be hidden in the thick forest. When the plane 
circled Tan Son Nhut airport for landing, it was late after-
noon. There seemed to be every sort of plane imaginable on 
the strip. Along one side of the airfield were concrete bays for 
fighters, and boxes and stores ran literally for miles. 
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After waiting some time in the dull, dirty concrete terminal, 
a bus pulled up and a warrant officer told us to get on it. A 
large unsmiling Negro in an air force uniform sat behind the 
wheel, bored and disinterested. All the windows of the grey-
brown bus were covered with thick wire mesh — so a grenade 
could not be lobbed inside. No one missed the significance of 
this. 
When we got to the Australian transit hotel the bored war-
rant officer told us to put our gear in a room and be ready to 
go to the Australian base at Bien Hoa at 8 in the morning. 
That was it, no war, no weapons being fired, no-one seemed 
to care in the least. 
Next morning it was raining and the trip by truck to Bien 
Hoa was slow. There were more people in that 50 kilometre 
ride than I had ever seen in my life. The paddies were full of 
water with shoots of rice just starting to show in places. In 
other fields there were men wearing conical hats with their 
trousers rolled up above their knees, ploughing little blocks of 
water with dejected-looking water-buffaloes pulling old 
wooden single-furrow ploughs. Many of the farmers wore 
sheets of plastic wrapped around their shoulders in lieu of 
raincoats. 
Near Bien Hoa City we turned off the road and headed for 
the airfield where the Australian base was situated. Along this 
road were dozens of small shanty-town bars. They were con-
structed of all kinds of building material, many of them 
covered in sheets of Coke tin foil with the labels visible to the 
world. Whoever sold the foil on the black market did a 
marvellous advertising job for Coca Cola. 
The truck passed through the gate and went across to the 
Australian lines. It was a bleak, depressing sight. There was 
not a tree in the whole area, just buildings that seemed to have 
been put up haphazardly. The Australian lines were tents with 
the kitchens made of prefabricated aluminium and fly wire. I 
was posted to D Company and taken down to the lines. 
After two weeks in the battalion I was sent to Saigon for 
guard duty at the transit hotel where we had stayed the first 
night. Part of the duties of the guard was to send soldiers out 
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to the Australian transmitter situated on the main Saigon air-
field. Across the open field from the transmitter was a shanty 
town full of the unwanted and unloved. Grass shacks teemed 
with the poor and destitute and the noise of crying, wailing, 
laughing, shouting and drumming from the area continued all 
through the night. By 2 a.m. I was deathly afraid of the place 
— what the hell was happening there. I was extremely relieved 
when the next shift came to relieve us. 
That wasn't the finish of it, however. On another occasion 
I found myself inadvertently going into a refugee area in 
downtown Saigon as I tried to take a short cut between two 
main roads. The conditions were appalling. I turned a corner 
in the narrow lane and confronted the most pathetic sight I 
have ever seen. A woman sat on a small piece of rotting 
board, her buttocks just clearing the mud that was 
everywhere. She was dressed in rags and was nursing an 
emaciated infant clad only in a filthy singlet. He was almost 
bald and on one side of his head was a huge weeping sore. He 
was crying, but all he could manage was a pitiful whining 
whimper, as if that was all his strength would allow him. The 
woman was slowly and aimlessly waving her hand across his 
head to keep the swarming flies away. 
As I came toward her she put out a hand to me and spoke in 
a voice stripped of emotion. I looked in horror and tried to 
brush past her. She grabbed at my pants as I went by and the 
sound that came from her was more like the cry of an animal 
than a human-being. I yanked my leg away from her feeble 
grip and hurried up the lane, not daring to look back at the 
pitiful sight of this human flotsam, abandoned and hopeless. 
I needed air but, every time I breathed in, the filthy putrid 
air choked me. I hurried to the end of the lane where a group 
of South Vietnamese soldiers sat eating and playing cards. 
They looked at me as I came stumbling toward them and con-
tinued talking. I looked at them uncomprehendingly. Here 
was the army of the people we were supposed to be helping 
and they were sitting there as if they were on a picnic. Their 
weapons were scattered all over the place and there was no 
way they could have retrieved them had they needed them in a 
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hurry. They seemed oblivious to the plight of their own peo-
ple only several metres away. 
Later I went down to Tu Do street in the central area of 
Saigon, where there were hundreds of bars and areas of filth 
and depravity. In amongst all this was the very obvious af-
fluence of the Americans, who had private restaurants, clubs 
with poker machines, beer and first-class entertainment. 
Swirling around outside, the majority of the Vietnamese lived 
in squalour and degradation. Though not all Vietnamese — 
there were many who were reaping the benefits of the 
American and Australian presence and could not have cared 
less about the desperate circumstances of their compatriots. 
When One Battalion went home I was transferred to the 
newly arrived Six Battalion who were then at a newly formed 
camp on the Back Beach on the outskirts of the coastal city of 
Vung Tau. After a week on the beach we flew to Nui Dat 
where we were to help establish the new Task Force base. It 
was a strange experience going to Nui Dat as it seemed that 
there was no war going on at all. There was, however, the 
constant grind of work in atrocious living conditions. The 
battalion's first few months at the Nui Dat base were 
physically and mentally demanding because of the lack of 
organisation and equipment to work with. Five and Six Bat-
talions had to virtually build the base from nothing. To make 
matters worse the wet season started and the rain and the mud 
increased the discomfort'. As well as the task of building the 
base there were security patrols and operations to be carried 
out and these seemed to be endless slogs through the bush. 
The first operation for the battalion was the destruction of 
the village of Long Phuoc, several kilometres from Nui Dat. 
We had been told the people from Long Phuoc had been 
"resettled" and tried not to think any more about it. The 
town of Long Phuoc was large and sprawHng, with well-
constructed houses built of timber and brick, nothing like the 
Australians' perception of grass-hut villages. The people had 
moved in such a hurry that they had left almost everything 
behind — clothes, cooking utensils, bedding, personal posses-
sions. Where had the people gone? How were they going to 
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live without anything to cook in or a place to sleep? How 
could they replace the small family treasures we were throw-
ing on to the small fires we had lit everywhere? Don't worry, 
the people have been resettled we were told. Don't worry! 
How could we? We were soldiers. The boss said pull down the 
town. We pulled down the town. 
When we left, virtually nothing remained of Long Phuoc, 
two hundred years of Vietnamese history wiped away in two 
weeks. In ancient Chinese, the wordp/zwoc means happy, well 
and prosperous. It would be a long time before Long Phuoc 
was ever happy, well and prosperous again. 
The grind of patrolling and building the base continued and 
the operation into the Long Tan area in July was a portent of 
things to come. B Company was hit by an estimated company 
of main force troops and were lucky to escape being overrun. 
The action brought home to us that the Viet Cong forces in 
the area were not to be taken lightly. Still, it seemed 
inconceivable to us in the lower ranks that they would hit us 
because of the heavy logistic support we had on hand. 
The VC flew in the face of this argument when they hit the 
base in August with an estimated 100 rounds of mortar fire. B 
Company Six Battalion were sent to find them, and D Com-
pany relieved B Company the next day. At 3.45 p.m. on 18 
August we were ambushed in a rubber plantation just north 
of the village of Long Tan by an estimated regiment of the VC 
main force. The battled ebbed and flowed for four hours. 
When relief finally broke through, we hurriedly evacuated the 
area in order to fly out our dead and wounded. Some of them 
had to be left in the area overnight, however, and we returned 
at mid-morning the following day. The sight was horrendous 
— no-one who was there could ever forget the horror and the 
carnage. Two of our wounded were found where they had 
Iain helpless all night while Australian artillery pounded the 
area. We recovered the bodies of our friends who had been 
laughing living beings the day before. Nothing takes the sup-
posed glory out of war more quickly than the sight of dead 
mutilated friends. Unfortunately it brings about a hardening 
of feeling toward your enemy that pushes normal human feel-
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ings of compassion to the back of the mind. It brings conflict 
down to a very personal level and gives you the licence to 
remain aloof from the suffering of others as long as your own 
little band of friends is protected. 
These became my feelings for the rest of my tour in Viet-
nam. I cared nothing for the Vietnamese. I cared nothing for 
why we were there. I cared only for the small unit of people 
who shared my life 24 hours a day. 
When D Company was reorganised, I was sent to Ten Pla-
toon and took over as a machinegunner. Very little was ex-
plained to us about Long Tan and no one could be bothered 
asking. Life moved on, but now we knew there really was a 
war here. No doubt of that anymore. 
In September the battalion went on an operation into the 
Nui Dinh hills, five kilometres west of Nui Dat. The hills were 
an endurance test, as they were very steep and covered in trees 
and foliage. We came from the northern slopes and up across 
the eastern face and over to the south. From the southern 
heights you looked out over the great mangrove expanses of 
the Rung Sat, or Jungle of Death, and to the west you could 
trace the highway through the many miles of rice paddies to 
Phu My. At night the glow of the lights in Saigon lit up the 
western horizon. We had to cut down huge trees to make a 
helipad to resupply the company and get us off. The only flat 
area was a huge rock so the landing zone was made on that. 
Back at Nui Dat again, the operations and patrols went on 
and there was no indication of whether our presence in Viet-
nam had altered the course of the war one bit. How did you 
measure success in that type of war? Perhaps by the attitude 
of the people. If so there had been no success as far as I could 
see. In the villages the people looked at us with strange eyes 
that seemed to smoulder. Their dislike was apparent to all but 
the blind. There were no young men in the villages. All the 
work was done by women, children and men over 40. The 
children went from adolescence to . . . who could tell? Gone 
as soldiers every one, but to which side? Those who did not 
join the Viet Cong were conscripted by the South Vietnamese 
army. 
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My perceptions had narrowed so much by this time that 
there were for me only two kinds of people in Vietnam: those 
in the villages, who hated us and showed it; and those in the 
towns, who hated us and didn't show it too openly because 
they were making a dollar and waiting to rip us off. The only 
way we ever met Vietnamese was when we went on leave and 
there they were the pimps, the bar girls, the bar owners and 
black market racketeers. It was a very lopsided view of the 
Vietnamese that we developed. 
At Nui Dat we drank Australian or American beer and ate 
Austrahan or American food, watched American movies and 
bought American goods from the PX that was set up on the 
base. We transported an Australian army camp and values to 
Vietnam and we lived in the same environment we had known 
at Enoggera or Singleton, except that we had to go out on 
patrols with live ammunition and a few of us would die and 
some would be wounded. 
By January the rains had almost disappeared. The season 
was very dry when the New Zealand artillery accidentally 
dropped more than a dozen rounds on us during a very low-
key operation. We lost 4 killed and 13 wounded from the 
company. One of the dead was the company sergeant major, 
big Jack Kirby, who was well liked and respected by 
everyone. Since Long Tan, Jack had been regarded as in-
destructible. 
During January Brigadier Graham became the new Task 
Force commander. Such was the interest at our level that I 
didn't think anyone even knew or could have cared. Task 
Force commanders were so far removed from us that it was ir-
relevant who they were. 
Early in the year the Australians made what turned out to 
be one of their biggest blunders in Phuoc Tuy. That blunder 
was the fenced minefield which stretched from Dat Do to 
Lang Phuoc Hai on the coast. The VC started to lift and reuse 
the mines almost as soon as they were put down. This was to 
cost more than 100 Australian lives. Writing of the minefield 
in Soldier in a Storm, General Alan Stretton said: 
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Another tactical error, which cost many Australian lives, was the 
laying of the 23,000 mines in a minefield from Dat Do to the 
South China Sea without making satisfactory arrangements for its 
security. It was naive to the extreme to think that such a minefield 
could be protected by regional South Vietnamese forces and that 
they would be capable of stopping the Viet Cong from lifting the 
mines and using them as a source of supply in their operations 
against the Australians. Some 8,000 were lifted from the field by 
the Viet Cong and caused death and injury to hundreds of young 
Australians. 
In February the battalion was involved in another very 
costly operation. There had been an attack on a South Viet-
namese outpost near the small hamlet of Hoi My. We were 
told to saddle up and get to the airfield, where there was fran-
tic movement. I think we were the last company out. We rac-
ed on to the choppers and the one I scrambled into was full of 
holes up the tail. The American pilot turned to us as we were 
lifting off and screamed, "This is a hot LZ. I'm only touching 
down and lifting off. Anyone who isn't out in 3 seconds 
jumps when I'm leaving or comes back with me." Very en-
couraging words. When we landed we got out quickly and 
there was the sound of heavy fire coming from inside the bush 
off to the west of the landing zone. When the choppers left we 
were told to head to the eastern side of the landing zone and 
we scarpered across as fast as we could, slowed down by our 
heavy packs and weapons. There was some shooting coming 
at us as we moved across but I think it was from the area 
where the heavy firing was going on, and not someone 
deliberately firing at us. 
We were placed just inside the scrub and lay there all after-
noon listening to the sound of the battle raging on the other 
side of the paddy. There was very little information coming 
through to us, but we were expecting to be thrown in a hook 
to roll up the force holding down the rest of the battalion. 
About 4 p.m. we were told to move back to the west across 
the paddy and link up with the rest of the battalion in the 
scrub. We were bloody angry by this time as we knew very lit-
tle of what had happened and we had been pumping ourselves 
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up for the inevitable clash. This order to move back came as a 
terrible let down as we had the enemy force bottled up and 
there was no way they could get away. 
Planes and artillery pounded the area all night and we were 
warned for an assault the next morning. We weren't told too 
much during the night, only that B Company had been hit 
fairly hard and one armoured personnel carrier (APC) had 
been knocked out. We weren't told that the battalion had 
pulled back and left dead and wounded in the battle area. 
In the morning we were formed up in an assault line and 
pushed forward into the area and one B Company soldier was 
found alive by our company. All the bodies of our own boys 
were found and the knocked out APC had obscenities written 
on the side of it in blood by the VC. It had been a bad day for 
the battalion, with 8 Australians killed and 27 wounded. And 
all we picked up were 8 VC bodies and two rifles. There was 
much talk after the operation that we were not to go in to get 
our own guys out because of the political implications in 
Australia of heavy casualties. It was maddening to realise we 
had the VC caught in a narrow strip of bush between the pad-
dies and the sea, yet we just had to sit there, twiddling our 
thumbs, while our boys were chopped up because the whole 
battalion was not permitted to be engaged. 
Not a good way to fight a war. If we were there to fight 
then why couldn't we fight when the opportunity was there to 
do some good? This was the sort of question that lowly 
privates were not to ask. If the questions weren't asked aloud, 
they were certainly thought about by many of us, and increas-
ed our frustration at the course of the war and at why good 
boys were dying and being mutilated. 
When we left in June I don't know what I took with me. 
Anger. Disillusionment. Disappointment. I certainly wasn't 
going to be able to join the exalted ranks of my family 
forebears on the equal footing I had planned on the day of my 
departure. I had gone to Vietnam for all the right reasons but 
found that none of them fitted the cause. The pride I felt for 
the boys I served with was overwhelmed by the uselessness of 
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the whole year. We had achieved nothing, except the death 
of 37 young men and maiming of more than a hundred. We 
had upheld Australia's good name in the world, perhaps, but 
the cost of this boot-licking to an American insurance policy 
that might never be paid was way too high. 
I was left feeling frustrated at the whole effort. The pro-
blem was that if there was anyone interested enough to ask 
about Vietnam, I was supposed to be an expert because I had 
been there. Been there! Been where? I had been to Bien Hoa 
airfield and some of the surrounding countryside. I had been 
to Vung Tau on leave and to Saigon for one week. I had been 
at the base at Nui Dat and had gone from there on operations. 
Even then the operations never took us far. To the north I 
had been no further than the Binh Ba plantation, a distance 
of only 5 kilometres from Nui Dat. I had been east to Xuyen 
Moc, 20 kilometres, and west almost to Phu My, 30 
kilometres. My knowledge of Vietnam was Australian 
knowledge and Australian memories. 
When people asked what progress we were making, what 
could I say? There was no way anyone could evaluate the pro-
gress of the war. The politicians kept giving all sort of figures 
to support the claim that the American and Australian effort 
was producing the results that were needed. But what were the 
figures: so many Vietnamese killed in such and such a week, 
so many villages destroyed and so many bombs dropped. The 
statistics were mind-boggling. How could the VC withstand 
the enormous resources of the Americans? There is an old 
story told in the army that, for all the destructive power and 
armament of a tank, the thing a tank commander fears most 
is a determined foot soldier. That analogy can explain the 
failure of the allied cause in Vietnam. We forgot the human 
factor. Driving our metaphorical tank we forgot the lesson 
and let the foot soldier snipe and chink at our armour while 
we drove at full speed blasting all before us. We ignored the 
pieces of armour that fell off as a result of the little man's 
bravery and persistence, until in the finish the shell we were 
driving collapsed. 
When we returned to Australia there were other reasons 
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that made it hard for people who had been to Vietnam to say 
anything against the war. For me there were always the feel-
ings of the parents and family of those who had died to con-
sider. When you lose a son or husband in a war, there has to 
be at least a Cause — he died for his country, or defending 
our freedom, or something. In Vietnam none of these 
rationales could be used. Many of us who had been there 
knew this, but it was better not to rock the boat while other 
boys went off to risk their lives and parents and wives grieved. 
After twenty odd years I can talk openly of the uselessness 
because it is apparent now to all. Well, almost all — except 
the politicians who have pushed Vietnam and the veterans out 
of sight and out of mind. 
The battalion returned to Australia in June 1967. We mar-
ched through Brisbane and the national servicemen were 
discharged that day. I went to Melbourne to see my parents 
and then home to my wife in Ballarat. One week later I walk-
ed away never to return. I still had one year of my three in the 
army to serve, so it was back to Brisbane when leave was 
finished. 
My life had no direction and the army seemed as good a job 
to me then as any. By that time I was a corporal — promotion 
in those days was fairly rapid. Our company was sent to 
Canungra, to the Jungle Training Centre, which suited me. 
We were the demonstration platoon, so discipline was fairly 
loose. 
It was while visiting my parents in Melbourne in February 
1968 that the Tet Offensive hit the world headlines and tore 
apart Australian and American optimism over Vietnam. My 
stepfather, David, just kept looking at the television reports 
and shaking his head. He had been against the war from the 
start, which was strange because he was an ardent Liberal 
supporter. He had never been able to understand the policies 
and the rationale in Vietnam. David always had a lot of time 
for Ho Chi Minh because of Ho fighting against the 
Japanese. He had no time for the French and could see 
nothing wrong with the Viet Minh kicking them out of Viet-
nam; and, similarly; the Americans. He had been a prisoner 
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of the Japanese on the Burma railway for three years and he 
had a greater understanding of Asia than I had, even with my 
12 months in Vietnam. David used to keep saying: "I just 
don't understand what we are supposed to be doing. If the 
South Vietnamese can't help themselves then us being there 
for twenty years will make no difference in the end. I just 
can't see the point." Neither did I. 
When it came time to go to Townsville to join the rest of 
the battaUon in March 1968 I signed again for another three 
years. As soon as we got to Townsville I was sorry about my 
decision. The battalion had changed completely. All the of-
ficers from the first tour had been posted out. After several 
severe exchanges with new officers I decided to become a 
civilian as I could see that there was no room in the army for 
me any longer. My ideas had changed too radically. I applied 
for discharge and this came through in November 1968. 
I was discharged in Brisbane and decided to stay there. The 
first thing I needed was a job. The government was good to its 
ex-servicemen in those days. They had what they called a 
resettlement programme. This consisted of a trip to the 
employment office in the city, where a phone call would be 
made, on your behalf, to the employment office nearest 
where you would be living when discharged. I was living in a 
boarding house at WooUongabba, which meant I had to go to 
the WooUoongabba Employment Office for my resettlement. 
The resettlement was a phone call to a construction company 
building the Story Bridge expressway. Yes, they wanted men 
for jackhammer work. Could I use a jackhammer? Right, 
job's yours, bye bye. 
The resettlement scheme reminded me of the one for the 
people of the village of Long Phuoc, but that was another 
time and another place. That was all behind me now. 
Needless to say, the job on the jackhammer didn't last too 
long. There was plenty of work at that time in Brisbane so it 
made no difference. 
Six months later I was in Darwin. I spent three months 
there and came back to Brisbane with very little to my name 
because a business deal went sour. Several jobs later I applied 
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for a position as a plantation assistant in New Guinea. Much 
to my surprise, my application was accepted and I was off to 
a new hfe; it was not quite what I was expecting but not too 
bad either. After six months I was managing a copra and 
cocoa plantation on the north coast of New Britain. The job 
gave me plenty of time to think and I also became a voracious 
reader, developing interests in politics, history and sociology. 
After almost three years, the isolation was starting to affect 
my nerves. I resigned and came back to Brisbane in 1972, still 
unskilled but prepared to work at whatever was available. 
There was never any shortage of work and one thing in my 
favour was that I was always keen to build up my nest egg. It 
was back to Darwin in 1975, after Cyclone Tracey, and a 60 
hour working week for the rest of the year. It was symbolical 
for me being in Darwin surrounded by the destruction. It 
became a year for destruction, in fact, with Cambodia falling 
to the Khmer Rouge, then Vietnam falling like a house of rot-
ten logs and, finally, on our backdoor step, the Indonesian in-
vasion of East Timor and the killing of five Australian jour-
nalists. 
Of these events Vietnam created the most media interest, 
and reports concentrated on the fall of the South Vietnamese 
army as the rout proceeded all the way to the jewel of Saigon. 
The patriot leaders in the south exhorted their people to fight 
to the last to hold off the communists while they filled their 
private planes and yachts with loot and made good their exit 
from the country they had drained for so many years. Presi-
dent Thieu was reported in Time magazine to have shipped 
out two to three tons of gold before he departed from Saigon 
in a plane supplied by the Americans. Good old South Viet-
namese corruption and free enterprise at work right to the 
very end. I sat in the broken down make-shift bar of Lim's 
hotel in Darwin watching small waves wash in on the coast 
and didn't really give a damn. I knew it had all been lies from 
my first few months in Vietnam, but now at least the sham 
was exposed and perhaps we would be the better for it. 
Wrong again. The apologists came forward with If we had 
done this, and If we had done that. You can't make a politi-
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cian change his vision, or make him admit he was wrong. But 
it was over, it was over. At least that could be said, and I 
didn't care who was right or wrong, the killing had stopped. 
The next year I bought a house in Brisbane, but was still 
moving from job to job, mainly on construction work. In 
1980 I realised with alarm I was almost 40. If I was going to 
do anything with my life it had to be now. Higher education 
interested me and I had always been conscious of my lack of 
basic educational skills. I decided to study at night for the 
Senior Certificate. It was quite a challenge as I had left school 
at 14 in Grade 9. After the examinations I was accepted at 
the University of Queensland. 
The three years of my degree were the most satisfying I had 
ever experienced. Majoring in Government, History and 
English gave me the opportunity to examine Vietnam in more 
detail than I ever had before. I was determined to take an 
academic stance and view the whole thing from an objective 
angle, standing outside and looking in as an observer. What a 
strange experience that was. The more I looked, the murkier 
it became. I kept teUing myself to leave it and get on with my 
life. The monkey on my back was becoming a baboon. In-
stead of letting it go, the thought of writing the story of the 
battle in the Long Tan rubber plantation began to interest me. 
The extra workload made things difficult finishing my degree 
as there was a lot of research on the battle to do before the 
manuscript stage. I pushed on with the idea and finished the 
book two months after my degree. 
During this period I was introduced to a Brisbane film pro-
ducer, Evan Ham, who specialised in documentaries on 
South-East Asia. He became interested in doing a project 
with me on the Long Tan battle and began talking about a 
return to Vietnam. 
He also wanted to do a story on Kampuchea. Because of 
the Vietnamese invasion of that country in 1979 he had to 
deal through the Vietnamese in order to get there. When he 
received permission to enter Kampuchea, he had first to visit 
Hanoi to explain what he was doing. At that time very little 
was known about how Vietnam had been faring since the war 
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ended ten years before — very few Westerners had been there. 
Evan returned to Australia with amazing footage of Hanoi 
and was due to return there the following year. 
He suggested it may be possible to get me a visa to go and 
talk to the Vietnamese about the idea of a documentary on 
the battle at Long Tan while he went filming in Kampuchea. 
The thought of being able to return to Vietnam almost had 
me a nervous wreck just thinking about it. 
1 waited for the visa for over six weeks and nothing happen-
ed. By the time Evan was due to leave it still had not come 
through. When he left I was mentally and physically ex-
hausted from the thought of going back to that strange and 
beautiful country. 
Four days later Evan rang me from Bangkok to say that my 
visa was at the Vietnamese Embassy there. "Get on the first 
plane and perhaps we will meet in Hanoi," he said. I couldn't 
believe it. Hanoi. The word sent shivers up my spine. My bags 
were packed and on the Saturday morning I was at Brisbane 
airport waiting to board the Thai International flight to 
Bangkok and then on to Hanoi. 
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The plane came out of the clouds not far from Hanoi and I 
looked in fascination at the scene below. The day was grey 
and dull and the clouds hung low. We were descending over a 
large circular plain ringed by dark, blue-grey, wild-looking 
mountains, the tops of which were covered by cloud. There 
were rice paddies as far as the eye could see, but, being the dry 
season, they were brown and stark. The bunds stood out, 
making irregular patterns across the landscape. The brown 
colour was broken in places by bright green, where paddies 
were planted with young rice. The numerous villages, about 2 
kilometres apart, were typically surrounded by trees. It was 
hard to judge the size of the plain but it must have been 50 
kilometres across. The area was densely populated and would 
have provided no cover during the war. I shivered, thinking 
of the American pilots who had been shot down there. There 
was absolutely no way they could ever have escaped capture if 
they survived the crash. 
We came straight in for the landing and raced up the strip 
while the engines screamed under the strain. As the plane 
slowed down, about 40 open concrete bays flashed by with 
perhaps 20 MIG fighters in them. The planes looked old but 
still deadly. We stopped at the end of the runway, prior to 
turning. The scene was dank and dismal and there seemed to 
be no activity on the airfield at all. For an international air-
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port, conditions were very basic. Mounds of dirt and material 
lay around as if construction work had begun and then been 
abandoned. As the plane turned and slowly taxied to the ter-
minal, we passed an old bulldozer that would have been a 
museum piece in Australia. There was no one riding on it, but 
the engine was slowly ticking over. 
As the aircraft approached the terminal, several people 
came out to meet it. They were dressed in ill-fitting grey 
uniforms and grey peaked caps like the old Brisbane tram 
conductors. No one seemed to be in any hurry and there was 
no laughter among them. When the plane came to a halt, four 
black Czechoslavakian cars cruised up and a Vietnamese 
woman aged about 40 got out of one of them. Her clothes 
provided the only colour in sight — she wore a red and yellow 
ao dai (traditional Vietnamese dress) with white pants. A 
delegation from Indonesia alighted from the first-class cabin 
of the plane, were warmly welcomed by the woman and her 
party, and whisked away. The rest of us then began to disem-
bark. 
Strung out across the tarmac, passengers walked unhur-
riedly to the terminal, a grey concrete building devoid of 
paint, decoration or amenities. There were forms to fill out 
and then the passport check. The customs inspection was 
done thoroughly. Filling in duplicate forms took up a lot of 
time as there was no carbon paper. The next hurdle was the 
money. I had been told to take only American dollars and to 
make sure I had plenty of small bills, as there would often be 
no change available. This created a problem as it all had to be 
counted out. A check is made of a visitor's expenses upon 
departure to see whether the money has been spent legally. 
As I was working through the procedures, a good-looking 
Vietnamese man pushed his way through the small crowd and 
stood beside me. He introduced himself as Dy, pronounced 
Zee, and proceeded to help me through the arrival for-
malities. Dy was the representative from the Hanoi Foreign 
Press Centre, the organisation that arranged the trip for me 
so that I could research the Long Tan documentary film. He 
was wearing a pair of faded Levis and a green Army Surplus 
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jacket, under which was a turtle-neck sweater. On looking 
around, I noticed all the Vietnamese were all wearing sweaters 
as well as jackets. The temperature being around 18 degrees, 1 
felt comfortable in a shirt and light sportscoat. Not so the 
Vietnamese, who appeared to think it was a very cold day. 
When we emerged outside, it was still overcast, the low 
clouds exuding moisture. Dy introduced me to a driver and 
we boarded a black Soviet-built car. The road was a narrow 
ribbon of bitumen. There were very few cars on it but a steady 
stream of bicycles and bullock carts. None of the people look-
ed prosperous — and all wore jackets and sweaters. 
Dy was a quiet, studious man of 38 who ran the staff of the 
Foreign Press Centre. He spoke softly and his English was 
perfect; 1 felt at ease with him. In 1973 he had been in Saigon 
with the Viet Cong delegation which, along with a North Viet-
namese delegation, was monitoring violations of the 1973 
Paris peace agreements; the leader of the Viet Cong delega-
tion was the well-known and respected southern VC general, 
Tran Van Tra. A corner of Tan Son Nhut airfield was reserv-
ed as a diplomatic base for the delegations. This facility was 
named Camp Davis, after the first American combat soldier 
to die in Vietnam, Specialist First Class James Davis (1961). 
The Vietnamese, however, had nicknamed it Camp David 
after the US Presidential retreat in Maryland, where Nixon 
had met Brezhnev in June 1973. 
It must have been a strange life for them at that time, sur-
rounded by enemy who were waiting for a chance to kill 
them. General Tran Van Tra, in his History of the Bulwark 
B2 Theatre, records that his party would not sleep in the 
buildings erected for them by the Americans because of the 
fear of listening devices. Tra brought in experts to search the 
building, who uncovered microphones hidden in ingenious 
places. His sense of humour showed when he wrote: "We 
didn't know whether they had been put there by the 
Americans or the puppets, or put there as a practical joke by 
carpenters who were also electronics experts." He also 
records that the Americans and South Vietnamese tried to in-
timidate them with helicopters and tanks and then to bribe 
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them with money and "pretty girls". Dy spent the best part of 
a year at Camp Davis. After the fall of the south in 1975, Dy 
continued his formal education which the war had inter-
rupted. 
The driver hurried the car along toward Hanoi while in bet-
ween conversation with Dy I took in the sights of this country 
that had become so important to me. I had only ever been to 
the south of Vietnam and had heard stories of how the nor-
thern people were so different from the southerners in social 
and personal attitudes. I had read that the climate and the 
economy had made the northerners more austere and thrifty 
than the southern Vietnamese who lived more for today than 
tomorrow. I don't know what I had been expecting in the 
north, but it was certainly not the poor and underdeveloped 
landscape I now saw, with the majority of people riding on 
bicycles and bullock carts. This was the country which had 
forced the Americans, with all their massive logistics and 
technology, to withdraw. Yet here they were, a peasant socie-
ty with no cars and narrow bumpy roads. Perhaps in Hanoi I 
would see the signs of the industrial base that westerners 
assume is essential to successful warfare. 
If I was about to see an industrial base, it was certainly well 
camouflaged — there were few signs of progress along the 
way. The houses were basic and the people had an air of 
struggle in their bearing and on their faces. Whenever the car 
had to pull off the road to let other vehicles past, they were 
always old rusting trucks, held together by pieces of wire and 
spewing diesel fumes. 
There seemed to be some kind of building going on in 
places, judging by the small brick kilns along the road, but all 
were of cottage industry proportions. We turned on to a new 
road and up ahead loomed a large new bridge. It crossed the 
Red River, a river like the Burdekin in North Queensland in 
the dry season, only five times bigger. The sand on the river 
bed stretched several kilometres across, and down the middle 
flowed a small, slow-moving stream. 
A kilometre or two downstream stood another bridge, its 
buckled, broken superstructure framed against the sky. Dy 
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followed my gaze and explained that it was the Long Bien 
bridge, the main bridge out of Hanoi during the war. The 
Americans bombed it repeatedly and this sad broken shell was 
all that remained. Impossible to repair, it was now used only 
for foot traffic and the occasional train. Dy laughingly 
remembered the Americans' efforts to destroy it. The Viet-
namese had seldom used it for moving supplies during the war 
because they built a pontoon bridge just a little further 
downstream where we were crossing. They would dismantle 
the pontoon bridge during daylight hours, rebuilt it at night 
and run enormous amounts of material over. During daylight 
hours they ran empty trucks over the Long Bien bridge and 
repaired it ceaselessly in order to deceive the American 
satellite pictures. I recently came across a book by some 
Americans who were in Hanoi during the war which also tells 
the story of the pontoon bridge. 
On the other side of the Red River we were on the outskirts 
of Hanoi but the atmosphere did not change. Houses, many 
of them two or three storeys, fronted directly on to the 
streets. They were unkempt and unpainted. The streets were 
full of people moving unhurriedly. On the footpaths many 
small tables and chairs were where people drank coffee or 
beer while children played in and out among them. There 
seemed to be many small workshops scarcely bigger than the 
houses. They may have been houses converted to workshops. 
In Hanoi proper the roads began to overflow with people 
and bicycles with here and there a vehicle, usually a truck or 
bus. The buses ranged from old relics to large new ones. The 
streets were wide and very clean. On the main avenues there 
were no stalls but on the footpaths in the sidestreets there 
were, with people selling all kinds of goods, and fruit and 
vegetables. We turned into a wide avenue with large trees and 
parked outside the Thong Nhat Hotel. 
The building was once an old French hotel and must have 
been beautiful in its heyday. In the foyer I noticed the high 
ceilings. There were coffee tables and armchairs, and several 
large ceiling fans turned in a desultory fashion. Nothing 
seemed to move in a hurry and most of the people in the foyer 
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— a diverse group of Western Europeans, Palestinians and 
Russians — were noticeably lethargic. They seemed to be just 
waiting for something to happen. 
Carrying my bags up the stairs and along the corridor was 
an adventure in itself. Cracked paint was peeling from the 
walls and the linoleum strip along the passage was old and 
buckled. The large door to my room intimidated me to say the 
least. What awaited me on the other side? I pushed the large 
key into'the large lock, turned it, and slowly the door creaked 
open. The room was musty but better than I was expecting. 
The floors were bare and the boards black with age. The two 
beds each had mosquito nets. The windows were closed, as 
were the storm shutters outside. I pushed open the shutters 
and let in the little bit of greyness. On one side of the room 
was an old cupboard with drawers at the bottom. There were 
also two chairs and a writing desk, on which was a kerosene 
lamp and a thermos of warm water. 
In the bathroom was a huge old enamel bath, chipped, 
peeling, and yellow with age and neglect. The bath had no 
side covering and the feet reminded me of ducks. The floor 
tiles were all chipped and stained. I searched desperately but 
in vain for some soap. Ring the desk on the old crank 
telephone: No, sorry, no soap. By now I was starting to feel 
cold and decided to get the shower over with before nightfall. 
Off came the clothes and on went the shower. A lukewarm 
trickle spattered out of the shower hose. As I tried to splash 
the water on to me the rose came away from the wall and 
finished up in the bath at my feet. 
I was glad that I had brought my sportscoat as I needed it. 
This really was a shock to me as this was Vietnam, wasn't it, 
the country where I had spent over a year and had never need-
ed more than a shirt and only ever showered in cold water. It 
may have been the same country but it was certainly different 
here in the north. 
I went back down to the foyer where nothing had changed. 
Dy and the driver were at a table, looking bored, and 1 joined 
them not knowing what to do next. Buy some beer, I thought, 
and walked to the bar past a Russian and a Palestinian, to 
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whom I nodded but received no acknowledgment. 
The driver, as it turned out, was a very interesting man. His 
name was Dang and he had been in the army as a driver dur-
ing the war. He had been guarding a group of American 
prisoners in Son Tay (North Vietnam) when an American 
rescue mission was mounted in 1970. Dang did not know 
whether the Vietnamese expected the attack or not, but the 
prisoners had been shifted from the camp several days before 
hand. They were in Hanoi at the time, probably to persuade 
the Americans to end their massive bombing of that city. 
Dang was still alive, thanks to the move, but all 55 guards at 
the Son Tay prison were killed in the attack. 
The raid itself was a disaster. According to American 
sources it had been carefully planned but their intelligence 
section knew the prisoners had been shifted yet the raid still 
went ahead. A 56-member Special Forces team had been 
especially flown from America to Thailand and then across 
Laos to Son Tay, 37 kilometres from Hanoi. They had gone 
in with five helicopters and others in support. There were also 
several CI30 aircraft as flare ships, and navy fighters from 
aircraft carriers stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin flew on diver-
sionary attacks. 
Several of the helicopters crashed on the way in and by the 
time the crews of the crashed choppers were aboard those re-
maining, there was hardly any room left for the prisoners — 
had they been there. The operation was a shambles. 
Dang had also been the driver for Wilfred Burchett, the 
Australian journalist who since 1963 had been reporting from 
Hanoi and with the Viet Cong in the south. When Burchett 
made a film in Kampuchea, after the Vietnamese invaded that 
country. Dang had been his driver during the preparatory 
shoot. At the time of the filming proper. Dang had another 
job in Hanoi and so did not accompany Burchett. He was 
lucky, because Burchett was ambushed by Khmer Rouge 
guerrillas. He only escaped because the driver, himself badly 
wounded, managed to keep the car moving. Burchett, though 
unharmed, was extremely shaken by the attack. Dang, too, 
was shaken when he heard what had happened, as he did not 
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relish the thought of being in the hands of Pol Pot's butchers. 
After several beers we felt quite merry and relaxed. There 
was some talk about why I was in Hanoi, but Dy preferred to 
leave that side to his director from the Press Centre, whom 1 
would meet the next day. This was okay by me as 1 had not 
yet caught up emotionally on what was happening to me. I 
had to keep reminding myself that I was actually in Hanoi. 
This was it — home of the legendary Ho Chi Minh, jewel of 
the French Empire, headquarters of the Japanese occupation 
army. How many armies had marched across that vast plain 
of ricefields ringed by the dark, forbidding mountains into 
the tiny city of Hanoi? So many momentous events in only 40 
years — the French, the Japanese, the Nationalist Chinese, 
the British, and back to the French again ending in their ig-
nominious withdrawal in 1954. And then what the Viet-
namese called "The American War" began. The small, wiry, 
determined people had refused to be dominated and spilled 
their blood all over their country. It is irrelevant to try to at-
tribute right and wrong in the struggle. It is the struggle itself 
that is important and these people had been through the fire. 
The sense of history and of struggle was everywhere and the 
people had accepted me quite civilly. This had been my hope. 
Here I was drinking Japanese beer with two people I had once 
thought of as my enemy. 
Several Europeans and their interpreters came in and Dy 
called them over to join the table. One was an American 
photographer. Bill Crawford, and the other was an English 
journalist, Nigel HoUoway, from The Economist, based in 
Singapore. Bill Crawford was working on a coffee-table book 
about Hanoi and Nigel was doing a story for his paper on the 
Vietnamese economy. 
They joined us and more beer arrived. Ours was the only 
table which was at all good-humoured — the other people in 
the foyer were all still waiting for something to happen. Bill's 
interpreter, Quang, was a real character, who drank beer like 
an Australian wharfie. Beneath his happy-go-lucky exterior, I 
suspect he was one of the real "hard" men I met in Vietnam. 
Like Dang, he had been with the American prisoners at Son 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
24 A Soldier Returns 
Tay and also in Kampuchea with Dang as Burchett's inter-
preter. Quang spoke very good EngHsh and claimed to speak 
Russian and Spanish. He had been to the Soviet Union several 
times, and also to Cuba, Angola and Mozambique, so he was 
a well-travelled revolutionary. Of course he said nothing 
about what he had been doing in these places and I was not 
going to ask. 
We arranged to meet later that evening in the foyer, when 
Dy would take us to a restaurant for dinner. There was over 
an hour to spare before the agreed time so I asked Dy if it 
would be okay for me to go for a walk. He smiled quizzically 
and said, "Of course". Were there any restrictions that I 
should observe, I asked, and he laughingly replied no, I could 
do whatever I liked. By this time I was beginning to feel rather 
sheepish, recalling all the stories I had heard back home about 
totalitarian states. 
I walked down the road toward the lake I had sighted on 
the way in. The lake is named the Returning Sword Lake and 
its story is not unlike the myth of King Arthur and the sword 
Excalibur. According to legend, Le Loi, a man of lowly birth, 
had been rowing on the lake meditating on how to rid Viet-
nam of the Chinese invaders, when out of the water appeared 
a giant turtle carrying a sword. The turtle gave the sword to 
Le Loi who went on from there to form an army. After a ten 
year struggle he succeeded in driving out the Chinese Ming 
Dynasty in 1428. Le Loi declared himself emperor and so 
began the reign of the second Le dynasty. Le Loi, however, 
because of the years of war, had forgotten about the origin of 
the sword he treasured. One day while he was out on the lake 
in a boat the turtle appeared again. Le Loi was so startled that 
he lunged at the turtle with the magic sword, whereupon the 
turtle took the sword and disappeared under the water. Le 
Loi was left to ponder the signs from heaven, the will of god, 
and the nature of man. 
The number of people cycling along the road by this time 
was enormous — bicycles seemed to be coming by the 
thousands as people rode home from work. It was quite eerie 
standing on the footpath at the main intersection because 
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there was hardly any sound, only the continual swishing of 
bicycle tyres on the wet road. I had never seen so many 
bicycles. Every now and then a very old, small motorbike 
came down the road, upsetting the rhythm of the cyclists. 
Wandering aimlessly up one of the tree-lined streets, I cast 
around for a way to dispose of my cigarette butt — the streets 
being so tidy. A little further up the road two old ladies were 
sweeping the gutters, so I waited until I reached their pushcart 
to throw my butt away. 
Everywhere there were people, all of them wearing old but 
clean clothes. They all seemed to live life at the same level, 
which was quite poor, although there were no beggars 
anywhere. Old gentlemen drove rickety old cyclos, the pedal-
powered taxis, some carrying as many as four people and 
others loaded up with bags of produce. It was an amazing 
sight and still no sign of an industrial sector. I knew there was 
no industrial base, how could there be in this impoverished 
society. Vietnam's strength was not its industrial resources 
but its determined people. 
As I walked down the main street to the hotel, some shops 
had newspapers pinned up on boards for people to read. A 
crowd was gathered around them and again I thought of how 
much we take for granted in Australia. 
The hotel was bewilderingly noisy when I arrived back. As I 
entered the foyer, trooping past me were about 30 couples 
heading for the hotel dining room. They were in high spirits, 
laughing and joking. I found out later they were Russian 
tourists on a vacadon cruise who had come for dinner from 
their liner at Haiphong. By the time we left to go to dinner 
ourselves they were skolling vodka. So much for President 
Reagan's "Evil Empire", I thought. They looked no different 
to me from a group of Australian factory workers, except the 
women were a lot larger. 
Bill and Nigel were in the foyer and when Dy arrived it was 
dark. We moved out to the street, where the lights glowed 
wanly. Electric power is so scarce in Hanoi that dull street 
lights are separated by great stretches of blackness. Rain pat-
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tered on the street, increasing the swish-swish of the bicycles, 
none of which had lights. 
We pulled up outside a house and Dy led us inside and up a 
small flight of stairs. The restaurant, the best in Hanoi, had 
only one room about five metres by four. The floor was bare 
and there were only four tables. A group of Palestinians sat at 
one and at another was a Belgian man whom I met later and 
an attractive Vietnamese girl. Dy led the way to a table and we 
ordered some beer. It was Hanoi beer, which comes in small 
dark bottles with no label. Dy laughingly described it as 
"Hanoi No Name". The food was delicious: a large bowl of 
onion soup to share and three crabs, followed by a steamboat 
at our table, of fish pieces, noodles and vegetables. 
The meal started out in a light-hearted vein but Nigel, the 
economist, began talking earnestly to Dy about the problems 
of the Vietnamese economy and how Vietnam should be 
travelling a different road. Bill, Quang, the driver and I 
decided to keep out of the conversation and concentrated on 
our food and the "Hanoi No Name". By the time we were 
due to leave we were in good spirits, but it was sobering to 
hear Dy say to Nigel in his calm measured tone, "We cannot 
afford to look at 'if. We had no choices. The choices were 
imposed on us ." The words struck home to me like the blow 
of a sledge-hammer and have stayed with me since. So many 
times since have I heard variations on those words spoken in 
Vietnam. 
Rain was still falling when we left for the hotel, but there 
were fewer people on the streets now. Near the hotel, we 
heard the sound of a jazz band echoing along the street. It 
was quite the last thing one expected to hear in Hanoi at 9 
p.m. on a rainy night. Apparently, a rehearsal by a small or-
chestra had turned into an impromptu jam session. 
The booming of a bell woke me at six in the morning. The 
day was again gloomy and heavily overcast and 1 wandered 
down to the dining room feeling wretched — too much wet 
weather or perhaps too much "Hanoi No Name". For the 
first time I had real Vietnamese coffee. I was expecting a pot 
but out came my own dripolater. The volume of coffee was 
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small, only several mouthfuls, but so strong. The one small 
cup would have made three normal cups to my taste. 
Dy arrived. The director could not see me until later in the 
day, so Dy had arranged for me to see some of Hanoi. The 
car took us along Dien Bien Phu Avenue to Ho Chi Minh's 
sombre mausoleum. This is set in its own gardens with a 
parade ground in the front. Queues of people, many of them 
schoolchildren, waited to go inside. I felt uneasy when Dy 
took me to the front of the line and we started to go up the 
stairs into the building. It is a huge structure similar to the 
Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne, only with more col-
our. At the entrance a soldier in dress uniform made sure no 
cameras were taken; he also reminded people to remove their 
headgear. 
Inside there is a long flight of steps covered with a red 
carpet. The stairs rise slowly, adding to the solemnity. At the 
top and after two right turns is the glass-encased body of Ho 
Chi Minh, about three metres from the viewer. I don't know 
what I expected to feel or even if I know what I felt. It was 
without doubt an awe-inspiring sight. Here was the body of 
the man whose image I had seen on a thousand posters and 
books during the twenty years since my days as a soldier. For 
many who served in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh epitomised the 
war. He did for me. Ho Chi Minh, scholar, soldier, revolu-
tionary — to some a hero, to others a devil incarnate. 
Whatever one's view of the man who died in 1969, his place in 
history is assured. 
The place where the body lies is a metre lower than the 
walkway. The glass case which contains it is raised — in rela-
tion to the walkway it is about knee high — so the people fil-
ing past look down slightly. A blanket covers the body from 
the waist down and the hands he across the stomach. It is as if 
Ho has only recently died or is perhaps asleep. The thin wispy 
beard and the thinning grey hair remain unchanged. The 
fingernails are neatly manicured. Children who had been 
chattering quietly on the way up the stairs were immediately 
hushed. The line does not stop but moves slowly around the 
body to the other side, past two soldiers in dress uniform with 
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white gloves and glistening stainless steel bayonets attached to 
their rifles. As we moved out of the room and down other 
stairs the children were obviously shaken by the experience. 
Perhaps not only the children. 
The next stop for me was Ho's house on the banks of a 
small lake in the grounds of the French governor's residence. 
The story is told that when the French left and the Viet Minh 
forces marched victoriously into Hanoi in 1954 it was thought 
that Ho would live there. However, when he walked inside the 
building, he said he could not stand the smell of colonial 
power. He had a house built at the back of the grounds by the 
lake and lived there until he died in 1969, at the age, it is 
thought, of 79. 
The house is almost a colonial Queenslander, but on stilts 
and open underneath but with only two rooms above. A set of 
stairs leads up to a verandah and the rooms lead off this. The 
first is the bedroom, where there is a bed, made up with the 
mosquito net down, one corner turned up in anticipation. 
There are books, clothes and other belongings on display. 
The other room is a study with a bookcase and desk. A 
typewriter has a page in it and beside it is an open book with a 
pair of glasses. As in the mausoleum the children speak quietly, 
reverentially. Fifteen metres from the house is the lake and 
a set of steps lead into the water. There is a bucket of dry fish 
food for the visitors to feed the carp — supposedly Ho's form 
of relaxation. The carp are huge, multi-coloured fish and one 
wriggled right up on to the top step, completely out of the 
water, when I threw in some food. 
The rain still drizzled but there were now glints of blue in 
the sky. The route to the War Memorial was the wide Dien 
Bien Phu Avenue, off to which were many largish parks. In 
Lenin Park there was of course a statue of Lenin holding his 
lapel in his classic oratorical pose. 
The War Memorial is a place of fascinating memorabilia. 
Because of Vietnam's history of struggle only a massive 
building could do justice to the story of the last 60 years 
alone. The building and area is nowhere near large enough for 
this. Inside the main gate a MIG fighter plane stands on a 
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concrete base four metres high. On its nose are painted 14 
stars, reportedly one for every kill attributed to the plane 
although it was flown by different pilots. Around the base of 
the MIG is the wreckage of some of the American planes shot 
down over Hanoi during the war. Behind it is a SAM missile 
and over to one side is the huge watch-tower of the ancient 
citadel. The tower, made of ancient bricks, is probably 30 
metres high. There was a soldier in the tower the day I visited. 
During the American war a guard in the tower rang a huge 
bell to warn the people of Hanoi that American bombers were 
coming. 
Inside the War Memorial is the tank that broke through the 
Independence Palace gates in Saigon in 1975. This sequence 
was filmed by the now legendary Australian cameraman Neil 
Davis; it is one of the most memorable pieces of footage of 
the war. The tank, after it had broken down the gate, was left 
hanging on a gatepost. One of the crew clambered out and 
came running past Davis carrying a Viet Cong flag on a pole. 
Dy, who knew Davis well before he was killed in Thailand in 
1985 during a bloody coup attempt, said that every time Davis 
came to Hanoi he wanted to see "his baby". 
After lunch 1 met the director of the Press Centre, as ar-
ranged and learned that my trip had been a waste of time as 
far as the documentary film went. Long Tan was an insignifi-
cant battle in the overall war and very few people in Hanoi 
were even aware of it. The Press Centre had been under the 
impression that I would present them with technical details, 
but all I was qualified to do as far a film went was the 
research and the writing. However, the director suggested 
that in order not to waste the trip I would like perhaps to go 
to the south for a few days and depart for Bangkok from 
there. This was a most acceptable idea to me, so it was arrang-
ed that 1 should fly to Ho Chi Minh City in two days' time. In 
the meantime Dy would show me around Hanoi a bit more, if 
I liked. I liked very much. 
The next morning Bill Crawford was going to Bach Mai 
hospital to take photographs, and Dy and I went along with 
him. The first place we stopped at was Kham Thien, an area 
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of Hanoi that was carpet-bombed by the American Air Force 
in 1972 during what is now known as the Christmas Bombing. 
Operation Linebacker Two began on 18 December 1972 and 
lasted for 11 days. Huge B52 bombers and other aircraft flew 
almost 3000 missions over Hanoi and Haiphong in that short 
time. Stanley Karnow in Vietnam: A History reports that the 
Americans dropped over forty thousand tons of bombs dur-
ing the operation. The press in America called the bombing 
"savage and senseless" and Pope Paul VI said that the bomb-
ing of Hanoi was causing him daily grief. The official number 
killed, according to Vietnamese sources, was 1320 in Hanoi 
and 300 in Haiphong, despite the fact that the majority of the 
people had been moved from Hanoi to the mountains. Kar-
now, although excusing the bombing and saying that it was 
not deliberately aimed at civilians went to Kham Thien and 
interviewed survivors. By his account over two hundred died 
there. The whole area was completely demolished. 
Kham Thien has been rebuilt, but like everything in Hanoi 
it looks old and bedraggled. A block of land has been set 
aside which is now a shrine in memory of those killed. Inside 
the unroofed area is a statue of a woman holding a dead child 
in her arms. The floor is tile and concrete and people from the 
area donate their time and what money they can spare to look 
after it. There were two elderly men volunteers tidying up 
when we arrived. Another old and gentle man, officially the 
caretaker, lost all his family during the bombing. He lives on 
the site in a small building on one side of the square. Now old 
and so frail that he can hardly get around, he is brought food 
and presents by the people and is treated with respect. It was a 
soul-destroying experience to talk with these people and to 
realise that they do not understand why Hanoi was bombed 
or why the Americans caused such death and destruction. The 
world of international politics means nothing to people whose 
world revolves around family and the immediate 
neighbourhood. To say the Americans were helping South 
Vietnam means even less to them — even the people in the 
south during the war said that there was, and always would 
be, only one Vietnam. General Khanh in 1964 publicly talked 
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of "the march north" to unify the country, much to the em-
barrassment of the Americans. So what rationale can an 
Australian who was part of what they see as the occupying ar-
my offer these people? Nothing. There is none. 
Bach Mai hospital was also quite a shock. The conditions 
are not good and everything is in short supply, except pa-
tients. The hospital was almost destroyed during the war. Be-
ing at least twelve kilometres from the centre of Hanoi, it 
should never have received bomb damage. The doctors, staff 
and patients were inadvertently helped by the French builders 
of the hospital back in the 1920s when they incorporated a 
system of underground tunnels. The tunnels had nothing to 
do with bombing or ground attacks but were a sop to the sen-
sitivities of French patients in the hospital who did not have 
to witness the corpses of French soldiers being taken away. 
During the bombing the tunnels served as bomb shelters for 
the patients and the operating theatre was also moved 
underground. 
Dr Khoi, who was in charge of the kidney unit, took us to 
see his department, where there was one old kidney dialysis 
machine. He said the hospital has six, but only four were 
working — the machines were old and it was impossible to get 
spare parts. In 1986 there were only 25 dialysis machines in 
the whole of Vietnam, and at least 9000 people were known to 
need treatment. Of these only about 5 per cent had any 
chance of receiving aid from the limited resources. The staff, 
in white uniforms, try to do their best but they are hopelessly 
under-equipped and besieged by the sick. 
Next we met Doctor Cau, who took us to the operating 
theatre. The veterinary surgeon in Cunnamulla has better 
facilities than we saw in the operating theatre of Bach Mai. A 
single light hangs over the operating table and the stainless 
steel around it is rusting due to the humidity. The operating 
theatre is underground and Doctor Cau became anxious after 
about 10 minutes. He was working there during the Christmas 
Bombing when part of the hospital above was hit. There was 
nothing for him to do but continue working and hope that the 
building did not collapse on them. The hosoital could not be 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
32 A Soldier Returns 
evacuated because of the large number of patients already 
there and the bombing casualties who poured in seeking aid. 
Thirteen years later Doctor Cau still could not stay in this 
area of the hospital for long. He started to wring his hands 
and became very agitated while waiting for Bill to finish tak-
ing photographs. In the end he had to excuse himself for ten 
minutes. The Christmas Bombing, the Christmas Bombing — 
in Hanoi the words brought instant fear to the faces of those 
who lived through it. After all those years sweat still breaks 
out on the lips of many people and their demeanour changes 
as soon as the words are mentioned. 
Because of the fear and the horrifying scale of the opera-
tion in Hanoi, I asked Dy if I could obtain photos of the bom-
bing. Yes, he said, by all means. When he took me to the 
Photo Archives to look through them I was sorry I had asked. 
He brought me four huge photo albums — and I mean huge 
— and told me he would have reprints made of any I wanted. 
The horror, the terror and the futility of the exercise hit me 
from the first page. By the time I had been through one book 
I was sickened and emotionally distraught, and I am not so-
meone who has not seen the casualties of war. After the first 
book I said that I had selected enough photos already. Dy 
looked at me with his sad little smile and slowly shook his 
head, "No, no, Terry. This is what you asked for, this is what 
you have". Trapped in an emotional whirlpool I looked back 
at him pleadingly but he refused to relent. "Perhaps this is 
your penance, my friend, the way of loosening the monkey 
you told me you thought was on your back." As I looked at 
him standing there like a schoolmaster gently chastising a stu-
dent, I thought he just may have been right. 
Several days later I was at the airport waiting for a flight to 
Ho Chi Minh City. Still the clouds hung over the Vietnamese 
landscape as I sat among the other passengers waiting to go 
south. I was pleased to be leaving Hanoi because of the lack 
of facilities and the bad weather. But in other ways this poor, 
austere city with its stoic and courageous people had let loose 
feelings I had not realised 1 possessed. I wanted to shout that I 
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was sorry, but, really, what would that mean to them, or me. 
Just another round-eyed bleeding heart. 
As the Air Viet flight lifted off into the low-hanging clouds 
I stared with my nose pressed against the glass and tried to 
capture glimpses of some of the places I had seen. Hanoi — 
where the word had once sent a shiver up my spine, it now 
enveloped me with a great longing. Hanoi before meant 
soldiers marching to the clash of cymbals and the beat of 
drums; and Vietnam, an aggressive nation intent only on kill-
ing and war. Now Hanoi meant the great plain of ricefields 
and the looming mountains; the children playing hopscotch in 
the rain; the old lady in the streetstall offering me a cake; the 
old man at the suburban shrine at Kham Thien shaking my 
hand and asking the interpreter if I was an American pilot; 
the body of Ho Chi Minh lying serenely and for eternity in the 
mausoleum. Most of all, Hanoi now meant people, laughing, 
crying, loving. It no longer symbolised alien ideologies or 
ideals that we in our arrogance thought we could not live 
beside in Asia. When Vietnam invades Australia, however old 
I am I will be the first to volunteer. Until that time I will 
always feel a deep regret that the Australian people allowed 
themselves to become involved in the destruction of that 
country. Whatever the rights and wrongs of Vietnam from 
the Vietnamese point of view, we had no right to interfere in 
the internal politics of a sovereign state. 
That extremely poor and decrepit little city of Hanoi had 
destroyed any arrogance I may have had on account of the 
"superiority" of Western culture. I thought of the people at 
that moment out in the rain, labouring under the weight of 
their dead, and looking to a better future that is nowhere in 
sight, even for the most optimistic. Dy's words returned to 
me, "We cannot afford to look at 'if. We had no choice. The 
choices were imposed on us". They reverberated in my head 
as the clouds came in and Hanoi and its struggling populace 
disappeared from sight. 
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As the plane climbed into the heavy cloud I turned to Binh, 
the interpreter from the Press Centre who was to be my com-
panion for the next few days. A studious man of 24 who wore 
thick-framed glasses, Binh was gentle and reserved. He had 
been 12 years old at the time of the Christmas Bombing. His 
father had sent the family to the countryside but stayed on 
himself in Hanoi. Binh remembered the time as a great adven-
ture which quickly lost its appeal. He and his family left 
Hanoi in trucks and were taken into the hills where camps 
were established for them with the village people. The family 
missed their father and there was no news from Hanoi. They 
could watch the bombing from their camp and at night could 
see the fires burning in the city. The thing he remembered 
most was the kindness of the village people who unselfishly 
shared everything with them. 
Some time into the journey the cloud began to thin and the 
landscape was visible in places. The central highlands were 
wild and rugged and appeared from this height to be almost 
uninhabited — there was no sign of any road, but what ap-
peared to be villages were dotted here and there. 
On a plateau area off to the west, appeared a town that 
looked small and lonely high up in the surrounding emp-
tiness. Binh followed my gaze and said, "Ban Me Thuot". 
This made me look again. Ban Me Thuot is a very important 
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town for the Vietnamese. One of the arms of the Ho Chi 
Minh trail passed close by, so many people from the north 
would have held memories of it. In 1975 General Dung 
launched the final offensive from near Ban Me Thuot, and 
there is no doubt that the fall of the town in 1975 was the 
beginning of the end for the regime in the south. Ban Me 
Thuot could be described as the windpipe of South Vietnam. 
In enemy hands, it meant a lightning strike could be mounted 
between the highlands and the sea, cutting South Vietnam in 
two. This had always been an American nightmare. General 
Dung struck Ban Me Thuot like a thunderclap on 6 March 
1975. Three divisions supported by tanks overwhelmed the 
defences and left the generals in Saigon in a panic. The rout 
continued and 55 days later Saigon capitulated. Americans 
and panic-stricken Vietnamese who had managed to flee 
Saigon in its last hours watched from on board the heaving 
ships of the mighty Seventh Fleet as 30 years of American in-
volvement in Indochina ended ignominiously. 
South of Ban Me Thuot the country became visibly in-
habited and roads and villages could be seen. The terrain was 
still hilly and there were no rice paddies. When the ricefields 
appeared, they splashed colour and imposed strange contours 
on the terrain. From there the colour became green, green, 
and more green. All shades of green. The towns were now 
closer together and below me was the Vietnam I remembered. 
Here was the sun and the bush and the bright green paddy 
fields, and the people moving in all directions, pushing for 
every spare inch of land. 
As the plane began to descend, Binh pulled at my sleeve to 
indicate the window on the other side of the aircraft. A huge 
deserted airstrip could be seen below and Binh said, "Bien 
Hoa". I looked again and there was nothing there except a 
wide pot-holed tarmac, black and mournful with disuse. I 
thought back to the time twenty years ago when it was crowd-
ed with planes, helicopters and troops, and barracks were 
scattered all over the area. The memory of the big dark U2 
spyplanes that were officially not in Vietnam flashed in front 
of my eyes as we left the broken scar behind. 
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Thick green paddies intertwined across the landscape, with 
no patch of land unused. The grass-thatched cottages backed 
right up on to the paddy fields and palm trees grew in profu-
sion and confusion: large clumps, small clumps, and some, 
waving luxurious foliage, standing stately and alone. 
The plane swept in a wide circle over Ho Chi Minh City. 
The Saigon River was like a snaking serpent below us, weav-
ing and bending and ripphng its scales as it basked in the sun-
shine. The river was full to overflowing and scores of ships 
lined the sides — large, medium, tankers, cargo ships, gun-
boats, barges. The opening phrase from Coppola's film 
Apocalypse Now kept running through my mind, the drawn-
out "Sigh . . . gone 1968". But this was 1986 Ho Chi Minh 
City, not 1968 Saigon, and the war had been over for me for 
almost twenty years, and for Vietnam for almost eleven. 
Below, on the wide tree-lined avenues human traffic flowed 
along as if drawn by a current. 
Tan Son Nhut airport appeared, wide and clean with large 
areas of grassy parkland around one side. The plane came 
straight in and screamed to a halt. The pilot had to be an ex 
fighter pilot to have made a landing like that. The aircraft 
taxied quickly to the terminal and we passed a concrete-block 
fence with old planes on the other side. I went to see them 
later. They were the planes and helicopters the Americans left 
behind when Saigon fell and there are hundreds of them. It is 
eerie to walk along the rows of rotting metal with pieces of 
lagging blowing softly in the breeze. Air America, proclaims 
several of the planes. Air America, the covert airline of the 
CIA. What did these planes do? Whom did they carry? What 
stories these old rusting hulks could tell. The Vietnamese kept 
as many of them operable as possible, but the ones at Tan Son 
Nhut have been cannibalized for spare parts. 
The plane stopped and the passengers strode purposefully 
across to the terminal — it was quite different from the 
landing in Hanoi. A small crowd had gathered to meet the 
passengers and a man came forward to greet us. Binh knew 
him well — his name was Chinh. Chinh quickly moved us out 
of the airport and into a small blue Datsun. The car was quite 
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new and spotless and we appreciated the air-conditioning as 
the day was quite hot. What a change from Hanoi. The 
people all wore light, brightly colored clothes and laughter 
and good humour abounded. A change too, from the Tan 
Son Nhut I had seen in 1966. 
The drive into the centre of the city was full of the sound of 
traffic and the smell of Vietnam. There was movement in 
' every direction. Small motorbikes carrying whole families 
spluttered along the roads, weaving and darting as quickly as 
their tiny engines and heavy load allowed. Many of the cycles 
were new and painted bright blue. Small cars and taxis moved 
as fast as they could through the endless stream of traffic on 
the roads. The trees lining the avenues branched out above 
the traffic providing shade from the sun. Young women were 
dressed in high heels and attractive light pantsuits, and many 
wore fashionable caps, their straight jet-black hair hanging 
down below waist-level. They rode on their motorbikes with a 
nonchalant air, indifferent to passing comments from the 
young men. 
We passed the Independence Palace and eventually reached 
Tu Do street. It is now a wide commercial street full of shops, 
restaurants, antique dealers and tailors. There were no bars 
anymore. And no bar girls on the street tempting drunken 
Australian and American soldiers inside. No massive US 
military police (MPs) prowling the footpaths, slapping huge 
batons into the palms of their hands and waifing for the 
chance to hit out at an unsuspecting skull. Sitting in a bar in 
this street I had watched two huge MPs, one white and one 
black, come in. The American servicemen had been quite 
boisterous, but when the MPs walked in the silence was 
heavy. They shouldered through the door and sauntered 
down the narrow bar, their helmets pulled low over their eyes, 
and their heavy batons held at the wrist by a thick leather 
thong. They walked up to the end of the bar, turned and 
sauntered back — just letting the boys know they were 
around. The sighs of relief when they left sounded like a mini 
cyclone. To see the effect they had on the soldiers made one 
believe the horror stories about the American Military Police 
Stockades. 
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Tu Do was now just a bustling Asian street with people go-
ing about their business unmolested. It ends at a T intersec-
tion, across from which is the Saigon River. The street names 
have all been changed and Tu Do is now Dong Khoi street. I 
stayed at the hotel overlooking the river, once the Majestic, 
now the Cuu Long. It, too, was a pleasant surprise after 
Hanoi. My room was fresh and airy and there was an air-
conditioner. The view was excellent, looking out on to the 
street and the river. The bath was clean and very deep. And 
there was soap. 
Binh had told me that the My Canh floating restaurant still 
existed, in reply to my query. The name had been floating 
around in my head for years as it was the scene of one of the 
first terrorist attacks against American soldiers in Saigon in 
June 1965. The restaurant was popular with Americans as a 
place to eat so the Viet Cong planted a bomb in it in June 
1965. They had then set off another bomb on the riverbank as 
the terror-stricken patrons tried to rush to safety. The death 
toll was horrendous: 12 Americans killed and 15 wounded; 
five foreign nationals were also killed. The local Vietnamese 
suffered the worst, with 27 killed and 80 wounded. The action 
brought home the fact that nowhere was safe in Vietnam. 
The My Canh, in fact, was moored only a Httle way 
downstream from the hotel so we walked down there for din-
ner. The traffic on the street was heavy but people along the 
riverbank were relaxed and casual. The food was delicious, 
but the hygiene left a lot to be desired. My meal was spoilt 
when a huge rat came out of one of the hollow posts in the 
dining area. It emerged, ran to secure some food and then ran 
back to the post. While devouring its food, it was so 
unconcerned that it left its tail poking out. No one seemed in 
the least perturbed. When the meal was finished Binh and I 
stayed on, talking and drinking Ba Muoi Ba beer. By this time 
I had come to accept the rat in the pole and was not put off 
when it darted out for more food. However, as we were talk-
ing, I noticed something behind me out of the corner of my 
eye. It was another huge rat almost at my shoulder sitting on 
the metal stanchion and staring straight at me. I flew off the 
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chair like a cyclone, upsetting the table and spilling food and 
dnnk over Binh. The startled Vietnamese diners looked at me 
in amazement. When they realised what had happened the 
whole place burst out laughing. "Crazy round eye", I 
thought they were saying, shaking their heads. Sheepishly I 
sat down again while the laughter continued. 
After I had settled down again Binh and I talked about the 
war in Phuoc Tuy, where the Australians had been stationed. 
One of the people I had been hoping to contact was Colonel 
Nguyen The Truyen, the commander of 5 VC Division at the 
time of the battle in the Long Tan rubber plantation in 1966. 
Binh had no idea what I was talking about but he had heard 
of Phuoc Tuy, because of the battle at Binh Gia in late 1964 
and early 1965. According to him the battle at Binh Gia is an 
important part of Vietnamese history now, as it is considered 
one of the turning points in the war. 
Binh Gia is located in Phuoc Tuy province only 11 
kilometres north of the area at Nui Dat, where the 
Australians established their Task Force base in 1966. In the 
1960s Binh Gia was a fortified village of mainly Catholic 
refugees from the north. They had come from North Vietnam 
during the 1954-56 period when those wishing to go to either 
part of the country were free to do so. The people who came 
south were set up in fortified villages as part of Diem's ill-
fated Strategic Hamlet plan. By 1964 the VC forces in the 
south had gained such momentum that it was apparent to the 
Americans that the country was on the verge of collapse. The 
VC, to show just what they could do, launched an attack on 
the fortified village of Binh Gia. VC troops took the village 
against only minimal opposition from the defenders and held 
the town just to show that it could be done. This was the first 
time the VC units had held ground after a battle. 
The army commanders in Saigon decided to send in forces 
to retake the town on 28 December 1964, but the ARVN (Ar-
my of the Republic of South Vietnam) advance toward the 
town was stopped by a determined VC force estimated to be 
of battalion strength. Sustaining only minor casualties, the 
ARVN force withdrew to await reinforcements. During the 
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night several South Vietnamese battalions arrived and on the 
29th another attack was launched. This attack was also halted 
by the VC defenders of the town and one South Vietnamese 
company was overrun and destroyed. By 2 p.m. the ARVN 
forces had only managed to retake a small section of the 
western side of the town and had lost three helicopters. 
At 3 a.m. the next morning, the 30th, the Ranger Battalion 
on the northern outskirts of the town was heavily attacked 
and sustained horrendous casualties. The battle lasted until 
dawn when the VC forces disengaged and disappeared into 
the countryside. The ARVN then retook the town without a 
shot being fired -— the VC having faded away, there was no 
one left to fight. During the night battle with the Ranger Bat-
talion an American helicopter was shot down and lost with all 
hands. When a company of South Vietnamese Marines was 
sent to recover the downed helicopter the next day they were 
ambushed. A full Marine battalion was sent to extricate the 
beleaguered company and were themselves ambushed by VC 
forces, suffering, as the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 
report on the action states, "extremely heavy casualties". 
After these actions the ARVN, reinforced again from 
Saigon, were sent on search operations for the next two days 
and the area seemed to be cleared. On 3 January 1965 that 
piece of wishful thinking was abandoned when VC forces am-
bushed an ARVN armoured column in a rubber plantation 
1.5 kilometres from Binh Gia. The ARVN unit again suffered 
horrendous casualties, with at least two armoured personnel 
carriers and one tank destroyed. By 6 January the ARVN and 
American Adviser casualties had still not been confirmed, but 
the incomplete figures were 201 killed, 192 wounded and 68 
missing, a total of 461 casualties; the figures included 16 
casualties among American advisers (5 killed, 8 wounded and 
3 missing). Against this there were 32 confirmed VC dead. 
According to the report, 4300 ARVN troops were committed 
to the battle against an estimated 1800 VC. ARVN troops 
were also supported by aircraft and helicopters and the report 
states that "A total of 57 armed UH-IB and 67 unarmed UH-
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IBs supported the operation. Thirty sorties were also flown 
by conventional aircraft." 
Historians of the Vietnam War are agreed that this battle 
was the major reason for General Westmoreland's call for 
American combat troops. They arrived in Vietnam in March 
1965, just 10 weeks after Binh Gia. In the official Marine 
history Westmoreland is reported to have said about the Binh 
Gia battle: "It meant the beginning of an intensive military 
challenge which the Vietnamese government could not meet 
within its own resources." This meant the involvement of 
American and allied forces to take over the fighting of the 
war from the Vietnamese. 
As 1 Hstened to Binh's account from his schooldays of the 
Binh Gia battle, I realised that it was an important compon-
ent of the Australian story in Vietnam and determined to find 
out all I could about it. When I contacted the Australian com-
mander of Six Battalion, who only 18 months after the action 
was stationed II kilometres from Binh Gia, it was disconcer-
ting to learn that he had never heard of the battle. This seems 
an amazing oversight on the part of the Australian Army's in-
telligence people. Brigadier Jackson, the first Austrahan Task 
Force commander, was aware of it, but not one of his bat-
talion commanders. Brigadier Jackson told me in an inter-
view that he had been to Binh Gia to study the ground 
because he thought the VC would "have at go at us" . This 
seems logical, and it makes one wonder even more why the 
Task Force was caught flat-footed when the Long Tan battle 
occurred in August 1966. 
I also found out in Vietnam that Colonel Truyen, the 5 
Division commander part of whose forces attacked the 
Australians at Long Tan, had been at the Binh Gia battle. 
Unfortunately he was no longer alive, having been killed dur-
ing the attack on Saigon during the Tet Offensive in 1968. 
General Tran Van Tra recorded in his book, mentioned 
earlier, that he would never forget some of his comrades, one 
being "comrade Nguyen The Truyen, a brave division com-
mander who entered the puppet capital during Tet Mau Than 
in 1968 and later died during the fierce fighting on the out-
skirts". 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
42 A Soldier Returns 
We left Binh Gia at the table of the My Canh restaurant 
because the next day we were to go to Vung Tau. Unfor-
tunately there was not enough time to arrange a trip to the 
Australian Task Force area at Nui Dat. At that time in Viet-
nam there was no restriction on the movements of tourists in 
the cities; however, permission was required to travel in the 
countryside. The country is split into administrative areas 
similar to the Australian states, within which are a number of 
districts. To go to a certain area permission has to be obtained 
from the upper level and then the lower. The area of the 
Australian Task Force is in the larger area of Dong Nai 
province, which encompasses the old South Vietnamese pro-
vinces of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Within 
Dong Nai are the smaller administrative districts; the 
Australian base is situated in Chau Due district and the Long 
Tan area in Long Dat. There was just not enough time to go 
through the formalities. 
The next day the Datsun sped along the highway to Bien 
Hoa. The road was in excellent condition — providing good 
highways was one thing the Americans did for the south of 
Vietnam. This was a four-lane highway with a metre-high 
concrete divider up the centre. We crossed the Saigon River 
and then the mighty Dong Nai, which makes the Saigon look 
like a stream. 
Before Bien Hoa City we turned off on to Highway 15 to go 
to Vung Tau. Now, as in the South Vietnam days, Vung Tau 
is a special zone. Because of its economic significance, it is 
administered differently, which was why it was simple to go 
there. Several kilometres from the turn-off, Binh pointed out 
the old base of Long Binh. This again was a significant area 
for the Australians as it was around here that Two and Seven 
Battalions were operating during the Tet Offensive in 1968. 
Long Binh was the administrative and supply headquarters 
for the American II Field Force Vietnam and the Australians 
were under the direct control of the commander of II Field 
Force from 1966 onward. The base itself covered an enor-
mous area, and every conceivable type of equipment required 
for the successful prosecution of the war was at Long Binh. 
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As the Tet holiday at the end of January 1968 approached 
there was a great deal of concern among American com-
manders about what the period might bring. Westmoreland 
thought that there would be a major strike into I Corps on the 
Laotian border and was manoeuvring troops accordingly. In 
January Westmoreland was looking at the 1 Corps area as the 
danger area, mainly due to the emerging seriousness of the 
situation at Khe Sanh. Khe Sanh was an isolated Special 
Forces camp near the Laotian border; the VC had surrounded 
it and were attacking in strength. Westmoreland had shifted 
troops from other areas to 1 Corps and as late as 25 January 
he sent a message to the commander of II Field Force telhng 
him to "be prepared for the possibihty that the entire 101st 
Airborne Division with appropriate helicopter support may 
be moved to 1 Corps tactical zone". 
General Weyand, commander of II Field Force at the time, 
saw a different picture emerging in his area of operations. He 
was alerted to the fact that something big was in the wind as 
early as the first week in January. He did not execute the 
December strategy of deploying his forces along the Cambo-
dian border and the plateau area, but brought what he could 
spare into a tight ring around Saigon. For Weyand, indica-
tions pointed to an attack on the populated areas and he 
predicted a major strategic shift from previous VC policy. 
Weyand was concerned by things like the reorganisation of 
the old VC Military Region 4 around Saigon, North Viet-
namese "fillers" being placed into local force battahons, and 
persistent reports that a major offensive was being planned. 
When VC forces launched the Tet Mau Than offensive on 
the night of 29 January 1968, Weyand had many of his forces 
in place, including two battalions of the First Australian Task 
Force who were out of Phuoc Tuy province for the first time. 
They were conducting Operation Coburg to the north-east of 
Long Binh, their main task being to help shield the massive 
logistic base. 
The VC launched a strong drive against Long Binh, mainly 
with the 275 Regiment of the VC 5 Division. Their targets 
were the Headquarters of General Weyand at Plantation, the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
44 A Soldier Returns 
prisoner of war compound containing more than 2000 POWs, 
and the ammunition bays inside the compound. The 
American 199th Brigade, from whom the Australians had 
taken over from on Operation Coburg, bore the brunt of the 
fighting and managed to dislodge the 275 Regiment. Several 
VC sapper teams, however, did manage to penetrate the 
perimeter of the Long Binh base and set satchel charges 
amongst the ammunition bays. Many of these charges were 
defused, but at least four of the bays were destroyed by 
massive explosions. 
The Australian forces had been spared the initial assault 
but were to encounter many groups of enemy returning 
through their area after the attacks on Long Binh and nearby 
Bien Hoa City. Australian accounts of the operation record 
that the Australians killed 181 enemy. 
As we continued our journey past the Long Binh base, 
there was a stretch of country, possibly a kilometre wide, that 
was entirely devoid of any plant growth. This was the area 
outside the perimeter of the base that had been defoliated to 
create a buffer zone. The effects had endured. Considering 
the density of the population in this area and the shortage of 
arable land, it was amazing to see it unused. Binh said that 
there had been attempts to cultivate the land but there was 
nothing that would grow. The authorities had tried to 
vegetate the area by planting trees but all had died. The bare, 
gently undulating land extended possibly five kilometres up a 
slope until it disappeared from sight. There was nothing 
growing on it at all. Off to the other side of the road 
thousands of young trees had been planted in areas that had 
been cleared but not defoliated. There was no doubt about 
what the problem was on the barren land. I wonder if the 
Australian soldiers who were engaged in operations in this 
area knew at the time of this heavy use of defoliant. 
As we headed east toward the sea I expected that the densi-
ty of the population would diminish. It didn't. There were 
people all the way along, and in many places old women had 
spread out cassava on the road to dry on the bitumen. The 
starch that comes from dried cassava is used for making 
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bread. The road came to Long Thanh township, where close 
by was the rubber plantation used as a base by Thai forces 
while they were in Vietnam. The plantation is now clean and 
working. Not far out of Long Thanh I sat up as the Nui Dinh 
mountain range came into sight way in the distance, a very 
prominent feature in the almost flat landscape. Heat haze 
made the hills appear to be a light blue colour and they were 
an impressive sight as we drove nearer. 
The closer we came, however, the more I began to feel 
uneasy. There was something wrong, although I could not see 
what it was. When I reahsed I could only sit with my mouth 
open, staring in disbelief. The once majestic ranges, covered 
in forest when I last saw them, were bare of growth. On the 
southern side along the highway the only growth on the 
mountain was a small bush, like lantana, perhaps a metre 
high. Where were all the great trees? Now there were only the 
rocks. The whole range on the southern side was just a vast 
expanse of bare mountain and boulders — bare, eroded 
slopes with great scars down the sides where the erosion had 
started to tear the mountain apart. 
It takes a long while to drive past the Nui Dinh range and I 
stared in disbelief all the while. 1 couldn't have imagined that 
such destruction was possible. Outlined against the skyline at 
one point was a lonely tree with no leaves. I had to stop the 
car to get a photo. So much for the Army and the Australian 
government telling their Vietnam veterans that there had been 
very little spraying in areas where they operated. Here was a 
whole mountain range of trees gone, as if they never existed 
— and the eastern extremity of the range was only five 
kilometres from the base at Nui Dat. 1 made a point of con-
tacting veterans who had been in Nui Dat in the 1970s to ask 
them the state of the range then. All said it was still covered in 
forest, although there were bare patches visible in places. 
There are no patches now. It is all bare. 
It seems that after the Tet Offensive in 1968 the Americans 
poured great amounts of defoliant on the range to deny it to 
the VC, who could use the cover of the ranges to intercept 
Highway 15 and Highway 2, the main arterial roads from the 
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port of Vung Tau. As it happened the plan did not work 
because the massive destruction did not really take effect until 
after the war was over in 1975. My mind could not really take 
in the sight. It is as if the mountain never had a tree growing 
on it. 
The enjoyment of the day had gone for me. As we drove on 
I looked out lethargically at the countryside. Outside Baria, 
the road passes in a loop around the town to the south and 
does not go in. I stared longingly northwards catching glimp-
ses of Nui Dat beyond Baria and telling myelf that it did not 
matter. It did. I was terribly disappointed to have been so 
close and not to have had the chance to go to the Australian 
Task Force area. 
As we rounded the long sweeping curve swinging south to 
Vung Tau the driver suddenly put his foot on the brake and 
the car stopped jerkily. Two soldiers were on the road, carry-
ing machine pistols. They waved us on slowly and then told 
the driver to stop. Binh jumped out of the car looking very 
worried and went back to talk to the soldiers. He then came 
running back to the car and said to me, "Quick, quick, give 
me your passport." I hurriedly dug in my pocket and gave it 
to him and he walked quickly back up the road. The driver sat 
transfixed, his hands locked tightly around the steering wheel. 
Five minutes later Binh came back, got into the car quickly 
and said to the driver "Go". The driver did not hesitate and 
we took-off smoothly but quickly. Binh said not to look back 
so I kept my eyes to the front and asked him what the trouble 
was. "Nothing" he said. Nothing? I looked at him sitting 
there white-faced and decided that this seemed one of those 
times when you just have to accept which is happening 
without knowing why. 
The airport was empty as we drove past and a little further 
on was Vung Tau. The car swung into the main street, which 
once was full of bars but now there are little shops. The wide 
streets are very clean and the Grand Hotel has been restored 
to its former glory. The little open-air cafes on the beachfront 
still remain, even the red-and-white checked tablecloths. 
The road to the Back Beach is as rough as it was twenty 
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years ago but on the beachfront there are several new hotels 
for Eastern bloc tourists. The sea was wild and dashing itself 
on the beach, in places washing over the road. Up at the 
Australian logistic base there is nothing now but sandhills — 
it is as if all those Australians who cursed the sand had never 
been there. The Beachcomber Club is now a beer hall with 
rooms to let upstairs. 
Vung Tau held nothing for me now and I was glad to get 
away, unsure whether I felt angry or not. 1 had not been very 
interested in Vung Tau but had decided to go because of its 
proximity to Nui Dat. The sight of the Nui Dinh mountains 
had depressed me terribly and not even getting into Baria had 
not made things any better. Still tomorrow was another day. 
1 booked a wake-up call for 6 a.m. and when it came 
through I crawled out of bed unenthusiastically just to stop 
the noise. After a shower things looked better. The sun was 
coming up over the Saigon River and because of the pollution 
it was a well-defined ball, the perimeter clear, like a fiery 
moon. Across the road in the park people were playing bad-
minton and others were doing Tai Chi. The traffic moved 
lazily and no one seemed in a hurry. 
After a leisurely breakfast we left for Cu Chi, about 35 
kilometres north-west of Ho Chi Minh City. The Cu Chi area 
near the village of Phu My Hung is now famous in Vietnam 
because of its importance during the war as the headquarters 
of the VC Saigon area command. The tunnels there were 
started during the French occupation; when American com-
bat troops arrived in 1965 these had become very important. 
The land around Cu Chi is about 4 metres above the water-
table which made it good for digging tunnels. Even better was 
the fact that the ground was soft enough to dig quite easily, 
yet moist and firm enough to support the tunnels without 
having to shore them. 
The Americans decided to build a base camp at Cu Chi in 
1966 as part of General Westmoreland's plan to have a ring of 
troops and camps surrounding Saigon. The 25th Infantry 
Division were stationed at Cu Chi and they unknowingly built 
the camp over the tunnel system. For at least a year they 
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received fire from inside their own perimeter, from the tunnel 
complexes inside the base. Across the Saigon River to the 
north of the Cu Chi base camp was a roughly three-sided area 
running to Ben Cat in the north. This was declared a no-go 
area by the Americans. All inhabitants were moved out and 
anyone inside the area was declared VC. This became known 
as the Iron Triangle, and many costly American operations 
were mounted into this known VC base area. Planes returning 
with tonnage of bombs not dropped just let them go in the 
Iron Triangle. Artillery bombarded the area night and day. 
Nothing could survive in the Iron Triangle — except the VC 
who lived in their tunnels throughout the operations, the 
bombing and the artillery fire. 
In the tunnels the VC had workshops, hospitals, and 
visiting troupes of entertainers to keep up morale. Story has it 
that a team would dismantle a full 105 mm artillery piece after 
use and drag the parts through the tunnels to a cave they had 
dug. They would then put the gun back together, ready for 
the next time it would be required. The tunnels, though link-
ed, were self-contained to prevent gas destroying large areas. 
One system was linked to the next by a U tunnel dug down 
into the water table which therefore filled with water. Gas 
pumped into one area of the tunnels could not penetrate the 
water to get through to other areas. The device was also a ter-
ror tactic for any troops. The tunnels were only large enough 
for a small man to wriggle along, and the way out was 
backwards. When the VC came to the watertable blockage 
they knew it was simply a matter of swimming under the 
water and emerging into the tunnel on the other side. But the 
allied troops did not have the advantage of this knowledge. In 
some cases the water tunnels led nowhere, so the man going 
into these blank water areas could drown if he panicked and 
failed to move out backwards quickly. 
The Australians participated in the operation to clear the 
Cu Chi area before the 25th Division established their camp. 
This was Operation Crimp, in January 1966, and the 
Australian One Battalion was attached to the 173rd Airborne 
Brigade. The Australians are in fact credited with finding the 
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first of the tunnels on that operation. Several Australian 
soldiers went into the tunnels and almost came to the head-
quarters of the Saigon area command. 
When we got to the tunnels that bright morning in 1986 the 
area was quiet and peaceful. A part of the tunnel system has 
been preserved as a museum and I went into one of them. My 
heart stopped as the light faded and darkness closed around 
me. That was enough. I backed out rapidly and breathed 
deeply as I climbed out. Tunnel war was not for me. 
Throughout the area relics of the war abound, here a huge 
bomb crater, there an American tank sitUng forlorn and 
derelict in spindly bush. Cu Chi is now part of a new 
economic zone and has been heavily resettled. After 1975 peo-
ple went back to the Iron Triangle and were given a block of 
land and food for six months, after which it was expected that 
they would be self-sufficient. As repayment for the land and 
the support they received in setting themselves up, they are ex-
pected to donate a certain amount of their time to community 
projects in the area, such as building schools and community 
buildings and constructing canals for new ricefields. Many of 
the houses are set back from the road on blocks of about one 
hectare. They appeared to be quite basic, with cattle sheds 
nearby and farmyard dogs, chickens and ducks. 
1 left Ho Chi Minh City for home via Bangkok. The inter-
national airport on my day of departure was crowded to 
overflowing — and there were children everywhere. The flight 
1 was booked on was taking passengers as part of the Orderly 
Departure Program. Those who wish to leave Vietnam may 
now do so but it is sfill not easy. On this day a group of Amer-
Asian children were flying to homes in America. 
These children are the real losers of the war. Even though 
they were born in Vietnam to Vietnamese mothers, they are 
not accepted as real Vietnamese on account of their American 
fathers. The part-caucasian children do not fare too badly but 
the part-negro children are treated with scorn and contempt. 
Many of the children were sitting with Vietnamese chaperones 
who were accompanying them to Bangkok, where other 
chaperones would take over the responsibility. The children 
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were well-dressed, but looked uncomfortable in clothes they 
were obviously unaccustomed to wearing. They moved as if in 
a trance, all with large tags pinned on them bearing a-name 
and a number. 
One girl of about 12 came up to me when I was buying a 
drink and tried to help me select the one I wanted. A very at-
tractive and charming little thing, she reminded me of a pup-
py trying to reach out for affection. She spoke no English at 
all and I couldn't imagine what she must have been feeling. 
Where would the little darling go? Who would take care of 
her? I had to move away from her as I was starting to choke 
up thinking of her future. As I did so she looked at me as if I 
had struck her and her lip started to quiver. I don't think I 
have ever felt as bad as at that moment when I had to ignore a 
little girl reaching out for a small sign of comfort that I was 
afraid to give. 
The plane lifted off and Vietnam was gone again from my 
life, physically at least. This trip was supposed to put Vietnam 
in perspective and let me get on with my life. Instead it had 
confused so many issues that I didn't know where I stood. As 
the miles and several planes took me back to the comforts and 
security of home, I wondered what Australia would hold for 
me now. 
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After my trip to Vietnam, Brisbane in 1986 was not the same 
and neither was I. What had happened in those three short 
weeks? I had gained something and lost something and 
couldn't articulate what they were. Efforts to interest myself 
in other things invariably foundered — always came back to 
Vietnam. 
My book. The Soldiers' Story, was launched in 1986 on the 
20th anniversary of the battle in the rubber plantation at 
Long Tan. Its favourable reception by the general public as 
well as by many Vietnam veterans, started me thinking about 
Vietnam in general and the possibility of writing another 
book — a critical look at the Austrahan involvement, warts 
and all. As interested as 1 became in the project I realised this 
had not yet been attempted. 
The published material available in 1986 on the Australian 
involvement was scant indeed. There were several novels, a 
book of essays, a study of the government's deliberations 
which led it to commit troops to the war, the experiences of 
an Australian journalist, and the battalion histories — not 
much for the historians of the future to go by. Of course there 
were also a great many articles by army officers in the Army 
Journal and articles in other journals by academics. The 
Army Journal was full of optimism in the early days of the 
involvement with articles unequivocally supporting the com-
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mitment and reporting on how well the Army policies were 
working. 
The only work that came anywhere near having a good 
look at the Army's role in Phuoc Tuy province, where the 
Task Force was based, was the thesis by Frank Frost which 
later became the book Australia's War in Vietnam. Frost 
must have been on very good terms with the Army or the 
Department of Defence because he was allowed classified in-
formation that is still unavailable to the general public. Ac-
cordingly he was able to produce a very good analysis of the 
role and workings of the Task Force from 1966 to 1971, 
although it could hardly be described as critical. 
It began to amaze me that most of the works I read gave no 
legitimacy at all to the political claims of the Viet Cong or the 
North Vietnamese. The Viet Cong were sneaky little bastards 
who would not stand and fight and resorted to terrorist tac-
tics. The French resistance during World War Two and the 
Viet Cong in 1966 both used the same means of attacking a 
superior enemy, for which the French were considered heroes 
and the Viet Cong barbarians. 
When the Americans or Australians destroyed a hamlet 
because a shot had been fired from it, the blame for the 
destruction was laid on the VC. The expression, "we had to 
destroy the town to save it" began to take on new meaning. If 
the VC used the people as a screen and civilians were killed 
that was the fault of the VC, not the soldiers who fired the 
weapons. This reasoning began to intrigue me. If it was ap-
plied in these instances, then any behaviour could be laid at 
the door of the VC. And if so, where did responsibility start 
and end for the Australians? It seemed there was no begin-
ning and no end. And no need for the Australians to question 
closely their role in Vietnam because anything that happened 
was really the fault of the VC. This thinking probably has a 
historical precedent in Australia — we have said virtually the 
same thing about the Australian Aborigine for two hundred 
years. In most writings on Australian involvement in Viet-
nam, we are right, therefore the other side is wrong. Because 
they are wrong then there is nothing to stop us bombing and 
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killing them until they see the error of their ways. If the coun-
try is destroyed in the meantime, that's a pity, but it's not our 
country anyway, so it won't affect my family or my safe, 
ordered way of life. 
As the war dragged on and the disenchantment at home 
began to be felt in the ballot box, Australia picked up its bat 
and ball and came home. First, one of the Task Force bat-
talions was not replaced in 1970 and then the Nui Dat base 
closed down in 1971. Now we could say it was the Yanks who 
lost the war. But, with Australia pulling out before the 
Amencans did, couldn't we be accused of seeing the wrifing 
on the wall? Perhaps even rats leaving the sinking ship? No, 
no, no. Australians aren't like that. 
Okay, if that's so, what answer could 1 as an Australian 
give to an American if accused of it. Think, think. Phuoc Tuy 
was cleared of VC. No, that was not correct. We had to fight 
for our survival somewhere closer to home. No, that was no 
good either. We were running out of money. That might be 
true. How about: The Australian people were getting sick of 
our Vietnam commitment and there was an election coming 
up. Yes, that's a good one. So 10 years and 500 Australian 
lives after we first sent in troops, we pulled out, leaving the 
country crippled by bombs and chemicals. The people we sup-
posedly fought for were left bankrupt, with a legacy of 
destruction and suffering that would take generations to wipe 
away. But, according to our logic, Australia had nothing to 
answer for. The politicians stood aloof, and the veterans and 
Vietnam were shoved under the carpet. 
My attempts to find some sort of critical, objective analysis 
of all this in the material available were disappointing. The 
exceptions were Gerald Stone's War Without Honour (1966) 
and Alex Carey's monograph, Australian Atrocities in Viet-
nam {196%). 
Even Frank Frost had been misled by some of the evidence. 
He had fallen into the trap of accepting what was written as 
being accurate, without checking back to original sources. 
For example, he stated that the battle near Hoi My, where my 
company sat on the edge of the paddies while the B Company 
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boys were chopped up, was a decisive victory for the 
Australians. This was news to me and to everyone from Six 
Battalion who was there. He claimed that the Australian force 
killed 70 VC and that the VC unit "subsequently withdrew 
from the battle but the Task Force lacked the means to pre-
vent its escape". Not so, according to the after-action report 
and the memories of those who were there. In fact most peo-
ple from A and B Companies who were in the thick of the 
fighting will say that there couldn't have been any more than 
50 to 70 enemy because of the small size of the area. The 
actual body count was 8. To make 70 out of eight is stretching 
the bounds of credibility too far. Frost neglects to mention 
that it was the Australians who withdrew first; nor does he 
mention that the Australian dead and wounded were left for 
the night or the bombing and shelling of those men in the 
battle area. 
He also stated that the claim made in 1968 that Australian 
soldiers shot wounded VC after the battle at Long Tan could 
not be supported. This is despite the eye-witness accounts of 
the shootings recorded in The Soldiers' Story, although the 
book is cited, and a signals log which clearly states that 
wounded were fired upon. 
The resettlement of the Long Phuoc and Long Tan people 
was also something that seemed to be studiously avoided by 
all writers of the period. It received a paragraph at the most in 
many of the works and told absolutely nothing. All that was 
said was that the people had been "resettled". What did 
resettled mean? Where were they resettled? Who resettled 
them? How did they survive? There is no way that a researcher 
will find out from published Australian material. 
When it came to many of the stories and books there was a 
smokescreen of fine but misleading sentiments. Robert 
O'Neill who served as the intelligence officer of Five Bat-
taUon in 1966-1967 wrote of the battle at Binh Gia, already 
discussed, in the Jan-Feb 1967 issue of Quadrant. The article, 
"Three Villages of Phuoc Tuy", tried to persuade the 
Australian public that the war was being won by the 
Australians in Phuoc Tuy; and that the people we were sup-
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posedly helping appreciated our efforts and were doing all 
they could to keep out of the evil clutches of communism. His 
account of the Binh Gia battle in December 1964 and January 
1965 is so different from the official reports that one would 
be excused for thinking they were not the same event. He 
wrote in the article: 
The most severe test of Binh Gia's defences came in late 1964, 
when a regiment of VC attempted to put an end to the village's 
defiance. The battle lasted for two days and two nights. The peo-
ple of Binh Gia fought back desperately. The superiority of the 
Viet Cong in numbers and equipment was very nearly decisive, 
but the situation was saved by a parachute landing of a Viet-
namese marine battalion behind the Viet Cong. The marines suf-
fered appalhng casualties. The battalion commander's batman 
hid with his commander's body in the bush for days until he was 
able to carry it into Government hands. Nevertheless the Viet 
Cong thought that Binh Gia warranted no further losses and they 
withdrew. 
The people of Binh Gia "fought back desperately"? A CIA 
report on the action, Binh Gia — An Appraisal, states that 
the VC entered the town on the first day "against only minor 
resistance". The "situation was saved by a parachute landing 
of a Vietnamese marine battalion behind the Viet Cong"? 
The CIA report notes that friendly forces in the action con-
sisted of: 
30th Ranger Battalion 
38th Ranger Battalion 
33rd Ranger Battalion 
4th Marine Battalion 
1st Airborne Battahon 
3rd Airborne Battalion 
35th Ranger Battahon 
7th Airborne Battalion 
1 Platoon 155's [artillery pieces] 
1 Platoon 105 [artillery pieces] 
1 Section of Tanks M24. 
In sum there were 4300 government troops with tanks, ar-
tillery, helicopters and jet fighters, plus the 6000 people in the 
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village; against them were an estimated 1800 Viet Cong 
troops. What did O'Neill say? "The superiority of the Viet 
Cong in numbers and equipment was very nearly decisive." 
From his account one would hardly think the VC took the 
town at all, but that villagers themselves held against over-
whelming odds until one battalion of marines arrived. 
O'Neill also wrote about the choice of Nui Dat for the Task 
Force base in an article m Australian Outlook in April 1969: 
The number of suitable sites for a base to contain 3,000 troops in 
centra! Phuoc Tuy was few. The base had to be away from closely 
settled areas so that the local population would not be endangered 
by the fire from Australian weapons if the base were ever under 
attack. It also had to be serviced by adequate roads, and it could 
not be permitted to dislocate the economic life of the province by 
taking up agricultural land. 
Task Force records show that there were 8000 refugees 
created by the Task Force one month after it arrived in May 
1966, almost 10 per cent of the entire province population. As 
far as not taking up any agricultural land, any soldier who 
ever went to Nui Dat could speak of the hundreds of hectares 
of paddy and garden land affected by the Australian 
presence. 
Looking at the enemy, Ian McNeill, author of the official 
war history The Team, wrote of the VC 275 Regiment after 
the battle at Long Tan in the Defence Force Journal in 
September 1980. "It was a long time before 275 Regiment 
reappeared at any scene of action". I don't know what 
McNeill considers a "long time", but the 275 were up and 
running and on the attack in December 1966, only four mon-
ths after the battle at Long Tan. Not only were they to hit 
American and South Vietnamese units, but according to 
official sources in America, they were the ones who stood and 
fought Six Battalion near Hoi My in February 1967. 
The Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
history records that on 22 December 1966 units of the VC 275 
Regiment attacked the US 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment 
on Route 1, south of Gia Ray in Long Khanh province. An 
American intelligence report on the 275 Regiment gives an 
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outline of its activifies in the first half of 1967 which leaves no 
doubt that the 275 was alive and fighting fit. 
9 Jan 67. Ambush vicinity of Suoi Cat. YT 595065 
13 Jan 67. Attack on Bau Chanh compound. YT 545115 
17 Feb 67. Contact with 6th RAR/lst ATF YS 5256 [Hoi My] 
6 Mar 67. Ambush of U/1 ARVN unit on LTL 23 vicinity 
Xuyen Moc YS 655680 
8 Mar 67. Shelling of Xuyen Moc Subsector Compound 
20 Mar 67. Attack on Hoi May village YS 519566 
21 Mar 67. Contact with B/6RAR/lst ATF YS 528552 
Attack on ARVN OP 510549 
22 Mar 67. Contact with A/6RAR YS 584597 
20 Apr 67. Contact with 2 companies 50th ARVN inf YT 7837 
6 May 67. SheUing of Ham Tan compound (possible) 
28 Jun 67. Contact with 85th and 52nd ARVN Ranger battalions 
YT 339329 to YT335325 
Perhaps Ian McNeill does consider four months a long time 
to be out of action, but I would suggest that anyone reading 
the article would presume that he meant a lot longer than 
that. The suggestion is that the battle at Long Tan completely 
demoralised the 275 Regiment for quite a long period. The 
above documents clearly show otherwise. 
The question that needed to be asked was why discrepan-
cies existed in the purportedly accurate historical accounts of 
the time? Was it a deliberate attempt to falsify history or was 
it just a biased view with insufficient research or a biased view 
with selective use of available material. The latter seemed the 
most likely and the quesfion then arose of whether it was 
important to review the period under study in order to obtain 
a more balanced perspective. 
In 1986 I found out that many Australian Army documents 
relating to Vietnam had been cleared prematurely because of 
the government's Agent Orange inquiry. When I asked what 
was available, a list was sent to me. Although there were 
many gaps in the declassified material there were good pick-
ings for a historian. Armed with this knowledge 1 applied to 
enrol at Griffith University to attempt a research thesis on the 
Australian involvement in Vietnam. The application was sue-
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cessful and in 1987 I started work on the project full-time. My 
intention was to look at the writings of the period and see how 
they compared to the available original research material. 
Another trip back to Vietnam was in order so that I might 
find out what I could of Vietnamese perceptions of the 
Australian presence in Phuoc Tuy. By August I had received 
permission to enter Vietnam again and arrangements for the 
stay were made, as before, with the Hanoi Press Centre. 
There was no guarantee that the trip would produce resuhs, 
but 1 felt it could be worth the effort. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
5 
Long Tan Revisited 
The Thai International flight came down over Bangkok, late 
again, and at 3.30 a.m. a taxi rocketed me into the centre of 
the city. I spent the next few days drinking a lot of Thai beer 
and Mekong whisky, but I was anxious to get to Hanoi — the 
wait in Bangkok began to make me irritable. After several 
days the visa for Vietnam was arranged and I was soon bound 
for Hanoi. 
As soon as we were airborne the clouds came in, but as we 
reached the mountains of Laos the clouds were above us and 
the flying was clear. The mountains stretched out in an inter-
minable chain, the villages folding into themselves. The 
mountain spines twisted and turned sharply in zig-zag confu-
sion. 
As we flew further to the north-east a huge river came into 
view, plunging down the mountain chain. Fed by tributary 
streams it quickly became larger and larger, racing down the 
mountain in a fury and sweeping away boulders and trees. 
The colour changed as it surged toward the lowlands, the 
muddy brown becoming a deep brownish red. The further 
down it went, the wider it became, a more ponderous, 
cumbersome creature. As we came out of the mountains the 
great plain of the delta lay before us awash with brown water. 
The mighty Red River swirled on majestically. It appeared as 
if the whole country was inundated, the roads into the villages 
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the only sinuous, tenuous lifelines to dry land. The little 
ambling river I had crossed on my last trip had swollen to a 
giant. In places it must have been the best part of 10 
kilometres wide. 
The airport and entry procedures had not changed and Dy 
was there again to meet me. On the drive into Hanoi he 
informed me that in an hour's time I was to meet General 
Hoang Phuong, the head of the Military Unit of the People's 
Army of Vietnam. The news cheered me as it angered well for 
the success of this trip. Nothing had changed, or improved, 
certainly not the Thong Nhat Hotel, where it seemed to me 
the same lethargic people were still sitting in the foyer. 
General Hoang Phuong was a surprise. He was quite tall 
for a Vietnamese, probably 175 centimetres. Straight-backed 
and with sparse silver hair, he ushered us into his sitting-room 
and called for tea from his aide. General Hoang Phuong was 
a northerner who had fought with the Viet Minh during the 
French war. He was thought to be about 68 years of age, but 
looked a lot younger. As we sat sipping tea he asked me the 
purpose of my visit and we went into the details straight 
away. 
As I finished explaining that I was on a research trip to find 
out about the Australian role in Vietnam, he became quite 
concerned. He doubted whether much could be done as there 
was nothing in Hanoi that would be of use to me. Australia 
had only played a small part in the conflict, he said. During 
the war someone had been in charge of collating information 
on Australia on what he described as the Australian "desk", 
but the information was more about what was happening in 
Australia. Hanoi, it seems, was well aware of what was hap-
pening in Australia as well as other countries. Everything was 
monitored and this affected their military strategy. 
It appeared to Hanoi by 1968 that Australia was consider-
ing its options as far as the commitment was concerned. 
Pressure to withdraw the troops was increasing in Australia 
and it appeared to them to be just a matter of time before the 
Australian contingent would pull out of Vietnam. They were 
correct. As regards Phuoc Tuy, the Australians were doing no 
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harm there so there was no need to worry too much about 
them. I asked about the strategic importance of Phuoc Tuy 
and the General bridled when I suggested that the province 
was unimportant in the overall context of the war. From a 
purely mihtary point of view, he said, that may have been cor-
rect but not in Hanoi's view. Every village and hamlet in Viet-
nam was as important as the next. There was no order of im-
portance, all had to have cadres working among the people. 
This shouldn't have surprised me, but it did. 1 had not realis-
ed the importance placed on the whole as distinct from the 
parts. The Vietnamese looked on the country rather like a 
piece of fruit. If one little spot was allowed to appear (a 
village without a cadre) then the spot could grow until the 
whole fruit was rotten. 
The general asked how 1 intended to go about my task and I 
said that I hoped to speak to some of the people involved with 
the Australians. He then proposed that he would arrange for 
me to go to the south and talk to officials there. The problem 
for me seemed to be that Hanoi would not force the people in 
the south to co-operate if they were unwilling to do so, 
because so much suffering had been caused there. He said 
that it would all depend on me personally. If the people decid-
ed they did not want to help me they would probably not say ' 
so — I would just never be able to find those I wanted to 
speak to, or the officials would be too busy to show me the 
way, or whatever. 
Several days later I fiew to the Ho Chi Minh City again. 
The city was even more vibrant than last time, with many 
more street-stalls selling all kinds of wares and there even 
seemed to be more motorbikes. I had a new interpreter this 
time, another quiet, studious young man. Thang, like Binh, 
had been evacuated from Hanoi during the Christmas Bomb-
ing and had spent time in the mountains outside Hanoi. He 
had received a university education in Vietnam and his 
English was very good. He was married, and his wife and 
their young son lived in Hanoi. Although he liked his work, it 
took him away from home too often and he missed his family 
very much. 
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We had made arrangements to meet General Hoang 
Phuong in Ho Chi Minh City when he was there on business 
of his own. The general came to the hotel for the meeting and 
this time he was armed with background information on the 
Australian Army in Vietnam. Although this was very good of 
him, the problem was that it was only secondary source 
material. Although not really useful from an academic point 
of view, the information was very good background material. 
General Phuong felt he had to apologise to me as he had 
not really answered the question I had asked in Hanoi about 
the significance of Phuoc Tuy. He stressed again about the 
importance of every hamlet, but then said that he had to 
admit that Phuoc Tuy had little strategic significance in the 
overall context of the war until the final offensive stage in 
1975. 
His information indicated that the Americans had sent the 
Australians to Phuoc Tuy because they knew it was a quiet 
area and there would not be heavy fighting there. The 
Americans were concerned about the "More Flags" policy, 
and did not want Australian involvement compromised by 
heavy casualties. In military terms the Australian involve-
ment was not important to Hanoi. But it was in political 
terms. The Vietnamese in the north had always looked on the 
Australian people as their friends, and so it seemed a con-
tradiction that Australian troops should be involved. Hanoi, 
however, could see that the situation was because of 
American pressure. This was not actually the case — it has 
now been shown that Australia needed no outside pressure to 
become involved. If the advent of a small contingent of 
Australian troops would help maintain an American presence 
in South-East Asia then Australian politicians at the time 
were eager to make the commitment. 
The question of the placement of the Australians in Phuoc 
Tuy is again one of those questions that seem to receive con-
flicting answers. Brigadier Jackson, the first Task Force com-
mander, told me in an interview that he had suggested Phuoc 
Tuy and that the American forces commander. General 
Westmoreland, had agreed, after considerable discussion. He 
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had suggested to Jackson that the Australian force should be 
used in the jungle areas because they were jungle-trained. 
Jungle area, to him, was the central highlands, where arms 
came south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But there were prob-
lems regarding the placement. Jackson had been told from 
Australia, (although he could not specifically say whom) that 
the Australian Task Force was not interested in "getting into 
anything in a major way in the north of the country where 
there were people streaming across the border". They were 
also restricted from the west of the country because Australia 
still had diplomatic relations with Cambodia and there was 
the fear of border incidents. 
General Alan Stretton in his book Soldier in a Storm also 
pointed out that Chief of the General Staff, General Sir John 
Wilton, had Phuoc Tuy in mind before he left Australia to 
discuss it with the Americans. In his book Stretton pointed 
out that one of the major advantages of Phuoc Tuy for 
Australia was the deepwater port at Vung Tau: 
In the event of the Viet Cong getting the military ascendancy, the 
proximity to Vung Tau would allow the Australian force to be 
evacuated or reinforced within Australian national resources. If 
we were operating inland any evacuation or reinforcement would 
depend on the allocation of American resources which would be 
fully extended in support of their own units. I think in selecting 
Vung Tau General Wilton showed remarkable mihtary judgement 
and that there would have been a greater loss of life if the 
Australian force had been allocated to any other province. 
It would seem to have been more of an Australian decision to 
place the Task Force in Phuoc Tuy rather than an American 
one, even though General Westmoreland stated in his diaries 
that it was he who decided on the placement of the 
Australians in Phuoc Tuy. His reason was for the Australians 
to secure Highway 15, which ran from Vung Tau to Saigon, 
and to carry out operations in the Rung Sat, or Jungle of 
Death, which the Australians for some reason never did. 
A copy of the 1966 directive signed by General 
Westmoreland and Australian General Wilton concerning the 
concept of role has never been released. My request for a copy 
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of the document received the ludicrous reply that the docu-
ment could not be found. 
General Phuong asked if the news he had received that 
allegations of atrocities by Australian forces in Vietnam had 
been met by violent denials in Australia was correct. When I 
said this was so, he smiled slightly and shook his head in a 
bemused way. He said the American public were outraged at 
first about the allegations of the My Lai massacre of over a 
hundred civilians by American troops. (Lieutenant William 
Calley was later indicted and found guilty of a charge concer-
ning the atrocity.) Later, when the evidence was presented, 
the public had to accept that it was true. Perhaps, too, there 
was a need for Australian society to confront its own image as 
well. Unfortunately I had to agree with him. We parted and 
he said that he was still working toward getting me to Phuoc 
Tuy. 
Another day was lost while arrangements were made about 
meeting the officials at Bien Hoa. I was beginning to think I 
may have spent my money for nothing again when the word 
came through to go to Bien Hoa the following day. The bar at 
the Cuu Long Hotel does not have many customers but there 
were quite a few people there when I finished my jobs for the 
day and went for a drink in the afternoon. Six East German 
seamen were staring at their drinks and looking quite morose. 
Several of them could speak English and we engaged in a 
halting conversation. 
It seems their ship had come from Europe and had to be 
refitted in Ho Chi Minh City over four months; they had 
already been there two. Afterwards, they were to go to 
Phnom Penh, to Singapore and then back to Europe. The 
German mark was not worth a lot in Vietnam and so they had 
very little money to spend. They had sold their spirit alloca-
tions on the black market in the first few weeks and had a 
good time on the proceeds but now they were counting all 
their money carefully. They were spending all their free time 
in the bar of the Cuu Long, drinking the Vietnamese vodka, 
Lua Moi, which is cheap, but quite good with lime juice. I 
was the first Australian they had ever met so we managed to 
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get into a rambling conversation, with me asking questions 
about their country and they asking me about Australia. By 
the time the bar closed we had become good friends, promis-
ing to meet again, we staggered off in different directions. 
The next morning I had the worst hangover ever — it felt 
hke 1 had a brick planted inside my skull. Thang the inter-
preter knocked on my door on his way to breakfast and I 
stumbled out of the room to join him. He looked at me, smil-
ed, and said that Germans were very good drinkers. I didn't 
need to be reminded of that and in the dining room headed 
for some of that strong Vietnamese coffee. It's the only time I 
have ever enjoyed it. 
The car travelled swiftly up the highway to Bien Hoa and 
the day reminded me of when 1 first made the journey in 
1966.1 chose to think that was a good sign — I certainly need-
ed one the way I felt. 
At Bien Hoa we were met by the local People's Committee 
and went through the intricate formalities of tea and discus-
sions. After an hour of talk the chairman said I could go to 
Long Dat to meet the people there. When? Right now. I was 
stunned. 1 had nothing with me except my camera, a pen and 
notebook, very little money, and only a couple of cigarettes. I 
whispered to Thang on the way down the stairs, "Why didn't 
you tell me?" He looked at me hopelessly and said that he 
thought we would be going to Long Dat another day, if it 
were at all possible. 
A group of Vietnamese got into their car and a Colonel Bao 
got into the back seat with Thang and me. Bao was an in-
teresting man and we established a good relationship over the 
following two days. He was born in 1943 near the hamlet of 
Long My, just north of the Long Hai mountains in Phuoc 
Tuy province. He joined the guerrilla army at age 16, just as 
the Viet Cong were moving toward the action phase of their 
activity. He rose through the ranks (as all VC had to do) and 
was an officer with the D445 Battalion from 1966 to late 
1968, when he was posted to 5 Division. 
Bao had been in the province at the time of the Long Tan 
batUe but he had not been involved personally. Only 
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something like a hundred men from the D445 had taken part 
in the action. The main unit involved had been the 275 Regi-
ment of the main force VC 5 Division. Bao had been involved 
with actions against the Australians and although he had a 
high regard for their small-unit activities he did not feel they 
made a big military impact. He commented that the 
Australians would only fight when they had the advantage — 
unlike the Americans, who came in all guns blazing and did 
not seem to be worried how many men they lost. An example 
he gave was the action near Hoi My, where he said many 
Australian troops were stopped by about a hundred main 
force troops from 275 Regiment. 
I had to sit up and take notice of this man. What he was 
saying was basically correct, much as I disliked hearing it. 
Australian tactics in Vietnam did not run to attacking a posit-
ion unless the full back-up was there to support the assault. 
In the battalion histories there are many examples of 
Australians sighting VC positions and pulling back to wait for 
support. Bob Breen in First to Fight (1988) succinctly summ-
ed up the Australian attitude when he wrote: 
Australian commanders were just not prepared to pay the price 
the US commanders were for success in causing enemy casualties. 
The prospects of tactical success were examined before commit-
ment of troops to an assuaU. Many times this carefulness may 
have lost opportunities to cause enemy casualties. However, lost 
opportunities were better than lost men. 
As much as I agreed with Breen, it is easy to see how this 
could have been interpreted differently by the Viet Cong. 
When he spoke of the Hoi My battle, I knew that he was 
aware of the history of the area. It was then he told me that he 
had been born not far from there and that he knew the com-
mander of that battle, who was still alive. When I said that I 
had been at that engagement, he looked at me strangely, as if 
not knowing whether to believe me or not. When I described 
to him where the area was and when the action took place he 
shook his head and gave me a queer smile. I got the feehng 
that perhaps he had been there himself and was seeing the 
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irony of us talking together about the event twenty years 
later. 
The car moved quickly down the highway, past Long 
Thanh and the Nui Dinh range came into sight again. Just 
looking at the hills made me feel despondent. How much of 
this beautiful country had been laid waste for generations by 
the foul and deadly defoliant? It was anyone's guess. 
As we came abreast of the hills I asked Bao if the small 
Buddhist temple was still tucked away in the folds of the 
mountain. Again he looked at me strangely and I think that 
was when he began to take me seriously. I had been close to 
the temple in 1966 on the operation into the mountains. It is 
only reached by foot track after a very arduous journey over 
some rough country. He wanted to know when I had seen the 
temple and I told him. He put out his hand and touched my 
arm and said, "You have a very good memory, Terry". I 
don't know what touched me the most, the mention of my 
good memory or to hear this man who had no reason to even 
talk to me, call me by my first name. 
As the car went to Baria we turned from the main road and 
went into the town. It had not changed from my memories. 
The car did not stop and went right through the town on to 
the road leading to the beach town of Long Hai, a large 
fishing town. It is situated just to the south-west of the Long 
Hai hills, a name that will conjure up bad memories for many 
Australian soldiers. 
Australian soldiers mounted several large operations into 
the Long Hais, mostly with disastrous results for them. The 
Long Hais had been ^ Viet Minh as well as Viet Cong base 
area since the French days and the Vietnamese called the area 
the Minh Dam Secret Zone. This was inside the mined fence 
the Australians had erected and the rationale was that the 
minefield would stop the movement of VC troops in and out 
of their bases in the mountains. It may indeed have stopped 
them from moving to the east, but it left them with free access 
to the population of Dat Do and Long Hai. 
When the minefield was in place, the VC then had an enor-
mous ammunition dump right at their back door, which they 
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used with devastating effect against Australian troops. Accord-
ing to a Vietnamese history of Long Dat printed in 1986, the 
mined fence created enormous difficulties for the D445 Bat-
talion for the first few months in 1967. Supplies in the Long 
Hais were drying up and some of their people were close to 
starving. They then decided that the field would have to be 
breached and one of their men from the engineer recon-
naissance unit. Hung Manh, volunteered to lead a party to at-
tempt to lift a mine. Manh managed to lift one of the mines 
and also secured the anti-lifting device attached to it. 
With these trophies they returned to the base area and then 
proceeded to hold courses on mine-lifting techniques. It 
became almost a competition to see who could lift the greatest 
number of mines in one night. The history notes: "Three Hoi 
My guerrillas, Tien, Dam and Chien, removed in one night 
160 Australian mines". 
The Long Hais became such a problem that David Horner 
records in Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War 
that there was high-level discussion about continuing the 
operations into them. Horner quotes Brigadier Pearson, the 
Task Force commander at that time, recalling that "[General] 
Hay told him that the Chief of the General Staff was wonder-
ing whether in view of the casualties the operations in the 
Long Hai hills were worthwhile". Horner also quotes General 
Daly as acknowledging that there was "indirect pressure" 
from Canberra about these operations. 
The most costly foray into the Long Hais for the 
Australians was the 8 RAR Operation Hammersley in 
February 1970, which resulted in 11 Australians killed, 59 
wounded, one armoured personnel carrier (APC) destroyed 
and four damaged, mainly due to mines. VC losses were 42, 
according to the battalion history. This was the last operation 
into the area by Australian forces. 
Dang Van Ba, a VC soldier whom I met later, told me that 
he was in the Long Hais when the Australians came into the 
area in 1970, although he did not know it was the 8 RAR. He 
said that the mines were not just scattered over the area in the 
hope that someone might step on them: many of them were 
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planted in the advance of moving Australian troops. He said 
that sometimes their men were within sight of the Australians 
as they planted the mines. He had a bit of a smile when he 
tapped me on the leg and said, "They were your mines that 
we had taken from the minefield". I had to smile ruefully and 
admitted that I knew. 
As we came into Long Hai village the hills stood behind as 
bare of timber as the Nui Dinhs. I had never been to the 
village or into the Long Hai hills but 1 had believed that there 
was a lot of timber on them. That was so, although they were 
not as heavily timbered as the Nui Dinhs. 
The town of Long Hai is a busy place with a large fishing 
fleet. The smell of seafood filled the air as we drove into the 
market area. It must have been a pretty town before the 
defoliant destroyed the countryside but now it is bare and 
bleak. All of the area to the west of the town is salt flats and 
to the east there are rolling sandhills with only sparse growth. 
The Long Hais once provided some greenery in the landscape. 
Out of the town is the beach area and we went there to a 
state restaurant. The sky was overcast, the wind blowing and 
the sea wild. As I stepped out of the car I saw two boats about 
200 metres from the shore. The swells were so big that they 
were being swallowed by them: one moment they would be in 
sight and the next disappear behind a huge swell. 
Inside the restaurant a crowd of people had gathered and I 
became quite embarrassed to realise they were there for my 
benefit. The tables were full of seafood and I was ushered in 
and seated. Introductions were made and the splendid meal 
began. After the meal we got down to the serious business of 
discussing what I was there for. 
At the table with me were five soldiers who had fought 
against the Australians. I found out later that there were 
others in the room but not everyone holds old animosities in 
check as well as the people I was to speak to. Do not imagine 
from the way I have spoken that all Vietnamese have forgiven 
and forgotten. There are many Vietnamese, as there are many 
Australians, who will never forgive or forget. 
At the table with me were Colonel Bao from Bien Hoa, 
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Colonel Khanh, Colonel Ba Son and an ex cadre Chinh Nhung. 
There was also an ex-soldier from D445 Battalion, Dau Thu, 
who was said to have been a company commander. He did 
not say much and the interpreter said that he could not con-
centrate for too long. He had been shot in the head during the 
battle in the Long Tan plantation and was lucky to be ahve. It 
was embarrassing to have to go and look at his wound but the 
Vietnamese insisted that I see it and feel it. The bullet had 
gone in just below his cheekbone, travelled up across the roof 
of his mouth, coming out on the other side of his face just 
under the temple. He had been left for dead on the battlefield 
and regained consciousness some time during the night. 
Disoriented and in agony, he slowly and painfully pulled 
himself along on his stomach out of the plantation and 
toward Long Tan village. His people found him in the morn-
ing and quickly took him away to the hospital complex in the 
May Tao mountains. 
The meeting was long and exhausting and, for academic 
purposes, the material I was obtaining was next to worthless 
— not that that worried me. The talk went on all afternoon in 
the form of a general discussion. People would interrupt 
while others were talking and begin their own anecdotes, or 
someone would say something and the others laugh at him in 
disbelief. It began to remind me of the RSL on Anzac Day. 
Beneath the bravado and the camaraderie of old soldiers, 
there seemed to be one theme that kept re-emerging: the point 
that Bao had made to me about Australians not standing to 
fight unless all was in their favour, or there was no way out, 
as happened at Long Tan. The VC had a great respect for the 
Australian tactics of quiet movement and limited resupply, 
which certainly restricted VC movements; so too did the cons-
tant ambushes which, they said many times, were the greatest 
fear for their small groups. But they were adamant that the 
Australians did not worry them overly much. Someone 
remarked that they feared the American operations the most, 
although one reason for this must have been the sheer weight 
of any American operation. Where the Australian operations 
were no more than a battalion until 1968, the Americans 
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could mount anything up to several divisions and seal off an 
area of 150 square kilometres. 
One aspect of Australian policy they were still very angry 
about was the dumping of bodies for public display, or dragg-
ing them through the populated areas tied behind APCs. This 
ridiculous policy was counter-productive to the Australian ef-
fort and seemed a strange way to win over people to your 
cause. Yet this was a policy thought out at Task Force com-
manders' level. A Memorandum for Record from America, 
reporting on a meeting between the Task Force senior officers 
and a joint CORDS/PSA team, dated 19 March 1969, states: 
(3) During an ensuing discussion, the following approaches were 
presented by the Australians. 
(a) Display VC bodies, (in some inoffensive manner), so that the 
villagers could see what the shooting was all about and what is be-
ing done for them by Free World Forces. This may encourage 
them to increase their participation in their own defence. 
I had to shake my head in despair when I found this docu-
ment in America. After three years of the Australian presence 
in Phuoc Tuy I am sure that the local population knew quite 
well what the shooting was all about. Perhaps the words 
should have been changed to "what is being done to them" 
rather than "what is being done for them". The inoffensive 
manner in brackets was the piece that really broke me up, and 
I do not mean laughingly. How on earth does one put on 
display in an inoffensive way the broken mangled body of a 
person known in the village. I have always thought that I had 
a warped sense of the ridiculous, but the idiot officer who 
made that statement really deserves something, and it's not a 
medal. 
The other area of anger still apparent is the spraying of the 
district. Long Dat district is about 40,000 hectares, of which 
about 8000 hectares of bush country were destroyed. There 
has been an effort to replant about 1500 hectares, but to date 
the results are extremely disappointing. The trees, though still 
alive, are growing very slowly. 
By about 4 p.m. we were beginning to talk easily to each 
other and I think that it was emerging that they were gaining 
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as much as I was from the meeting. There was no formality by 
then and everyone was moving around freely and still drink-
ing plenty of beer. 
The convivial atmosphere changed abruptly on two occa-
sions, once on my part and once on theirs. The first was when 
Colonel Khanh asked me if I knew of the two Australian 
prisoners taken during the battle of Long Tan. I was not 
taken aback and said that was incorrect. No prisoners were 
taken by their side at Long Tan. He looked me straight in the 
eye and said there were two wounded Australians collected 
during the battle. Again I shook my head and said that was 
incorrect. I asked him to show me on the map where they 
were taken and explain to me what happened to them. What 
he said had me looking at him in stunned silence, not knowing 
what to think. 
Khanh said that during the battle they had found two 
wounded Australian soldiers lying in the battle area. Several 
of their men had attempted to take them out of the plantation 
to the north on to Nui Dat 2. Nui Dat 2 was a small feature 
just north of the battle area which was suspected of being the 
headquarters position of the attacking force. There were at 
least two heavy machineguns on this feature during the battle 
and telephone cable was found leading there the morning 
after. According to Khanh, the two Australian soldiers and 
several of the Viet Cong trying to get them out had been killed 
by Australian artillery after travelling only a short distance. 
When he pointed out on the map the position they had been 
found in, I had to sit back and take a slow sip of my beer. My 
head was spinning and there was bile in my throat as I sat 
looking at him and wanting to lash out all around me. 1 
wanted to cry out bullshit . . . bullshit . . . bullshit. But I 
couldn't. I couldn't because what he was saying could quite 
easily have been true. He had not read anything of the 
Australian side of the battle and knew nothing of what hap-
pened from our side, as I knew nothing of what happened 
from theirs. Yet his story and his map reference was accurate 
in terms of what could have happened. How could he know 
unless he was telling the truth? The other thing that I had to 
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ask myself was why he would lie. Why would he make up 
some story to impress me? There was no need. 
During the battle in the planation, Eleven Platoon of the 
Australian force had been cut off from the rest of the com-
pany. The relief forces from Ten and Twelve Platoons sent to 
get to them had been unable to break through and in the 
finish there was nothing else for Eleven Platoon to do but at-
tempt a running withdrawal. This was an every-man-for-
himself situation and the survivors of the platoon just picked 
themselves up and ran in an attempt to reach the rest of the 
company. As Eleven Platoon withdrew there was an extreme-
ly heavy artillery barrage brought down on the area they had 
left. Those thought to be dead were left and several of the 
retreating soldiers were cut down on the way back. There was 
no way of knowing who was wounded and who was dead 
when the platoon broke and moved back. 
When the rest of the battahon finally broke through to the 
company and reorganised for the medical evacuation, there 
were 16 soldiers missing from the company, all presumed 
dead. Those missing lay in the battle area all night while ar-
tillery continued to pound into the area. When we moved 
back at mid morning of the following day, two of the com-
pany were found alive. The question I kept asking myself 
was, if two were left for dead, who was to say that others were 
not still alive as well. There is no way that anyone can say that 
all our fellows were dead when the platoon fell back. 
Everyone thought Jimmy Richmond was dead and yet he was 
found alive, the next morning, lying helpless with a huge 
wound in his back. I had to keep trying to work out a reason 
for Khanh teUing me the story if it were not true and couldn't 
come up with an answer. 
This question is going to have to be one of the many 
unanswered questions concerning the Long Tan battle, unless 
the Vietnamese can present more concrete evidence. Ques-
tions about eye-witnesses to this event were unproductive, 
because the people who found the wounded Australians were 
from the 275 Regiment, whose soldiers were not local men. 
Most of 275 were recruited from the Bien Hoa, Ben Cat and 
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Xuan Loc areas. It remains to be seen whether there can be 
any veritification of what the Vietnamese say happened. 
Another thing that makes the story plausible is the fact that 
Khanh said that they wanted to take prisoners from the bat-
tle. A prisoner to parade around their area would have done 
wonders for the morale of their units, who were at that time 
taking a terrible beating all over the south due to the massive 
American build-up that was still under way in 1966. 
The other break in the conviviality of the meeting came 
when I asked about a Vietnamese who had defected from the 
D445 Battalion and had then worked at the Task Force at Nui 
Dat as a Bushman Scout. They all nodded their heads and 
said yes, they knew the man. The atmosphere changed to 
sullen animosity while they discussed this man amongst 
themselves. Later an ex-soldier, whose name I did not record, 
came over to me and said he knew the man very well. This 
man was small and softly spoken — he was an official in the 
district, evidently of some importance. He wore long pants 
and walked with a pronounced limp — I had the feeling that 
the leg was withered. 
He said again that he knew the man well and would 
remember him for a long time. It seems when the defector 
gave himself up to the Australians he betrayed several people 
working under cover in the villages. One he betrayed was the 
speaker's brother who had been killed when he tried to escape 
from the Australians and the ARVN who had come to arrest 
him. Another brother had been lost in an Australian opera-
tion in the Long Hais, possibly the 6 RAR Operation Mun-
dingburra in July 1969. The 6 RAR Battalion history records 
an incident that sounds Uke the action he was told of in which 
his brother had been killed. 
At 0100 hours on 21 July [1969], six VC had walked into the am-
bush heavily laden with fresh food. The ambush was initiated 
with claymore and machine gun killing two VC. The remaining 
VC fought back and a heavy fire fight resulted. A sweep at first 
light revealed a further two VC dead and a large amount of am-
munition, weapons, documents and packs which were recovered. 
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Throughout the Battalion records there are many instances 
of the VC fighting their way out of Australian ambushes. In 
one ambush with 5 RAR in January 1967 it is recorded the VC 
used a counter-ambush tactic as soon as the ambush was in-
itiated. They moved around to the flank of the ambush firing 
and hurling grenades. By this action they retrieved a heavy 
weapon from one of their dead soldiers before hastily 
withdrawing. 
When the meeting ended for the day, Thang, Bao and I 
were taken to the hotel at Long Hai where we stayed the 
night. The hotel room was basic with only a bed with a very 
thin mattress. There was a bathroom next door but no runn-
ing water, only a large ceramic bowl holding perhaps 40 litres 
of water and a ladle. For bathing, you were meant to pour the 
water over yourself. 
We sat in my room drinking coffee and by now I was confi-
dent enough to be able to talk openly with Colonel Bao. He 
asked how I thought the day had gone and I said without 
hesitation that there were many things wrong with the inter-
pretation of some of the events I had heard during the day 
regarding the Long Tan battle. Again he looked at me as if he 
had been waiting for such a comment and shook his head 
slowly. 
It seemed there was a big problem regarding the Long Tan 
battle as far as the local people were concerned. The battle 
had been fought mainly by the 275 Regiment and they were 
the ones who received most of the casualties. The local D445 
only had about 100 men involved and from those there were 
only about 30 killed, which is what an Australian Intelligence 
report dated September 1966 also states. The D445 were told 
that they had been the ones most heavily involved and that the 
275 were only supporting them. In fact the 275 had been the 
major attacking force and the D445 had come from Long Tan 
village to cut off any retreat and try to stop the Australian 
rehef force from reaching the beleaguered D Company. There 
had been heavy fighting in their area against APCs so there 
was no doubt to the D445 men that they had been in a major 
action. 
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Because the 275 Regiment did not come from the area, the 
local people in Phuoc Tuy had no knowledge of how many 
Viet Cong had been killed. The 275 at that time had also 
started to reinforce with North Vietnamese, which also reduc-
ed the number of casualties from the local area. 
All that the Vietnamese in Phuoc Tuy knew was that there 
had been a big battle and very few of the local people had 
been killed. It was also widely known that it was the 
Australians who had left the battle area first and had not 
returned until mid morning of the following day when they 
had received reinforcements. From this it would not be very 
hard to convince the people and the local soldiers that a 
significant action had taken place and that the VC forces had 
won on the day. Victors of a battle do not have to vacate the 
ground they have fought over and they do not leave their dead 
and wounded on the battlefield. This is especially true of the 
VC soldiers who would take enormous risks to retrieve their 
dead and wounded under fire. 
For the majority of the VC forces to disperse that night and 
not attack the Australians on their return the next day was 
also easily explained to the Vietnamese. VC strategy was 
never to hold ground. When a battle was initiated by their 
forces, the intention was always to inflict casualties and then 
disperse before reinforcements could arrive to encircle them. 
Therefore the fact that the VC fought a battle against the 
Austrahans and remained in possession of the ground until 9 
a.m. the following morning surely indicated that their troops 
had achieved their aim. This interpretation of the battle had 
been widely accepted by their people and the more senior 
officers who knew a different story about the battle and the 
major involvement of the 275 Regiment were not about to 
speak out and shatter the illusion held for twenty years of a 
victory for the local D445. 
The situation had me shaking my head. Here was one battle 
and both sides, VC and Austrahan, claiming victory. As far 
as I was concerned there was no argument — it should be 
declared a draw. Both sides had a legitimate reason for their 
claim, but I could not see why there should be any subterfuge 
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involved. That, however, is not how politics work. There was 
loss of face to be considered, on both sides. 
There has been subterfuge on the part of the Australians as 
well: the attacking force in the battle has grown since the 
event from one reinforced battalion to 2500 enemy. Over the 
years this number had been thrown around loosely and has in 
fact become an institutionalised myth. An advertisement for 
Duntroon Royal MiUtary Academy in the Brisbane Courier-
Mail of 10 July 1988 stated about the Long Tan battle: "The 
enemy force had numbered about 2,500 men". Australian 
documents do not support this claim. The after-action report 
on the battle puts only two battalions of the 275 in the actual 
fighting: "It is estimated that two of the battalions [of the 275 
Regiment] were involved in the actual battle with D Coy, the 
others being in depth. Elements of the D445 battalion were 
moving to assault D Coy from the west and were contacted by 
A Coy." An enemy forces situation report, dated 1 June 
1966, gives the strength of 275 Regiment as approximately 
1850. The regiment includes three battalions of around 500 
men with the rest as support forces. Even this is a high 
estimate of the strength of VC battalions. So two battalions 
of 500 men each and elements of the D445, an estimated 100, 
do not come anywhere near 2500. Even allowing for 
overestimation, the attacking force could not have been more 
than 1500, on these figures. 
The other dispute with the Australian interpretation of the 
battle is the body count. The official Australian body count 
of VC dead is 245, but Bao insists that this is not correct. 
Information he received has their losses at around 150. When 
I returned to the battlefield the day after the battle, there were 
bodies lying all through the area. We were all in a state of 
shock and I don't think anyone really took in how many there 
were, but there were a lot, that is certain. One hundred and 
fifty dead bodies in a 2 square kilometre area is a mind-
numbing sight. It is a great deal of death; and 250 dead bodies 
is the same. The mind cannot cope with the sight of destruct-
ion of that magnitude. The difference between 150 and 250 is 
not something that those who were there could even look 
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back on with anything like an objective view. 
I had never questioned the body count before, although I 
have since learned that some in D Company say that they 
have always thought the body count was inflated. What now 
makes me question the count is that Bao asked me a most 
important question that had me shaking my head at the 
memory. When he told me the body count was definitely 
wrong he asked, "How did you count them?" That question 
really put me back on my heels. The count was done in slip-
shod fashion. My memory of it is that the sections were given 
areas and told to count the bodies there. We were wandering 
around half-dazed and didn't really care too much about 
anything so one can imagine the way the count was con-
ducted. Would a shell-shocked digger count an arm, a trunk 
and a leg scattered over several metres as one body or three 
bodies? Nobody knew or cared at the time, and certainly not 
the people doing the counting. 
1 have since come across documents in Australia that also 
suggest that the count may not be accurate. According to the 
signal log recording messages sent and received during the 
action, the battalion reached the battle site at 9.20 a.m. on the 
morning of 19 August 1966. At 9.50 a.m. there were between 
12 and 15 VC bodies found, yet by 10.20 a.m. only thirty 
minutes later, and no one was counting then, it was recorded, 
"Approaching 100 EN [enemy] DEAD". 
By 7.20 p.m. that night the supposed body count was 188. 
When this was recorded it was then dark and there would 
have been no movement outside the night positions so it must 
be assumed that no more bodies could be accounted for after 
that time. Yet the Canberra Times of 20 August 1966 records 
that an Australian Army spokesman had given the body 
count figure that night as 193. Admittedly this is only a varia-
tion of five, but it is not accurate. Malcolm Eraser, minister 
for the Army at the time, was quoted two days later, on 22 
August, as saying that the Viet Cong, "suffered 500 to 600 
casualties". The commander of D Company made the com-
ment to me in an interview that "eventually a body count of 
245 was arrived at. I personally never saw 245 bodies in a 
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heap anywhere, but that was the count of bodies located". 
No one saw 245 bodies. They saw bodies here and bodies 
there. Looking back 1 don't really think that I would have 
seen more than 50 bodies and I spent three days in the area. 
How can one tell in such a situation? The only thing for sure 
is that the body count was not done accurately, as any private 
soldier who was on the spot will testify. 
I personally do not care how many troops we faced at Long 
Tan or whether the body count is accurate or not. Whether it 
is 1500 or 2500, or whether the VC losses were 150 or 245 is 
irrelevant. 1 and the rest of the company who survived that 
day are aware how close to death we came. 1 think 1 can say 
for most of us that the glory put into the battle over the years 
is not important. Jingoism is the last thing we need. I do not 
care who claims victory and I certainly would not argue over 
the fact. The only fact 1 care about is that a lot of good men 
from both sides died that day and I will forever be saddened 
by that. 
Bao and I stayed talking for a while after the others left to 
go to their rooms. Staying at the hotel were about two hun-
dred children on a seaside holiday. The government seems to 
reward those who do well at school by giving them a holiday 
twice a year. These were children from Ho Chi Minh City and 
most of them had never seen the sea before. We had heard 
children laughing and roaring all the time we had been talk-
ing. When the others left I went downstairs to see what all the 
laughter was about. 
At the foot of the stairs I moved behind a door so as not to 
disturb the scene. All the children were sitting on the floor, 
entranced by people on the stage who were entertaining them. 
At times they would all sing and at other times one of the 
entertainers would make them all call out and laugh. Two 
men behind the entertainer on stage went around mocking 
him and making the children shriek with laughter. It was a 
good sight to see in this poor country. The people have almost 
nothing by western standards and yet there is always laughter. 
I slept fitfully on the thin mattress and tucked in the mos-
quito net tightly around the bed. 1 had visions of one of those 
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huge rats I had seen in Ho Chi Minh City coming to visit me 
in the middle of the night. I was awakened at dawn by the 
shrieking of the children as they all scrambled out to the sea. 
By the time I had washed in the bowl and cleaned myself up, 
they were out in the square in front of my room doing their 
morning exercises under the instruction of a teacher. Most of 
them looked about as enthusiastic as I had been doing early 
morning PT in recruit training. When the teacher dismissed 
them they really came to life and darted off in all directions. 
The teacher tried once to control them, but it was too late — 
they were all gone. He walked into the building shaking his 
head in mock severity. 
After breakfast we went to the headquarters of the local 
party committee in Long Dien and then to Dat Do township 
— another place that would hold bad memories for a lot of 
Australian soldiers. Many Australian casualties were incurred 
around Dat Do by mines from the minefield. During 1969 the 
Task Force decided to mount operations in the area to deny 
the VC access to the town. A fence had been built with the 
help of local government forces but it did little to deter the 
VC who were helped by the people of Dat Do. 
Another meeting took place with the district officials and I 
was introduced to the chairman of Long Dat district, Tran 
Tan Huy. Huy was a small thin man who had been born in the 
village of Long Tan in 1945. He was proud to come from a 
revolutionary family. His father, who had been with the Viet 
Minh, had been killed fighting the French in Phuoc Tuy in 
1953. Huy was the eldest of two sons, but his brother had 
been killed in the Long Hais in 1969. His mother was also an 
ardent revolutionary, although not a fighter. 
Huy said that he had been in the local district guerrilla 
forces and had been in C Company of 25 District. This was a 
district group of about 25 who lived in the bush but returned 
to their homes quite often. He said the western concept of 
guerrilla by night, farmer by day was not correct. He said that 
in Long Dat there were three levels of VC forces. One was the 
group he was with, the district guerrillas. There were also the 
local force D445 Battalion, and the regular forces of the VC 5 
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Division. As well, people from the villages who were not 
soldiers would help when required, acting as guides or carry-
ing supplies. 
Huy had served with the district forces until he was 
wounded in an Australian ambush near Long My in 1968. A 
friend of his had been killed and he himself had been shot in 
the hand and wrist — the old bullet wound is plainly visible. 
When his wound healed it was decided that he should become 
a cadre and concentrate on political activities. 
This was a very dangerous job with very little protection. 
Huy moved around the area with two trusted people as 
bodyguards. All three were armed, which made it even more 
dangerous, as anyone moving with a weapon was fair game to 
any Free World Forces in the area. They lived in the bush, 
moving into the villages and hamlets at night for meetings and 
political rallies. They were helped constantly by the local 
people, who gave them information and supplies. The locals 
always met them outside the hamlets and led them through 
any obstacles, including mines. The people would also post 
sentries around the meetings and rallies. 
There were times when the Australian troops made it dif-
ficult for Huy and his bodyguards to get to their supply 
caches or to receive help from the people and then they suf-
fered badly. Sometimes they were reduced to boiling leaves 
and roots to make some soup in order to survive. For Huy it 
was all made worthwhile when the local forces entered the 
capital of Baria, before the fall of Saigon. He now lives on the 
outskirts of Long Dien with his wife and children in a 
comfortable home surrounded by fine wooden furniture he 
has made himself. 
By this time in the meeting I had run out of cigarettes, but 
the Vietnamese put several packets on the table and told me to 
help myself. It had been arranged for me to go to Long My to 
meet some people who had been personally involved with 
Australian troops, and after that to go to Long Tan village 
and the rubber plantation. I asked about the cross that the 
members of 6 RAR had erected in 1969 on the site where 
Eleven Platoon had been trapped. None of the officials knew 
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of the cross or if they did, it had seemed unimportant. One of 
the village children said he thought he knew where it had been 
and agreed to be the guide for the party when we came back. 
There were two cars and Bao sat in the back of one with 
Thang and me. We went down to Tam Phuoc and then 
through the green rice paddies toward the sea. The paddies 
stretched endlessly, waving slowly in the gentle breeze. The 
sky was a brilliant blue, and here and there, very high up, was 
a thick white puffball of cloud gleaming starkly out of the 
blue. The road was narrow and in very poor condition and the 
cars travelled at no more than 15 kilometres an hour. To the 
south rose the bleak, bare slopes of the Long Hais. Great 
sandy-coloured boulders on the hills stood out, accentuating 
the lack of trees. 
All the people from the rice areas had been forcibly shifted 
by the Australian Army and the ARVN forces, and herded in-
to the town of Phuoc Loi so they could be kept under super-
vision. The Australian minefield mentioned earlier, which was 
meant to isolate the VC from the populated areas, ran from 
Dat Do in the north to Lang Phuoc Hai on the coast, and just 
to the east of Phuoc Loi, where we were now heading. Here 
and there were small thatched houses and people out working 
the paddy fields. The trees around the houses were still 
young, as they had only been planted since 1975. The area 
had been cleared of trees during the war to deny the VC cover 
and food. 
We turned off toward Hoi My on to an even narrower road 
and went along perhaps two hundred metres. Across to the 
right was a stand of tea-trees surrounding a tiny thatched cot-
tage on the edge of one of the rice paddies. We all got out of 
the cars and set off up the small narrow path between two 
paddies. A group of children came toward us and several of 
them chattered excitedly and ran straight to Bao. He was in 
military uniform, but I could no longer see him as the fear-
some enemy soldier he had once been. It was strange to think 
of his past now as he walked up the muddy path holding the 
hands of small children who spoke to him as if he were a 
revered uncle. 
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When we came to the hedge surrounding the cottage a 
group of people came out of the house and stood under the 
small thatched eave. A frail old lady came forward to greet 
us. She was no more than 150 centimetres tall and must have 
been well in her advanced seventies but she still carried herself 
well. She was wearing black peasant clothes of a blouse and 
pair of loose-fitting pants. Her feet were bare, brown, wrinkl-
ed and hard. Around her head, a piece of towelling held her 
thin grey hair in place. She moved directly to me and stood 
before me as if barring the way. She looked up at me and one 
old betelnut-stained tooth was the only one that was visible in 
her mouth. She clucked loudly, which alarmed me. Immed-
iately I thought that something was wrong. I looked at Thang 
in terror and saw that he was beginning to laugh. All the other 
Vietnamese also started laughing. Thang laughingly told me 
she had said, "Look at you. Look at you. When you were 
here before you were young and fit and very strong, and now 
you are fat and an old man." Of course 1 had never been 
there before but she was thinking of all the young Australian 
soldiers she had seen. We were introduced and her name was 
Huynh Thi Xiu. 
1 put out my hand to her and she took it in her small brown 
one and gave it a squeeze. She continued to hold my hand as 
she led me into the cottage. It was basically only one room 
with a partial division between the cooking area and the living 
side. The floor was concrete — the local committee had done 
this for her, I was told. In the living area was a beautiful table 
and six chairs, and a lovely sideboard. Other than that there 
were basic peasant utensils. As she ushered me to the table 
another woman began pouring tea. 
Mrs Xiu sat on one side of me and Thang on the other. On 
the table was an Australian hootchy, the small half-tent that 
infantrymen carry. 1 couldn't help myself — 1 touched the 
hootchy and felt one edge of it. Mrs Xiu spoke to me quickly 
and the sound of her voice startled me. 1 looked at Thang in 
confusion and his face was chalky as if he wanted to be sick. 
He translated softly that this was the thing "your people" 
had sent my youngest son home in. 
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I sat staring at the hootchy as if it were alive and the 
patches on it became bloodstains in my mind. "Display VC 
bodies (in some inoffensive manner)." I wonder if she 
thought it was inoffensive as she collected the mangled body 
of her son from the military post at Phuoc Loi. I looked down 
at Mrs Xiu as she sat staring at the hootchy and couldn't 
imagine what was going through her mind. I wanted to get 
outside to get more air but couldn't move. In the finish 1 
reached out and took her hand and we sat staring at the hoot-
chy together. 
Bao broke the mood by pushing my tea toward me. He 
later suggested that we get up and look at the mementoes of 
her sons. Over the sideboard hung the certificates for Heroes 
of the Revolution — they were all she had left of her four 
sons. Three of the certificates had photos pinned to them. On 
one was the picture of a young boyish-looking Vietnamese 
standing proud in military finery. He wore long trousers, an 
army shirt, and VC rubber-tyre sandals. On his head was a 
cloth hat and he carried a light pack with the straps pulling 
down on his shoulders. Proudly held in his hand was an AK47 
automatic rifle with the curved magazine pointing out. Beside 
him was a young girl dressed in black pants and white shirt. 
Her hair was pulled back and a long braid of it hung over her 
shoulder almost to the waist. 
The photo was of Mrs Xiu's eldest son who had been killed 
in 1966. He and his wife had both joined the Liberation 
Movement in 1965. In 1966 a baby girl was born to the couple 
and several months later her son was killed. At that time his 
wife had been living with Mrs Xiu in Phuoc Loi. Not long 
after they heard of his death, the Saigon Army came and took 
the daughter-in-law away. Mrs Xiu heard she had been taken 
to the infamous Con Son island prison. She has never been 
heard of since, gone without trace, no word, no grave, 
nothing. 
Saigon Army officers had then come to Mrs Xiu and taken 
her granddaughter from her. The little girl was taken to Baria 
and lived in an orphanage there for three years. Attempts to 
retrieve her had met with hostile refusals, but in the end the 
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authorities relented and let Mrs Xiu take the girl back to 
Phuoc Loi. 
As she finished talking, she turned and gestured toward the 
other side of the cottage where four young people were stan-
ding listening to the conversation. She pointed toward the 
young people and said, "That is my granddaughter there. She 
is now 2 1 . " A girl I thought was about 17 stood side-on to 
me, leaning against one of the upright poles that supported 
the roof. She was dressed in a light blue blouse and the black 
loose-fitting peasant trousers. She was looking over her 
shoulder at me with no trace of a smile on her face. I tried to 
smile at her and nod, but received no response. Embarrassed, 
I turned away, not knowing whether she had snubbed me or 
whether she was just shy. She certainly did not look shy with 
her unblinking gaze that burned into me like a laser. 
I was glad when the old lady spoke again because it broke 
the tension building up inside me. I looked at the other 
documents with the photos of the young Vietnamese looking 
back at me. After losing three sons and a daughter-in-law, she 
did not want her other son to go away. But for her, and him, 
there was no option. That old refrain again, "We had no 
choice. The choices were imposed on us". He had gone with 
her blessing and her prayers for his safety, and he had been 
sent back in a bloody Australian hootchy, so she could "see 
what the shooting was all about". What were we doing here! 
How much humanity did we manage to lose while we tried to 
impose our will on these simple people who didn't need us to 
tell them how to live their lives. 
Mrs Xiu must have been reading my mind, or starting to 
feel the weight of her sorrow again because she said to me 
curtly, "Why did you come hereT What right did you have to 
destroy my sons? I had never heard of your country before 
your soldiers came here." 
Bao moved over quickly and extricated me from the situat-
ion. He said to me quietly, "Do not worry, Terry. She now 
has nothing but her memories and she is bitter at the loss of 
her sons. You must remember that she knows nothing of the 
world outside this district. Her world has always been this 
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place and her family." This explanation made me feel even 
worse about the old lady and I looked back at her sitting at 
the table staring vacantly through the opening that served as a 
window. 
Bao introduced me to the other two women in the house. 
One was Mrs Bay Cong who was mentioned in Maddock and 
Wright's book. War: Australia & Vietnam. In a chapter by a 
Vietnamese Army historian, Tran Quoc Trung, it was claimed 
that Mrs Cong was beaten and crippled "for taking to the 
fields a meal they [the Australians] considered too large for 
her needs alone". 
When I met Mrs Cong she was not crippled, although she 
had a slight limp. She said that she was stopped near Ap Lo 
Gom by two Australians and two Vietnamese in a Jeep on 
about 29 September 1971. When 1 asked if she was sure they 
were Australians and not Americans, she had to admit she 
was not sure. By September 1971 the Australians were about 
to leave Phuoc Tuy, so it is uncertain whether or not they 
were Australians. There were American Advisers in the pro-
vince at the time, but there were also MAT teams of 
Australians (these Military Advisory and Training teams were 
advisers who worked with South Vietnamese units). 
Her story of the beating differs from the published version 
in that it excludes Australians or Americans from committing 
the actual offence. She said she was detained by the four army 
men and roughly treated — she did not say beaten — and then 
taken to the Saigon Army headquarters in Baria. She was held 
there for four days, during which time she was badly beaten 
several times, but by the Vietnamese, it seems, although 
Australians or Americans were close at hand. 
The other lady I met was Mrs Le Ku Hoa. She was badly 
disfigured by a burn over her neck and parts of her face and 1 
was told that her body was badly burnt. She had been a 
soldier and had suffered the injuries when struck by napalm 
during an air-strike on the Long Hai base area in 1969. 
When it came time to leave 1 was both relieved and sadden-
ed. It had been an emotional meeting and I thanked the 
people for their time and hospitality. I wondered how many 
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Australian families would give the same hospitality to a VC 
soldier if he came to Australia. I kept thinking of my mother 
and my grandmother and the animosity they bore the 
Japanese over the death of my father in 1943. 
The cars moved slowly back to Dat Do where others joined 
us and we headed north to Long Tan. Just out of Dat Do the 
car stopped at the old Australian base known as the 
Horseshoe. This was an old volcano crater, a 30 metre feature 
in the otherwise flat surrounding landscape. This base, a 
defended position, was built in early 1967 to control the 
eastern approaches to the populated areas and to help in the 
protection of the minefield. 
We went into the rim of the crater, looking south, and 
could just see the sea from where we stopped. The Vietnamese 
have now established a quarry on the site to extract road-
building material. 
To the north lay the village of Long Tan. It has been rebuilt 
and looks quite prosperous again. At that time of the year 
(August, the wet season) the growth was luxurious and spilled 
over the roadway. We turned off the main road and went up a 
small track toward the rubber plantation that had been visible 
for some time. It was then midday and the clouds were star-
ting to build up for the afternoon storm. My heart started to 
gallop as we moved under the canopy and the sun almost 
disappeared. 
It was an uncanny feeling moving back inside the planta-
tion again after all those years. It seemed as if time had stood 
still in that dark, doomed place. 1 was expecting the rubber 
trees to have grown large after twenty years, but they were 
hardly any bigger — perhaps only 7 centimetres in diameter 
larger. This nevertheless makes them seem closer together 
than I had remembered, but that was the only difference. The 
plantation was still being worked and most of the area was 
clear of undergrowth. The trees had not been thinned, which 
explains their lack of growth. Young trees are planted close 
together and after several years every second tree is taken out 
and used elsewhere. This is repeated several times until the 
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trees are mature; they then have room to grow and are not 
competing for nutrients. 
The atmosphere of the place was foreboding and stagnant. 
1 have read accounts of old soldiers returning to the battle-
fields of Europe and commenting on the beauty and tranquill-
ity of what they saw. Such was not my experience here. The 
day was hot and steamy, but I was cold the whole time, occas-
ionally breaking out in a sweat. The ground was red and wet 
and damp and an air of decay pervaded the place. 
The child who was acting as a guide found the area where 
the cross had been. There was nothing there but a hole in the 
ground and the block of concrete that had been poured as a 
base to secure the cross. This must have been close to the area 
where Jimmy Richmond lay wounded all night, hoping that 
the Australian artillery would not hit him and finish the job 
the VC had started. 
Through the trees to the north I could see the base of the 
feature of Nui Dat 2. This was where it was thought the VC 
headquarters had been, and was the placement of the heavy 
machineguns that raked the area with tracer fire almost non-
stop for four hours. I wanted to walk around the area and 
especially get to the place — only several hundred metres 
away — where we had finally made the defensive position we 
thought would be our last stand. 
This was not to be, as Thang said that Bao had to be back 
at Bien Hoa by 2.30 p.m. and we would have to leave soon. I 
took photographs of the area and walked around with the 
other people looking at the site. I asked about the cross again 
and no-one seemed to know what had become of it. There 
was some story that a farmer whose father was a Christian 
had taken it to put on his father's grave. This seemed unlikely 
and the thought of a three-metre concrete cross somewhere in 
the middle of the rice paddies seemed ludicrous. 
I moved away from the group, down the gentle slope where 
the main attack had been mounted against the company. Col-
onel Khanh moved over to me and asked which direction the 
main attack had come from. I said that it had been mounted 
along this line, from this area down the slope to the north-
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west. He shook his head and firmly stated, "We attacked 
from the south-west". He pointed to the direction of the 
D445 action with the APCs, and said again, "The main at-
tack came from there". I was not in any mood for this type of 
pedantic argument and said firmly exactly where the main at-
tack came from. He looked at me and then abruptly moved 
away to the other group of Vietnamese, who talked quietly 
amongst themselves. That was a test of some sort, I was sure, 
and I was not certain whether I had passed or not. Bao had 
been listening to the exchange and said quietly, "You are 
right, Terry. I know that, so do not worry." 
Part of me wanted to walk around the plantation and part 
of me wanted to get out of the accursed place. I don't know 
whether 1 was sorry or not when Thang said that we would 
have to be getting back to Bien Hoa. 1 frantically asked 
Thang about the cost of the trip. I had not paid for a thing the 
whole time I had been in Phuoc Tuy and had been supplied 
with a room, food, beer and cigarettes. Thang went over to 
Khanh and returned with a smile on his face, saying that there 
was no cost to me. He looked at me in a knowing way and 
said quietly, "I think you have made some friends here, 
Terry." I was unsure about that but I certainly hoped so. My 
aim had been to meet the people and establish a rapport that 
had been lacking for twenty years. Whether we became 
friends or not was not quite as important. The main thing to 
my mind was to instigate some form of dialogue so that we 
could begin to understand their side of the conflict and they 
might begin to understand ours. I hoped that with my visit 
some small step might have been taken in that direction. 
We all shook hands before leaving, amidst so much con-
viviliality and good humour that Thang had to urge us to 
hurry before the rain caught us in the plantation. We left the 
other Vietnamese standing in the plantation and drove across 
onto a different track, leaving the plantation by the south-
west corner. From there the Task Force rubber stood looking 
as it had twenty years before just across the bush and the low 
ground. The Nui Dinhs stood stark and bare, a grim reminder 
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that even though some things may look the same, a lot had 
happened since I had been there last. 
As we reached the edge of the rubber, the rain that had 
been threatening for the last hour lashed down on us and the 
car slowed almost to a halt. The whole area was plunged into 
semi-darkness and I put my nose against the glass of the side 
window in an attempt to catch one last glimpse. 
The sweat was pouring from me in the humidity, which was 
worse for having to keep all the windows shut. I sensed my 
heart was fluttering out of control and I took Bao's hand and 
placed it on my chest to let him feel the racing. He held it 
there for a moment and then looked at me with that sad little 
smile of his and slowly shook his head. I had the feeling that 
some of his ghosts had come back that day, as well as some of 
mine. 
As the car moved into the outskirts of Baria, the rain had 
stopped but I was still staring out the window trying to take in 
as much as 1 could. There was a strange silence in the car as if 
we were all mentally exhausted. When we arrived back in Bien 
Hoa there was another meeting with the Dong Nai officials. 
Thang and 1 were taken to a hotel in Bien Hoa and given a 
room and we were to meet the officials again in two hours. I 
think this may have been to allow them to talk to Colonel Bao 
and discuss the trip. When we went to the meeting there was a 
good feeling in the room. Things must have gone well in Long 
Dat because it was suggested that if I wanted to return to do 
further research, then the officials at Dong Nai would do all 
they could to help. They presented me with a letter written in 
English, explaining that 1 could come to Vietnam in 1988 for 
up to three months if required and that they were prepared to 
help in any way possible. 
I slept most of the way back to Ho Chi Minh City, and 
made that beautiful large bath my first priority on reaching 
the hotel. Over the next few days I met other people and did 
more sightseeing. In Ho Chi Minh City now there are many 
street cafes where people sit at little tables, drink beer, eat, 
and watch the world go by. 
On Sunday nights in the city it seems that everyone who 
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owns a motorbike comes into Dong Khoi street. Thang and I 
sat in an outdoor restaurant and watched the traffic get 
heavier and heavier. When we went out into the street, the 
footpaths were jammed with people watching the motorbikes 
go around and around the block. It was a carnival at-
mosphere. Down one of the sidestreets two policemen sat on a 
1000 cc Honda motorcycle and chatted with the crowd while 
the motorcycles in Dong Khoi street became thicker and 
thicker. 
1 thought about leaving on the following day, but didn't 
want to go. I had fallen in love with this country and its 
people, so full of contradictions. What a place it is. Austere 
one moment and exciting the next. As in the days of the 
Americans, there are people in Ho Chi Minh City living in the 
streets and others who seem quite wealthy. Exotic restaurants 
stand beside dirty little street cafes. In Le Loi street the foot-
paths are full of street-traders seUing all sorts of things. One 
shop made fairy floss — one of the last things I expected to 
see. 
When I arrived at the airport the following day, the chaos 
was even worse than the last time. There were two flights 
going at about the same time and this created enormous prob-
lems. A group of factory workers were going to the Soviet 
Union and of course all their families were there to see them 
off. As the plane took off I looked longingly back at the city 
as it became smaller. This time I knew that I could and would 
return. 
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Face to Face with a VC Colonel 
My next visit to Vietnam came unexpectedly only three 
months after the last. Evan Ham, the film producer who had 
been interested in the Long Tan battle, was now planning to 
make a documentary on Hanoi and then cover the December 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. He asked 
if I was interested in going to Hanoi with one of his crew to 
make arrangements for the shoot. I jumped at the chance of 
an all-expenses-paid trip and the possibility of seeing 
Kampuchea. 
A member of his crew, Kieran Knox, sound recordist and 
still photographer, set off with me in late November 1987. In 
Hanoi we found we could not do anything until Evan arrived, 
so we waited for news from him. But word came that he could 
not arrange flights for the crew and they would have to 
postpone the trip. This left us on hold as well. I suggested to 
Dy, who was again assisting us, that Kieran and I could go 
south, where I could start on some of my own work, rather 
than remain in Hanoi doing nothing. Overcoming organisat-
ional difficuhies, Dy managed to arrange this for us, with no 
guarantee that anything productive would come of it. We 
were to meet Thang, the interpreter from the last trip, who 
was already in Ho Chi Minh City. So far so good. He met us 
at the airport and we went into the city by taxi — this was a 
surprise as there was no private taxi service allowed the year 
before. 
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Next day, Thang took me to visit the main military bar-
racks, where I met several senior officers. It seemed he had 
been busy arranging something for me but he refused to say 
what it was until it was all set. This intrigued me, but 
whenever I tried to find out what was going on, he kept telling 
me to relax and enjoy myself for a few days while he tried to 
arrange something that could prove very interesting. 
That night he came to my room around 9 p.m. and said 
quietly that in the morning we were to go to Bien Hoa. When 
I asked why, he gave me a smug little smile and said I would 
find out in the morning. Could he give me a hint? "Terry, do 
not be impatient." He then instructed me to take enough 
clothing for a few days and to leave the rest of our gear and 
equipment in the hotel store room and book out. This really 
did have me intrigued and 1 spent most of the night awake 
wondering what was going on. 
At Bien Hoa we went straight to the hotel 1 had stayed in on 
the last trip. Thang still very secretive, arranged rooms for us 
and then went off to make several telephone calls. He came 
back grinning from ear to ear. I was to meet an ex-Viet Cong 
colonel who had been a staff officer of 5 VC Division in 
1966. When he told me, I stared at him in disbehef. 
An hour later a car arrived and a strong, thick-set Viet-
namese man stepped out from the back seat. He was dressed 
in khaki dress uniform with two medals on his chest and took 
off his officer's cap as he came through the door. He stood 
very aloof as the introductions were made and then we went 
upstairs to the large sitting-room on the first floor. I asked if 
he was still in the army and he said no, adding that he had 
worn his uniform to show me he had been a soldier. His 
authoritative air gave me no doubt about that. He was now 
director for Transport in Dong Nai province and hved in Ho 
Chi Minh City with his wife and four children. 
When we sat down at the table he pulled out an American 
picto map from his briefcase and said that it had been cap-
tured from an Australian unit in the Hat Dich area by a unit 
of the 274 Regiment. We each behaved with reserve, feeling a 
little uneasy. 
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The colonel's name was Nguyen Thanh Hong, but he was 
introduced by his nickname Hai, which means two. He was 
the first son in the family and in Vietnam the first son is con-
sidered number two after the father. Hai — it is simpler to 
call him this — had been a staff officer of 5 VC Division from 
1966 to 1968, a major in charge of military operations. 
Our conversation was tape-recorded and I also made notes. 
As soon as the meeting was finished I wrote up the interview 
using both sources. This then is his story as he told it to me. 
For the sake of simplicity, I have altered the sequence in 
which he told me some of the information and I have also 
interspersed his account with findings of my own. I have 
checked whatever I could from other sources and have been 
able to verify some points but not others. Twenty years is a 
long time and it is apparent that some timings are incorrect. 
Hai was born in 1932 near the village of Hoi My in the old 
Phuoc Tuy province. He joined the revolutionary forces in 
1947 at the age of 15 and fought with the Viet Minh during 
the whole of the French war. During that time his mother was 
arrested twice and detained for quite lengthy periods and his 
uncle was killed fighting in Phuoc Tuy. During the 1954-60 
period he remained in the army and would neither confirm 
nor deny that he was sent to the north. In 1960 he was with 
the 275 Regiment, which had several different names in its 
life. 
Between 1960 and 1965 there were no regular divisions in 
the south. The VC forces were rather fragmented with the 
level of regiment being the highest. Hai was at a loss to know 
why the American Marine History recorded that it was the 
VC 9 Division who attacked the town of Binh Gia and fought 
off the South Vietnamese Rangers and Marines in December 
1964. To the best of his knowledge the units who attacked at 
Binh Gia were all independent units who came together for 
that attack. The 275 had been one of those units and Hai had 
been at the Binh Gia battle. When I asked him if he knew 
what happened to the three Americans who were classified as 
Missing in Action as a result of that battle, he said that their 
forces captured two and took them to Tay Ninh. He only 
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knew of two prisoners, not three. I have since found a paint-
ing of the two prisoners done by a soldier who became a 
director of Cultural Affairs. The soldier had been in charge of 
a supply unit at the Binh Gia battle and painted the very 
detailed work from memory. 
In 1968 Hai had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and 
had become deputy commander. Chief of Staff of 5 Division. 
In 1970 5 Division was upgraded and moved west; it was 
stationed in Cambodia around the area of Kompong Som and 
Kampot. The unit moved regularly back into Vietnam but left 
two regiments permanently in Cambodia. In 1971 Hai had 
been promoted to deputy commander-in-chief of Military 
Operations in Military Region 7. In 1975 he was the Com-
mander in Chief of Staff of Military Operations during the 
final offensive on Saigon. His units were involved in the 
fiercest fighting of the final campaign with the attack on 
Xuan Loc. 
In 1977 he became the commander of 5 Division and in 
1978 he and the division were sent to Kampuchea when the 
border fighting started. When the Vietnamese invasion was 
launched on 25 December 1978, 5 Division were inside Kam-
puchea near Kratie, in support of the pro-Vietnamese Heng 
Samrin forces. His orders had been to move quickly to Poipet 
on the Thai border and set up a firm base. He thought this 
was about 400 kilometres from Kratie and he moved his entire 
division of about 7600 men, with APCs, artillery, anti-
aircraft weapons and trucks in three days. The advance was 
so fast that they outstripped the following Vietnamese forces 
and it was 15 days before the other Vietnamese linked up with 
the division. During that time, 5 Division encountered strong 
resistance and his fear was that the Khmer Rouge forces 
would be able to consolidate and counter-attack while he was 
still mobile and only loosely co-ordinated. This did not hap-
pen, however, and Hai was able to establish the firm base at 
Poipet. An interesting sideline to the conversation was when 
he said that one of his forward units had ambushed a car in 
the dash to Poipet, but the occupants had escaped. On sear-
ching the car, soldiers found the Chinese passports of Pol 
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Pot. Hai is sure that he almost had the Khmer Rouge leader. 
When the Chinese invaded Vietnam in February 1979, his 
division was rushed north to the border, but the fighting was 
almost over by the time they arrived. They were then 
immediately sent back to Kampuchea and were thrown into 
the fighting of a heavy Khmer Rouge counter-attack around 
Phnom Penh. I had never heard of a Pol Pot counter-attack 
in March, although Kampuchean specialist Martin Stuart-
Fox, from the University of Queensland, agrees that it is more 
than possible there was such an attack then, although it is 
unlikely that their supplies could have come from outside 
Kampuchea. 
Around the end of April 1979 the division had moved again 
to Poipet; they were still in Kampuchea in 1987. In 1979 Hai 
was promoted to colonel and in December 1980, senior col-
onel. He remained in Kampuchea until 1982 when he was 
posted back to Vietnam as commander in chief of staff of 
Dong Nai province. He retired in 1984. Life now, he said, was 
quiet and he missed the army very much. 
Looking back on the 1965 period, he said that when the 
Americans entered the war with combat troops in March 1965 
(the landing of the Marines at Da Nang), there had been a 
broad evaluation of strategy on the Viet Cong's part. They 
decided that the units needed to be brought under tighter con-
trol and so divisions were formed, 5 Division, officially, on 23 
November 1965. An American intelligence report on 5 VC 
Division states that the unit was activated in August 1965. 
According to American sources, the American build-up 
caused some dispute at that time between the Viet Cong and 
Hanoi over the implementation of policy. Hanoi thought h 
better for the forces in the south to make a strategic shift and 
go back to raiding and harassment tactics, thus enabUng them 
to hold much of the ground won and to shield the regular 
units, such as 275 Regiment and 5 Division Headquarters, 
from heavy casualties. General Thanh, the North Vietnamese 
commander in the south in 1966, argued against this move 
and said that the forces were now reorganised and would be 
able to sustain the offensive. He wanted to continue with the 
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policy of large-scale clashes, and was adamant that to pause 
then would mean a psychological defeat that could be 
disastrous in view of the heavy American build-up of combat 
troops. 
This argument prevailed and the VC units in the south con-
tinued with their forward momentum. In 1965 Hai went to 5 
VC Division headquarters and during this time there were 
many clashes with the American forces and also with the 
Austrahans who were at that time attached to the 173rd Air-
borne Brigade. 
When the Australians came into Phuoc Tuy in 1966 and 
established the base at Nui Dat, 5 Division thought that their 
plan was to form a protection line on Highway Two that ran 
almost due north from Baria to Xuan Loc. At Xuan Loc was 
the South Vietnamese 18th Infantry Division and, later, the 
American 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment. With forces 
based at Nui Dat and Xuan Loc, it seemed that the plan was 
to cut the VC forces from moving east to west unhindered. 
There was much apprehension about this at first as the 
bases of the 275 Regiment were in the Nui May Tao area to 
the east. The 5 VC Division thought that the Australian unit 
was to be an independent, highly mobile strike force, 
operating with its own support of artillery, armoured person-
nel carriers and helicopters. They could also see that the 
Australians had situated themselves at Nui Dat with the inten-
tion of destroying the forces of the D445 in Phuoc Tuy. From 
Nui Dat it would be possible to strike out at the local force 
units in an attempt to cut them off from the people of the 
villages. There was a worry about what Hai described as the 
Australian "commando tactics", but they were not concern-
ed about big unit operations as they felt capable of handling 
these. 
At that time decisions about plans of attack were taken at 
divisional level, unless something specific was required from 
the higher commands. Five Division had moved forces into 
the Phuoc Tuy area in order to probe the American and 
Australian units and had been successful in some of these 
encounters. On Operation Abilene near the Courtenay rubber 
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plantation in Phuoc Tuy, elements of 5 Division and the local 
D445 Battalion had attacked an American unit and inflicted 
heavy casualties. 
I have confirmed this episode from American documents. 
In the action C Company of the 2/16th Battalion of the 
American 1st Infantry Division were badly hit on the night of 
12 April 1966. There were 34 Americans killed and 71 wound-
ed from C Company and other companies racing to relieve 
them. The VC body count from this action was 42. 
An indication of the aggressiveness of the VC 5 Division is 
seen in the after action report from Operation Toledo in 
northern Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh provinces in 
August 1966. It is recorded that "Ninety-five contacts were 
made with VC forces. Fifty-eight of these were VC initiated." 
This is despite the fact that the VC forces in the area were not 
massed. The largest force encountered was platoon size. 
The 275 Regiment of 5 Division was also in Phuoc Tuy dur-
ing the initial Australian move into the province. This was the 
unit that inflicted heavy casualties on the 173rd Airborne 
Brigade in Long Phuoc during Operation Hardihood. 
American casualties during that operation were 23 killed and 
104 wounded for a VC body count of 48. Hai was not sure 
whether the D445 or the 275 Regiment were responsible for 
the attack on B Company of the Australian 6 RAR in July 
1966, but thought that it was one of their units with some 
D445. 
By August it had been decided that the time was right for 
an attack on the Australian force, not only for mihtary 
reasons but also for political reasons. The decision, he said, 
was made at divisional level, as they were able to decide their 
own objectives. For 5 Division there were compelling political 
reasons for an attack on the Australians. One was the impact 
a major confrontation, with heavy casualties, might have on 
the resolve of the Australian government to continue the com-
mitment of troops. The second line of political thought was 
from their own side: the Australians had destroyed the town 
of Long Phuoc and shifted the people from Long Tan, as well 
as many more people from the country around the base, and 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Face to Face with a VC Colonel 99 
there was a need to show support for these people. It was 
necessary to demonstrate to the people that the Revolutionary 
Forces cared about their plight and were ready to avenge 
them. 
Hai said it was left to him to plan the attack. He decided 
upon what he described as "the luring of the tiger from the 
mountain". This tactic would not only test the Australians in 
battle, he reasoned, but also give him a clue to the 
"characteristics of the Australian commanders' thinking". 
By this, he said, he meant the reaction that the Task Force 
would take to provocation by the VC. 
The plan was for the 275 Regiment to move close to the 
Task Force and to mortar the base. This occurred on the night 
of 16 August 1966 and Hai said that elements of the 275 as 
well as some members of the D445 were responsible. Over a 
hundred rounds of mortar fire were fired into the Task Force 
area and 21 Australian soldiers were wounded, several of 
them losing hmbs. The aim of this action was to draw out a 
force from the base into the area of Long Tan, which had 
been selected as the killing area. The VC had their heavy 
machineguns set up in the bush area to the north of the plan-
tation. The plan was to leave pieces of equipment so the 
Australians would pick up some sort of trail. 
By the day of 18 August the forces were now in position. 
Hai was in a small deserted hamlet just on the eastern side of 
the Long Tan plantation called Ap Phuoc Hung. He had with 
him there the third battahon of the 275 as a reserve element, 
while the other two battalions were forming a screen to the 
east and the north of the plantation. Elements of the local 
D445 Battalion were on the south near the deserted village of 
Long Tan. One unit of the D445 had been placed on the 
south-western edge of the plantation with several rocket 
launchers; the intention was to slow down any reinforcements 
and cut off any Australian retreat. When I asked him why 
they had been placed there he looked me straight in the eye as 
if it was a stupid question and said that was the only place ar-
mour could cross. He said, "That period was the wet season. 
The river was very full. Because of the steep banks of the river 
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the only place tracks could cross was the old disused ford" 
He was quite right. 
On the small feature of Nui Dat 2, just to the north of the 
plantation edge, were the headquarters of the attacking force 
of the 275 Regiment under the command of Senior Captain 
Ut Thoi and the executive officer Major Du. They had 
several heavy machineguns there. If as hoped they were able 
to lure the Australian force out of the plantation into the bush 
area under Nui Dat 2, the Australian force would be restricted 
in movement and find it difficult to maintain contact. And 
the machineguns could pour fire into the area from the high 
ground. If, however, the Australians moved east instead of 
north, the plantation itself was to be the killing ground. 
When I asked why there had been no plan to attempt to 
neutralise the guns at the Task Force, Hai said there was con-
sidered to be no need. This seemed a funny thing to say as it 
was the guns that actually turned the course of the battle. But 
Hai said that at that time their policy was not to let a confront-
ation develop any longer than two hours. He considered 
there would be such confusion in the Task Force in the early 
stages of the battle that they would have the job over and be 
away from the area by the time the guns could start doing any 
major damage. 
His recollection is supported by the American Quarterly 
Report for Period Ending 30th April 1966, from 11 Field 
Force Vietnam, which states: 
The VC avoid large units such as Brigades and Regiments, but 
seek to attack isolated battalions and companies using great 
numerical superiority. In these attacks, they use a hugging tactic 
as a means of protecting themselves against artillery fire and 
airstrikes. 
The plan was to hit the Australians very close to their base 
where they would least be expecting it, and move out of the 
area quickly. Hai does not know whether the small patrol (34 
men) originally sent out from B Company was seen, but said 
that quite possibly it was and was allowed to go by. They 
knew that the Australians sent out small parties in advance of 
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their larger units (they may have been referring to SAS 
patrols). On this occasion, however, they were wondering 
whether any Australians would arrive at all as it was over 36 
hours since the mortar attack had been launched. 
When D Company 6RAR moved into the rubber plantation 
the company moved through to the east in single file. They 
then found the track split in two and the company moved into 
a formation of two platoons up and one platoon and Com-
pany Headquarters back around 100 to 150 metres. In this 
formation there was Ten Platoon on the left. Eleven Platoon 
on the right and Twelve Platoon and Company Headquarters 
behind. The two forward platoons followed each track and 
the other platoon and company headquarters spread out to 
link with them, 100 metres back. The right-hand platoon of 
the advance had a contact with six VC who fled to the east. 
The platoon, on the right, continued to advance to the east in 
steady pursuit of the fleeing VC. 
Hai is not sure what happened next, but the action began 
against Eleven Platoon. It must be assumed that the com-
mander of 275, Captain Ut Thoi, initiated the action at that 
place because Eleven Platoon was heading directly toward the 
headquarters of Hai, at Ap Phuoc Hung. 
Once the action had been initiated there was no turning 
back. The enemy attack against the Australians in Eleven 
Platoon built up very quickly and a force of at least several 
companies were attacking within about 20 minutes. The pla-
toon was completely cut-off and could not move backward 
because of the heavy attacks coming in on them. This is when 
confusion must have set in on both sides. The rain began 
pouring down, which decreased visibility to perhaps 100 
metres. 
Ironically, it was Eleven Platoon being cut off that saved 
the day for the Australians, because it caused a lot of move-
ment from the rest of the Australian force. First Ten Platoon, 
on the left, near the edge of the plantation, was swung to the 
right in a hook to relieve Eleven Platoon. As they moved, 
they ran into a large group of VC heading round to encircle 
Eleven Platoon. They managed to break up this attack but 
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then came under withering fire from VC in the plantation and 
the guns to the north on Nui Dat 2. This stopped them in their 
tracks and eventually Ten Platoon withdrew to the Company 
Headquarters position. As they were coming back, the 
Australian company commander sent Twelve Platoon off in 
an attempt to reach Eleven Platoon by a different route. They 
were also stopped, but happened to be pinned down in a pos-
ition where another large unit of VC were moving to attack 
the Company Headquarters position. They managed to inflict 
substantial casualties on this VC group. 
Meanwhile, the trapped Eleven Platoon had left their pos-
ition in an every-man-for-himself attempt to reach safety and 
the survivors had been able to get back to Twelve Platoon. 
They then managed to get back to the Company Head-
quarters position, just after a helicopter had flown in a much-
needed ammunition resupply. 
By the time the company had come together in the one pos-
ition Hai's two-hour time limit was well past and the artillery 
barrages were taking a fearsome toll. From then on it was a 
case of Hai saying that they would have to start the 
withdrawal and Ut Thoi and Ba Du saying that, with the 
Australians now in the one spot, all that was needed was a bit 
more time. 
Viet Cong forces then pushed into assault lines and began 
to bear down on the Australian position, being stopped close 
to the perimeter each time by small-arms fire and the fear-
some artillery barrage. Hai sent the D445 Battalion elements 
from Long Tan village to attempt to close the gate on the 
Australian position by moving around to the west between the 
trapped company and the Task Force base. 
By then it was almost dark and he knew that there would 
have to be some sort of relief force on the way. He knew that 
as soon as a relief force was in sight they would have to break 
off the assauh and begin the withdrawal. The relief force 
crossed the river at the ford and found the small group of 
D445 waiting for them with the rocket launchers. Luckily 
they managed to break through, but then ran into the other 
unit of the D445 moving around the back of D Company's 
position. 
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Ho Chi Minh's glass-encased body before being moved to the Mausoleum in Hanoi. Left: 
General Dung; Right: General Giap. (Photo courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
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Building the Pontoon Bridge over the Red River in 1968 (Photos courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
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Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, Hanoi 
Dedication square in Kham Tiem street. The statue is of a woman holding a dead baby in 
her arms. 
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Kham Tiem street after the Christmas bombing of 1972 (Photos courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
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Bomb victim, Hanoi (Photo courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
Rescue workers rush to aid bomb victims. Ha Nam Ninh Province May 1972 (Photo 
courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
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Rescue worker helps bomb victim, Hanoi, 1972 (Photo courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
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Bach Mai hospital, Hanoi, 1980 (Photo courtesy Archives, Hanoi) 
Hanoi's Bach Mai hospital after the December 1972 bombing (Photo courtesy Archives, 
Hanoi) 
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MIG Fighter at the Hanoi War Museum — note kill stars on nose. The wreckage at the base 
is an American plane. 
The Nui Dinh mountains, Phuoc Tuy province, Vietnam, 1987. These mountains were only 
five kilometres from the Australian base at Nui Dat in 1966 and were covered with forest. 
Today they are barren — a result of chemical spraying during the war. 
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Colonel Bao, 1987. From 1966 to 1969 Bao was an officer of the VC D445 baualion. 
A photo of a painting of two American prisoners being taken away after the battle at Binh 
Gia, 1964 
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Author Terry Burstall on a wrecked American tank near Cu-Chi 
A group of entertainers perform for VC troops in the Song Rai forest, Phuoc Tuy province, 
1967 (Courtesy Bien Hoa War Museum) 
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Terry Burstall and Le Tranh in the Long Tan rubber plantation. Tranh, a member of the 
D445 battalion, fought and was wounded in the Battle of Long Tan. Tranh made sure the 
replica cross was placed in the exact spot where the original Australian cross was placed in 
1969. 
The Australian cross, now housed in the War Museum, Bien Hoa City 
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The plaque from the Long 
Tan cross when first found. 
Holding the plaque is Tran 
Tan Huy, Chairman of Long 
Dat district. (Photo courtesy 
Normella Pictures, Kieran 
Knox) 
The plaque when cleaned 
(Photo courtesy Normella 
Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
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Colonel Nguyen Thanh Hong (Hai), commander of VC forces at Long Tan battle, checks 
references on a map with Terry Burstall (Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
Hai at his home in Ho Chi Minh City 
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Terry Burstall in front of Nui Dat hill, 1987. In 1966 the hill was covered with trees. (Photo 
courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
In the Task Force. The blocks aie situated near the southern end of the Nui Dat base. 
(Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
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Dang Van Ba with his wife and children outside their home near Hoi My. Ba was the 
commander of the Hoi My guerillas and was wounded by the Australians in 1968. (Photo 
courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
Mrs Trinh from Phuoc Loi village. Her son's body was dumped in the market square in 
Phuoc Loi in 1969. tPhoto courtesv Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
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Mrs Nau momentarily breaks down during the interview with Terry Burstall in 1989 
Captured, 1966 (Photo courtesy Gabriel Carpay) 
(Inset) Mrs Nau. This woman was water tortured by Australian 
Military Police in 1966. She is looking at photographs of herself, 
taken in 1966, when she was first captured. 
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Interrogation, 1966 (Photo courtesy Gabriel Carpay) 
Signing a statement, 1966 (Photo courtesy Gabriel Carpay) 
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Blindfolded and ready for the South Vietnamese authorities, 1966 (Photo courtesy Gabriel 
Carpay) 
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Terry Burstall and Le Tranh 
at the house of Mrs Ngo Thi 
Loc, Long Tan village, 1989 
Le Tranh (centre) and Nam, 
listening and reflecting dur-
ing their first meeting with 
Terry Burstall in 1987 (Photo 
courtesy Normella Pictures, 
Kieran Knox) 
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Terry Burstall interviews Long Tan residents, 1987 (Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, 
Kieran Knox) 
Terry Burstall with Ba Lien a former political officer of the D445, at his home in Bien Hoa 
City, 1989 
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Ba Du and Terry Burstall after 
the meeting 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Mrs Nam, a "resettled" 
refugee from Long Phuoc in 
1966 (Pho to courtesy 
Normella Pictures, Kieran 
Knox) 
Mrs Su, who was also forced 
from Long Phuoc. Her 
daughter was killed by an 
Australian patrol in 1967. 
(Photo courtesy Normella 
Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
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Houses in Long Phuoc, 1989. These are the types of substantial dwellings destroyed by 
Australian troops in 1966. 
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Mrs Nau's house in Hoa Long village, 1989 
A street in Long Phuoc, 1989 
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Tran Tan Huy, Chairman of Long Dat district. Beside him is his mother, Mrs Ngo Thi Loc, 
and other relatives. (Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
Inside Mrs Ngo Thi Loc's house. The house is on the same spot in Long Tan village as the 
old house she was forced to leave in 1966. Note the polished logs supporting the roof and 
the fine furniture. 
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A stone stencilled with names in the old Australian Task Force base. Blue paint once 
covered the entire rock but is now wearing off, revealing the names underneath. 
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Village children recoil at the sight of VC bodies being dragged behind Australian APCs 
near Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy province, 1969 (Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial) 
Brigadier Jackson, Task Force commander Brigadier Graham, Task Force Commander 
from April 1966 to January 1967 (Photo from January 1967 to October 1967 (Photo 
courtesy Australian War Memorial) courtesy Australian War Memorial) 
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Australian soldiers destroy the town of Long Phuoc, June 1966. This and another similiar 
photo are the only remaining photos in the Australian War Memorial's Collection relating 
to the destruction of Long Phuoc. (Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial) Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
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Reference to killing the wounded VC after Long Tan battle 
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Terry Burstall and Barry Peterson, author of Tiger Men, drink beer in a street cafe in 
Hanoi, 1987 (Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
Terry Burstall and Barry Peterson at the War Museum, Hanoi, 1987 (Photo courtesy 
Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
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Terry Burstall points out areas of the Task Force to Thang the interpreter (centre), and 
Thao, a VC soldier from Xuyen Moc, 1966 (right) (Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, 
Kieran Knox) 
Nam and Terry Burstall in the hole with the block of concrete that held the Long Tan 
Cross, in the Long Tan rubber plantation (Photo courtesy Normella Pictures, Kieran Knox) 
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Twelve Platoon moves forward to assist the besieged Eleven Platoon from the 
rear, while Ten Platoon withdraws to Company Headquarters position 
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By then the order was given for withdrawal and the units all 
started to pull back. Hai was very worried about being cut-off 
and moved all his men into their predetermined withdrawal 
routes. His headquarters and the other battalion of the 275 
Regiment moved north to the Long Khanh/Phuoc Tuy 
border to Ap Suoi Cat where he said they prepared another 
ambush in the hope that the Australians would follow them 
out of artillery range. But this did not happen. 
Several companies were left at the battle site to retrieve 
weapons and the wounded during the night, but much of the 
cleaning up and collection of weapons had been taking place 
while the battle was being fought. The majority of 275 moved 
out that night, as did the D445 people. The badly wounded 
from the 275 Regiment and the D445 went to the north to the 
Nui May Tao mountains. Those not so badly wounded had 
their wounds treated at the many aid posts stationed around 
the battle area. 
Hai concluded this part of the discussion by saying: 
The plan at Long Tan was flexible and when we could not destroy 
your troops in the required time frame and beyond, we decided to 
withdraw. The artillery was hitting us hard and we knew rein-
forcements would be arriving and we did not have the strength to 
stop them. We were disappointed that we could not have overrun 
your troops in the rubber plantation, but the weather was a factor 
that created many problems with our communications. We were 
hoping you would follow us to Ap Suoi Cat where you would 
have been out of artillery range, but it seems you were not 
prepared to fight unless you had the advantage. 
The Australian reinforcements Hai had been nervously 
awaiting had only been seven armoured personnel carriers 
and one infantry company of around 110 men. He had the 
forces to stop them if only he had known it. Fortunately for 
us and unfortunately for him, he assumed that the relief force 
would be much larger and so ordered the withdrawal before it 
could be ascertained what the force consisted of. 
The other ironic part of the aftermath was the statement 
that Task Force commander Brigadier Jackson made to me in 
an interview on 19 February 1988: 
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I can still hear Colin Townsend (CO 6 RAR) on that radio to me, 
"May I proceed?" I said, "Yes, one thousand metres only," 
because I was very worried, not about what we had been fighting, 
but the others. They could have been sitting at the back of us just 
a few thousand metres away, just waiting for us, and they knew 
where our guns were. All they had to do was pick a fight out of 
gun range and if we were stupid enough to go into it [out of 
artillery range] we were in real trouble — real trouble. 
A fact little known in Australia about this action was that 
at the time of the battle at Long Tan the Americans were con-
ducting a large operation called Toledo in northern Phuoc 
Tuy, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. The records from 
11 Field Force Vietnam report that the concept of the opera-
tion changed following the battle at Long Tan: the American 
units swung south in order to attempt to make contact with 
the VC 275 Regiment on its move north; but they were unsuc-
cessful. American documents do not support the Australian 
claim that 2500 VC troops were involved in the battle. One 
states that the Australian force "encountered what was 
estimated to be one of two reinforced VC battalions. These 
forces were determined to be elements of the 275 regiment 
and 860 local force battahon [D445]." 
Another document that supports Hai's claim that his force 
moved to Ap Suoi Cat is an after-action report of the 173rd 
Airborne Brigade from Operation Toledo. It is recorded there 
that: "At 1950 hours [on 25 August 1966], an ambush patrol 
observed 75-100 VC at YS 563848. They were wearing black 
pyjamas, soft caps and carrying large rucksacks and at least 
one (1) 81 mm mortar. They were moving north and remained 
in observation for 45 minutes. No action was taken because 
of radio difficulties." Grid reference 563848 is approximately 
18 kilometres in a direct line from Long Tan to Ap Suoi Cat, 
which is only another 22 kilometres further north. This is not 
to say that Hai's story is correct. There were times when he 
seemed hesitant about answering questions and there is 
always the political angle to be thought of, even after all this 
time, as I have also found out in Australia. It seems that both 
participants of the Long Tan battle know things that they 
would rather leave unsaid. 
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Hai's observations on the battle were contradictory in parts 
but he did admit that the Long Tan battle was not good for 
them militarily because they did not achieve their aim of wip-
ing out the Australian unit. However, he thought it was a 
good political victory in that it won them much support from 
the people of Phuoc Tuy, especially those displaced from 
their villages. He felt that it made the Australian military 
leaders look at the Australian position in a different light, but 
he was amazed that Australians could look on the battle as a 
victory. "How can you claim a victory when you allowed 
yourselves to walk into a trap that we had set? Admittedly we 
did not finish the job, but that was only because time beat us 
and your reinforcements arrived. I mean, you did not even 
attempt to follow us up. How can you claim a significant vic-
tory from that sort of behaviour?" 
Hai also disputed the Australian body count. He wanted to 
know how it was, if the 275 were decimated, they were able to 
launch an attack on the ARVN 18th Division only seven days 
after the battle. I am doubtful about this claim as there is 
nothing about an attack on the 18th ARVN in any of the 
American documents I have looked at. His recollections are 
also questionable because there is no one willing to quote any 
casualty figures. The count of 150 is acceptable and the fact 
that only 53 weapons were picked up could also be telling, 
were it not for the fact that there were VC in the area all night 
and part of the next day. 
The question that has always been in my mind is. Did the 
Australian military commanders inflate the figure to make 
the action appear an Australian victory rather than have to 
face the questioning of why they allowed a force to become 
involved in such a situation with no readily available back-up 
organised? This question is the more pertinent because there 
were many indications that a VC attack on an Australian unit 
was imminent. Just one of many documents recording the 
likelihood of an attack on the Australians is the 11 Field 
Force Vietnam operational report. This records that in early 
August, 
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2. Reports of VC battalions in the 1st ATF TAOR had been 
received. These reports were partially confirmed by recon-
naissance and minor enemy contacts. The contacts were believed 
to have been with reconnaissance elements of main force units 
probably located in the May Tao area. 
This warning is one of many warnings that were available to 
the Australians before the battle. With the knowledge of the 
Binh Gia battle, the intelligence reports indicating the move-
ment of the VC 5 Division toward the area, and the inade-
quate defences at the base, it is a major military blunder that 
no back-up was on hand and organised at that time. Yet the 
Army has never had to answer these questions publicly 
because the battle was a resounding victory, according to 
Australian accounts. From one who was there, all I can say is 
that if it was a victory it was not because of good planning. It 
was so close to a disaster of huge proportions that it does not 
bear thinking about. Looking at the forces Hai had in the 
area and their disposition, one can thank the boys of Eleven 
Platoon, the rain, and the accuracy of the artillerymen that 
we survived the day. 
The other big factor in the battle from the Australian point 
of view was that the company had a good commander. Major 
Harry Smith may not have been the most liked officer in the 
battalion but he was certainly one of the most competent, 
which he proved in the Long Tan rubber plantation on 18 
August 1966. Without the cool leadership of Harry Smith the 
story could easily have been different and Hai may not have 
had to tell me about the event. 
Another interesting point to come out of my talk with Hai 
was the Australian interpretation after the battle. If what Hai 
said was correct about the planning and the lead-up to the 
battle, then the only one who got the interpretation of events 
right was subsequently told that he was wrong, the com-
mander of B Company 6 RAR, Major N.E. Ford. He went in 
to the rubber plantation on the first patrol before D Company 
and wrote his interpretation in his after-action report: 
a. Enemy Intentions. Despite the statements by VCC, [Viet Cong 
Captured] it is thought that the enemy plan was:-
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(1) A mortar and recoilless Rifle attack from east and west. 
(2) An attack on lATF forces following up the trail of the 
withdrawing Mortar and Recoilless rifle detachment. 
b. Evidence and opinions to support this view is:-
(1) It seems unlikely that VC would alert lATF with a mortar 
and recoilless rifle attack before an infantry assault. 1 ATP could 
be expected to call in all forces (as it did with 5 RAR) and to look 
to its defenses. 
(2) A fairly clear trail was left, leading to the " t rap" sprung by 
D Coy. This trail was admittedly broken for about 500 yards, but 
VC could expect that it would be found in a fairly short time. 
(3) A 445 Bn POW stated that his unit was in Long Tan on 18 
Aug and that his orders were to march to the "sound of the 
shooting". This sounds like part of a plan to close a trap. 
This interpretation by Major Ford is the same as Hai explain-
ed to me. It is also substantially the same as a VC defector 
told the Battalion Intelligence officer on 20 February 1967. 
According to an intelligence debriefing of a prisoner dated 23 
February 1967, the situation Hai outlined in 1987 was given to 
the Task Force in 1967. The record of the interview with the 
defector states in part: 
A. The version of the Long Tan battle that he knows is as follows. 
D445, minus heavy weapons and a small protective element, were 
ordered out of the area and went into the vicinity of YS 5668. 
Both 5 and 9 Divisions came into the area and the plan was to 
mortar the lATF base and lure a battalion out into their area. 
They would then annihilate this battahon. The mortaring took 
place but the plan did not eventuate as thought . . . 
B. The reasons for not attacking the Australian base were that 
they would lose too many men in capturing it. When they had 
done this the Americans would surround them and they would be 
trapped. 
Of course this information cannot be relied on but it does give 
food for thought. 
I would suggest that the Army at that time could not afford 
such an interpretation as it would show a lack of planning and 
organisation. 
The commanding officer of 6 RAR completely discarded 
the analysis by saying 
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1 do not agree at all with OC B Coys [Major Ford] of enemy in-
tentions (mainly for reasons given in para 3). His evidence to sup-
port them are very weak. Why the enemy bombarded 1 ATF on 
the night 16/17 Aug is not yet clear but it is most unlikely to have 
been part of a trap. Major Ford states in para 7a (3) "A 445 POW 
stated that his unit was in Long Tan on 18 Aug and that its orders 
were to march to the sound of the shooting" etc. This is true but 
the POW also stated that this order was given, not as an an-
ticipatory order, but after the battle began. 
I feel that it is the colonel who has the weak supporting 
arguments not the major and I believe Hai's story vindicates 
the analysis of Major Ford and the conversation with the 
returnee. 
The Australian interpretation of the battle at Long Tan has 
always been that the VC force was moving toward the Nui 
Dat base and were contacted by D Company. This story has 
always let the Australian commanders off the hook; they have 
not had to admit that they allowed their forces to be lured 
into an ambush situation and that their subsequent reactions 
left a lot to be desired. 
According to Hai, there was never any plan to attack the 
Australian base. For the VC in 1966 the war had entered a 
new era of military tactics and they saw no value in attacking 
defended positions if they ran the likelihood of being trapped 
by the mobile American forces — hence Hai's plan to lure the 
Australians from the base and "hit them under the heart 
where they were least expecting it". It was intended to be so 
close to the heart that there would be confusion, initially, at 
all levels hence the two-hour time limit. 
For Hai there were several significant after-effects of the 
battle he wanted to mention. One was that 5 Division forced 
the Australians always to be aware of the security of their 
base area. This restricted them geographically and Long Tan 
did inflict a substantial number of casualties on the 
Australian force. When I told Hai that the Australian casual-
ty figure from the battle had been 18 killed and 26 wounded, 
he did not dispute the figures but obviously disbelieved them. 
He thought the casualties would have caused a rethinking of 
the Vietnam commitment in Australia. 
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Another significant factor for the VC was that the battle 
brought their troops up against the Australians for the first 
time and gave them confidence and experience. The VC 
wanted to test the tactics of the Americans and Free World 
allied forces to see how they would respond to different 
scenarios. He said, "You must remember that . . . this was a 
new era of military tactics and both sides were still experimen-
ting with which was the correct line to follow." 
One of the lessons learned from the battle, Hai said, was 
the nature of the Australian command. It appeared to them 
that the Australians were willing to respond to provocation 
without looking too far behind for the motivation. Therefore 
they were easy targets to draw into situations of advantage for 
the VC. Hai used a similar tactic to lure Australians into 
another ambush near his home hamlet of Hoi My. This was 
when we attacked the outpost at Phuoc Hai [February 1967]. 
There were two reasons for this. One was to cause casualties to 
the Saigon Army and the other was to hit the Australians who we 
thought would try to cut off our retreat. 1 had my forces make a 
defensive position to the east of Hoi My and then we waited for 
your troops who we were sure would land in that area. 
According to Hai, there were only about 60 men at the 
prepared site of that battle. They were not the group who hit 
the South Vietnamese at Phuoc Hai — those had been the 
D445 and they had moved back to the Long Hai base area. 
Hai's force had dug extensive positions and had men in trees 
and also rocket launchers and heavy machineguns. The posi-
tion had been formed in the shape of a U and the Australians 
had come into the mouth of the U. He thought his men had 
destroyed several armoured personnel carriers, as well as kill-
ing many Australian soldiers. When I asked him how he had 
decided on that position he said. "Did I not tell you before 
that I was born near Hoi My. That was my country. Where 
else would you have landed a force if you were to cut off our 
forces from the Phuoc Hai attack if you thought they were 
moving east?" If one looks at the map of the area there are 
not many other places that a landing could have taken place if 
it was to be effective. 
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An indication of the care taken in the siting and defence of 
the position is given in the statements of the commander of 6 
RAR in the battalion's after-action report: 
The enemy position was a very strong one and generally well dug 
in. Although not a defensive position it was sited for good all-
round defence. Individual pits were sited very skilfully and with 
very good fields of observation and fire. They were camouflaged 
with leaves, sticks and local vegetation, and because of the nature 
of the light-coloured sandy soil, spoil heaps blended in naturally 
with the background and were difficult to see. I was unable to 
pick out individual pits from low air observation, even when 1 
knew exactly where they were, when 1 flew over the area 
subsequently. 
Hai's men moved out of the area as soon as the Australians 
pulled back. They checked out the destroyed Australian 
armoured personnel carrier to see if there was anything of 
value in it, but it had been burnt out. They then moved to the 
area of Xuyen Moc because there was a plan to hit at the 
South Vietnamese forces in the area in an attempt to discredit 
the coming elections and disrupt the Hearts and Minds Cam-
paign of the ARVN battalion around Dat Do. 
The Long Tan battle also gave the VC better understanding 
of Australian tactics and so they could make plans to counter 
them. They also learned that the timings set for the attacking 
forces on large ambush positions were crucial and had to be 
adhered to. The co-operation between the main force units 
and the local force D445 had been a very good experience for 
all concerned. Hai went on to say that the 275 Regiment of 5 
Division, being a mobile division, only came into Phuoc Tuy, 
and contact with the Australians, when there was a job to be 
done. Some of the significant actions involving the 275 from 
his recollections were: 
1. Feb. 1967. Battle with 6 RAR at Hoi My 
2. June 1967. Attack on the American 9th Division at Kim Long 
3. During Tet 1968, attack on the American base at Long Binh 
4. Early 1969. Attack on the American 25th Division 
5. May 1969. Attack on 4th Regiment ARVN 18th Division. 
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There was one last question that I had to ask Hai before he 
left and I held my breath as I waited for the answer. Did he 
hear of the two Australian wounded picked up by VC forces 
in the plantation during the battle? He shook his head at me 
and looked bemused by the question. 
I spent the afternoon in the room writing up the interview. 
The meeting with Hai had been most important and there was 
no doubt that a lot of what he said was correct and could not 
be disputed. However, there were many things that could not 
be substantiated and many of my questions he either did not 
answer or answered hesitantly, as if thinking of the best 
thing to say. In general what he had said was correct and it 
certainly made me think hard about the people who had been 
my enemy 20 years before. 
I was later to meet another three ex Viet Cong officers 
whose stories were as interesting and illuminating as the inter-
view with Hai. 
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Meetings with Three VC Officers 
Colonel Hai added a new dimension to my perspective of the 
war from their side. The interview with him certainly con-
vinced me that the forces against us were professional, 
dedicated soldiers and not the indoctrinated puppets many 
people led us to believe of communist soldiers. I was lucky to 
find another three officers who were involved in actions 
against the Australians. Although I met and interviewed them 
on a later trip to Vietnam, it is useful to relate what they told 
me here. 
The first officer, Ba Lien, reminded me of everybody's 
favourite uncle — slightly round and cuddly, with an infec-
tious smile, and exuding friendliness and hospitality. He kept 
making sure that there was tea in my cup and that I took 
cigarettes from the packet he left for me on the table. Even 
when he started talking about his early life, it was in a good-
humoured way. His nature was complemented by the cosiness 
of the front room of his house in Bien Hoa City where we sat 
talking. 
Ba Lien probably had more to do with the Australians than 
any other officer or ex-officer from the revolutionary forces 
alive today. Born in the north of Vietnam in 1924 in Ninh 
Hoa village, Hai Hung province, near Hanoi, his real name 
was Dong Van Chuong. He joined the revolutionary move-
ment in 1944, and fought in many places during the French 
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war although his unit was not involved at Dien Bien Phu. In 
1955 he came south with what he described as the "volunteer 
forces" to the vicinity of Baria. Baria, to Ba Lien, is not the 
town of that name but the province of Phuoc Tuy so I will use 
Baria to mean the province and Baria Town to distinguish the 
tWtt, 
The nucleus of the D445 Battalion was formed in 1957 
when Ba Lien and others formed two local force companies, 
the C40 and the C44. These two units amalgamated and in 
1965 became the D445 or the 860 Battalion (the units were 
known by various names). 
During the period 1957 to 1960 these units were concerned 
with political activity. They had at their disposal quite a few 
arms caches which had been hidden after the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements, but at that time the units were trying to achieve 
their aims through political means rather than armed strug-
gle. It was not until 1960, as the regime of Diem in the south 
became more arrogant and repressive, that they had to resort 
to the armed struggle. This created problems because, even 
with their arms caches, they were no match for the well-
equipped forces of Diem, who was being supplied with equip-
ment by the Americans. 
Ba Lien believes that the battle his unit was involved in at 
Binh Ba in March 1960 was one of the first major confronta-
tions in the south. He had been concentrating his activities 
around the rubber plantations in Baria and Long Khanh from 
1957 because the rubber workers were then the only organised 
workers outside the urban areas and were a rich source of 
revolutionary potential. They already had their own leaders 
and their own grievances which could be sheeted home direct-
ly to the plantation owners and the Saigon government. Their 
political consciousness, therefore, was already fairly 
advanced. 
In 1960 industrial unrest at the Binh Ba plantation had got 
to the point where the plantation manager had called in the 
police. With their arrival the confrontation turned even 
uglier. The police fired on the rubber workers, and Ba Lien 
thought several were wounded. In response to this the 
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C40 and the C44 companies attacked and overran the Binh Ba 
police station on the night of 3 March and gained much sup-
port from the rural workers as a result. 
By 1962 the American Advisers coming into the country 
were causing a lot of difficulty, as they were stiffening the 
forces of Diem. They also set up many strategic hamlets in 
Baria and Long Khanh provinces, which created problems for 
Ba Lien's forces responsible for those provinces and also part 
of Bien Hoa province. 
In December 1964, when it was decided to attack the 
Catholic town of Binh Gia, Ba Lien's forces were given the 
task of guiding other units to the area and then mounting the 
major assault on the town. These other units were indepen-
dent main force units from the 275 Regiment, sometimes 
known as 5 Regiment in those days. Some other units also 
participated which later became part of VC 9 Division. When 
they took the town they ran into some fierce pockets of 
resistance but overcame them very quickly. Many Catholic 
residents of the village were opposed to the revolutionary 
forces and remained indoors, but Ba Lien's forces were 
helped by the poorer people of the town. 
Once the objective had been taken the main force units 
moved into position around the town in order to trap the 
expected reinforcements of the Saigon Army. The first South 
Vietnamese (ARVN) forces sent against them were stopped 
and then the main force units ambushed several larger ARVN 
units in some particularly ferocious night fighting. Ba Lien's 
people moved out of the area and he heard later of the 
ambush in the rubber plantation at Binh Gia where the 
ARVN lost some tanks. When I asked him about the 
American prisoners, reported in American documents as hav-
ing been captured, he looked up quickly as if he had forgotten 
all about them, and then said in a pleased way, "Yes, I heard 
later that we had captured two Americans. I do not know 
what happened to them, although I think that 1 heard they 
were sent to Tay Ninh." 
Ba Lien's forces then moved throughout the area and made 
big propaganda about the defeat of the Saigon Army at Binh 
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Gia. He laughingly said they even held a political meeting in a 
Catholic church with the priest present. He knew all about 
this aspect because he was the unit's commissar in charge of 
Political Affairs at that time. 
With the advent of the American troops into the south, all 
the forces there were reorganised. Ba Lien's two companies 
became the D445 Battalion in May 1965. They were to be the 
local force for Baria, Long Khanh and part of Bien Hoa 
provinces, much as they had been before. Ba Lien realised 
that the war could not be won without the support of the peo-
ple and so always endeavoured to bring his forces close to 
them by remaining in touch as much as possible. 
When the Australians moved into Nui Dat, Ba Lien 
thought that their purpose was to help pacify Long Khanh 
and Baria. He said that they knew of the intended arrival of 
the Australians before they came to Nui Dat. They did not 
know what strength the unit was to be, but thought at least a 
regiment. Because of the Australians' reputation as guerrilla 
fighters they knew they would experience difficulties in the 
early stages. When the Australians destroyed the villages of 
Long Phuoc and Long Tan it came as no surprise to them — 
they were expecting moves of this nature. Although the loss 
of the villages made it difficult for Ba Lien's forces, it gave 
them a huge political advantage because the people never 
forgave the Australians for their treatment of them. 
The D445 Battalion made many probes of the Australian 
Task Force position in the early stages and then got the 
chance to bring them to battle in late June 1966. This was 
actually July, and it was the battle that occurred during 
Operation Hobart. There were two companies involved in this 
attack on B Company 6 RAR and Ba Lien, who was the com-
mander on the ground, said they used hugging tactics to get in 
close to the Australians in order to avoid the artillery. The 
after-action report confirms that the VC attacked very close 
— close enough to hurl grenades into the Australian 
perimeter. The Australian commander had to bring in the 
artillery so close to his own position that several rounds fell 
inside his own line of defence. 
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When I asked Ba Lien about his losses during that engage-
ment he said there had not been more than 6, but one had 
been a company political commander. The 6 RAR after-
action report states a body count of 9 VC for 3 Australians 
killed and 19 wounded during the five-day operation. 
Ba Lien was also involved in the Long Tan battle. He and 
the commander of D445, Sau Chanh, co-ordinated with the 
275 Regiment and the element of 5 Division Headquarters. 
Part of the D445 were guides for the units who mortared the 
Task Force on the night of August 1966. He was not directly 
involved in the fighting but, as he understood it, the plan was 
to draw a large unit into the area of the Long Tan rubber 
plantation and then attempt to break up the Australian force 
into smaller units as the battle progressed. 
He is not sure if the small unit of B Company was seen, but 
thought it may have been and was allowed to pass as they 
waited for a larger unit. He had heard the story of the two 
wounded Australians being captured but could not confirm it 
any further. He said that they especially wanted to take 
prisoners. 
When their forces withdrew, Ba Lien's part of the D445 
went to the area of the Song Rai forest and then moved 
around the area telling the people all about the big battle in 
the rubber plantation. They did not go anywhere near the Nui 
May Taos. He said that after every big action it was his policy 
to move into the villages and tell the people about the battles. 
When questioned about the Australian force, he said he 
thought there had been several battalions, meaning, in VC 
terms, about 750 men. 
When 1 asked him about the battle near Hoi My in 
February 1967, he said that he could not remember it. He 
thought it may have been a 275 attack but he knew nothing 
about it. This confirmed Hai's story of the action. It seems 
strange that the only people who seem to think the D445 were 
at that engagement are the Australian Army. 
During Tet in 1968 the D445 were unaware that most of the 
Task Force was away at Long Binh in Bien Hoa province, but 
Ba Lien said that it would hardly have mattered. He said that 
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Tet was a good and a bad time for them. They took Baria 
Town and held it for a day and also Dat Do and Long Dien. 
Dat Do, he says, they held for four days and Long Dien for 
eight. Even though the offensive crumpled, they gained much 
from it politically because of the behaviour of the ARVN 
forces in these towns. The South Vietnamese forces were later 
accused by the American Advisers in Phuoc Tuy of looting 
and open cowardice, according to the MACCORDS advisory 
reports held in Washington DC. 
In 1969 Ba Lien was promoted to deputy director of 
Political Affairs in Military Region 7. In 1970 he was pro-
moted again and went back to Baria and Long Khanh pro-
vinces as deputy political commissar. There was a big 
reorganisation at this time of all forces in the south. In 1972 
there was another major reorganisation, before the Nguyen 
Hue Campaign, named after the legendary Vietnamese hero. 
In 1973 Ba Lien, then a lieutenant-colonel, was again deputy 
director of Political Affairs in Military Region 7. 
On leaving the Army in 1978 he became director of the 
Department of Disabled Veterans and Social Affairs in Dong 
Nai, and retired from public office in late 1988. He now lives 
with his family in Bien Hoa City. 
Looking back on the Australian presence in his area, he 
said he thought that the Australians were harder opponents 
than the Americans, but still they did not worry them too 
much. The constant patrols were a worry, but these were only 
small groups. They were very fearful of the Australian am-
bushes, however, but again he emphasised that these were on-
ly small-scale affairs, a worry only to their small groups, not 
their main force units. 
As we said our goodbyes it was still hard not to see him as 
that favourite uncle. He stood there waving and smiling and I 
wondered what ghosts he would confront when he closed the 
door and sat down alone in that comfortable sitting room. 
Ba Du was the second officer I met. The meeting took place 
at the Military Headquarters in Ho Chi Minh City and I was 
surprised at how it developed. Though retired, Ba Du arrived 
in military uniform. We sat at a large table with fruit, drinks 
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and cigarettes and a group of junior officers joined us to sit in 
on the experience of two former enemies sitting down to talk. 
His real name was Vu Due, born in 1925 in the north of 
Vietnam in Thai Binh province. He had been brought to the 
south in 1937 by his elder brother after his parents died. The 
brothers joined the revolutionary forces in 1945, and the 
other had been killed fighting the French in Baria province. 
Ba Du had also been part of Baria unit Number 2 during the 
French war. 
After 1954 this unit moved to North Vietnam and remained 
there until 1962. They then came south and went to Can Tho 
in the Mekong Delta. Then called 2 Regiment, the unit 
became part of the 275 Regiment of 5 VC Division in 1965, 
when the regiment operated in the Baria and Long Khanh 
areas. 
In 1966 Ba Du was the executive officer of 275 Regiment 
with the rank of major. Part of 275 Regiment had been at the 
battle at Binh Gia in 1964, but they were only one of several 
independent units brought together for that attack. At Ba 
Du's level he had only his job to do and said he was not aware 
of the overall plan. He did not know that Americans were 
captured during that battle, but admitted that it may have 
slipped his mind. 
During 1965-66 his unit had several major clashes with the 
American 173rd Airborne Brigade. He did not know of any 
specific instances where his people had come up against the 
Australians while they were operating with the 173rd. 
In 1966 when the Austrahans arrived at Nui Dat, he and the 
other commanders were aware that there were at least two 
battalions and the support of New Zealand artillery. They 
realised that a base at Nui Dat could control a large area and 
caused their forces a lot of trouble. They were expecting the 
force at Nui Dat would be larger and more mobile, and were 
pleasantly surprised when the Australians seemed to be 
restricted in how far they could go. 
There was a need for their forces at that time to attempt to 
maintain pressure on the new American units arriving in Viet-
nam, with the result that little notice was taken of what was 
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happening at Nui Dat. It soon became clear, however, that 
the Australians would have to be taught a lesson; their policy 
of saturation patrols and ambushes, and the destruction of 
the people's homes and livelihoods required some action to be 
taken. The destruction of Long Tan and Long Phuoc villages 
called for retaliation, as these villages had always been con-
sidered "theirs". "Our orders were to attack the Australians in 
order to halt their policy of destruction in the province," said 
BaDu. 
The 275 had moved down to Long Tan and Ba Du's forces 
had been positioned to the north of the rubber plantation just 
to the west of Nui Dat 2, from where they could move in any 
direction when the attack started. He said that the purpose of 
mortaring the base at Nui Dat was to bring out a large group 
into a killing area. As Hai had already explained to me, the 
whole of the plantation was screened by VC forces. 
Ba Du was the first person who said unequivocally that the 
small patrol of B Company was seen and allowed to pass in 
expectation of a larger group. When the battle started the rain 
caused much difficulty ar a ne sent out his units to try to 
separate the Australian force. Any of the soldiers in D Com-
pany that day will shudder at that recollection, as VC soldiers 
seemed to be moving all through the area. I would not say 
there is conclusive proof, but it certainly seemed so on the day 
that the VC forces were trying hard to separate the Australian 
force into smaller groups. 
When the reinforcements arrived at the river in armoured 
personnel carriers, the VC forces had decided to withdraw, 
lest they become trapped should the battle go on too long. 
They had also heard on the radio that American forces were 
being rushed to the area. The VC had left forces to clean up in 
the battle area and many of the forces withdrew to the vicinity 
of grid reference 4971, which is three kilometres north of the 
battle area. They then moved north and then east to the Song 
Rai forest area, north-west of Xuyen Moc. Ba Du knew 
nothing of the other forces moving to Ap Suoi Cat. 
He said that after the Long Tan battle they came to realise 
that the Australians were a more difficult opponent than the 
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Americans. The Australian fighting spirit was very high, he 
thought, even though they had no real reason to fight in Viet-
nam. He said that in discussions among themselves they said 
that the Australians would be a formidable foe if they were 
fighting for their own country and their own families. They 
thought that the Australian soldiers could stand more hard-
ship than the Americans and were more like the Vietnamese in 
this respect. They did not need their rations and ice-cream 
and they could hve in the bush quite easily for long periods. 
Ba Du also said that his men had noticed and respected the 
way the Australians supported each other. It seemed during 
the battle in the Long Tan rubber plantation, that whenever 
an Austrahan was wounded there was always another who 
tried to help him, sometimes at great personal risk. "When 
we had withdrawn from the battle we had a greater 
understanding of the Australians and their tactics, and a 
greater respect," he said. 
There were four objectives in bringing the Australians to 
battle at Long Tan, according to Ba Du. These were: to try to 
lift the fighting spirit of the local people; to attempt to stop 
the destructive Australian activity; to make the Americans 
realise their allies could be endangered; and to prove to 
themselves that they were capable of engaging and defeating 
any of the large mobile American and allied forces. 
Ba Du said he was not involved with the action near Hoi 
My in February 1967. He was not directly involved with the 
Australians again very much after that, as before Tet in 1968 
he had been promoted to Military Region 7, Department of 
Supply, and so missed the fighting at Long Binh. 
He said that it was hard for him to think clearly of specific 
battles because he had been involved in several hundred bat-
tles since 1946. It had been a difficuh time for him and all his 
comrades as there was no way that they could look after their 
famihes. The life had been very hard, but in his opinion the 
sacrifices had all been worthwhile. He shook his head sadly at 
me and said that the Americans and their allies had no hope 
from the start in the war. The Americans had no understan-
ding of the Vietnamese and could never understand the 
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motivation of his people. They kept talking about some sort 
of freedom that meant nothing to the people of Vietnam. 
Ba Du remained in his position as supply officer until he 
retired in 1984 with the rank of senior colonel, having been 
stationed in Kampuchea from 1979 to 1982 and involved with 
the supply bases at Siem Riep and Kompong Cham. He now 
lives in Ho Chi Minh City and is married with five children. 
Ut Thoi was a man I had been trying to meet for four years. 
When the time arrived it was a hurried meeting and not really 
productive. Ut Thoi is now Lieutenant-General Nguyen Thoi 
Bung, Commander in Chief of Military Region 7, which in-
cludes Ho Chi Minh City. He is still a serving officer and so 
the conversation was more general than specific, and was not 
as open as the talks with the retired officers. 
We met at the Military Headquarters in Ho Chi Minh City 
and the meeting was very formal. He was a slim, hard-looking 
man in a very neat, starched military uniform. His aide ac-
companied him to the meeting and we sat side by side sipping 
tea. To my eternal disappointment the hurriedly taken 
photographs did not turn out. 
Ut Thoi was born in 1927 in Tay Ninh province and had 
joined the revolutionary forces in 1945. He rose through the 
ranks to regimental commander of the 275 Regiment of 5 
Division in 1966. He had also been with the 275 forces at the 
battle at Binh Gia in December 1964. He confirmed that the 
units at Binh Gia were all independent units, and said that the 
American Marine history had been partly right when it men-
tioned 9 Division being at Binh Gia, as some of the units there 
were the nucleus of 9 Division, as 275 was the nucleus of 5 
Division. 
He commanded the 275 Regiment at the battle at Long Tan 
and said that the reason for the battle was that the local forces 
had called for 5 Division to try to halt the Australians' policy 
of destruction in the province. As allies of the Americans the 
Australians had all the power and they had very little, so they 
had to manoeuvre the Australians into a position where their 
tactics could be employed effectively. The plan was to mortar 
the base to draw out a unit into the area of Long Tan. They 
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would then ambush this force close to the base and quickly 
withdraw in order to avoid being trapped by the mobile 
American forces they knew were operating to the north near 
the Long Khanh border. 
Ut Thoi was directly in charge of the forces during the bat-
tle and there were two battalions and one in reserve plus some 
of the forces of the D445. When the battle started in the rub-
ber plantation it was a small space and they pushed very hard 
to isolate and split the units, hugging to avoid the artillery. 
They found it hard to maintain communications because of 
the heavy rain and the lengthiness of the battle. They heard 
over the radio that there was an American unit coming 
toward the area and they decided to withdraw the majority of 
their troops when the Australian relief arrived, by which time 
it was almost dark. Although they had not overrun the 
Australians, he felt they had inflicted substantial casualties on 
them and had achieved their aim. In doing so, he said, they 
had responded to the request of the local forces and people, 
their effort being instrumental in slowing down the 
Austrahans' destruction of the province. 
After the action the forces moved to the north and there 
was no mention of an ambush at Ap Suoi Cat. My previous 
thoughts of Ut Thoi being admonished over the Long Tan 
battle were discarded, as in late 1967 or early 1968 he became 
the commanding officer of 9 VC Division, one of the most 
ferocious and respected units in the south. I am not entirely 
certain whether he remained as the commander of 9 Division 
until 1975. 
The information I have gathered on the first two D445 
leaders, given below, is unconfirmed, being based only on the 
recollections of various people. The local D445 Battalion was 
based in Phuoc Tuy and was the main opponent of the 
Australians. Its first commander was Sau Chanh, who assum-
ed the office in 1965 when the battalion was formed and 
remained until the end of 1966. He was then promoted and 
became the deputy commander of the Baria-Long Khanh-
Bien Hoa area. He became ill in 1972 and died the following 
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year. The second battalion commander was Tu Chanh, who 
was ambushed by the Australians and killed by a mine (most 
likely a claymore) during the engagement in 1967. 
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The Village People Remember 
The meetings with Ut Thoi, Ba Lien and Ba Du reinforced the 
feelings I had had after meeting Hai. These VC leaders were 
not mere puppets as we had been led to believe — they were 
thinking, caring human beings who were just as distressed by 
death and injury as the Australians were. I did not meet them 
until 18 months after my meeting with Hai and it is to that 
part of the story that I now return. 
The day, after the meeting with Hai, we went from Bien 
Hoa to Long Dat again to do some more research on the 
Australian involvement. The day was heavily overcast, 
showery and humid. I had by now become quite used to this 
trip but still looked in fascination at the sights and sounds of 
Vietnam. The town of Long Hai looked sleepy and forlorn as 
we drove in and went to the old hotel. From there we went 
again to Dat Do and arranged some interviews. 
The next day, Huy, the Long Dat chairman, accompanied 
us as we drove down toward the Long Hai mountains from 
Dat Do. He pointed out the house of old Mrs Xiu and I 
acknowledged that I knew where I was. We went across to the 
area of Hoi My and there our car stopped on the side of the 
road in the silent deserted countryside. The day was sunny but 
with a hint of rain to come. There was a gentle breeze blowing 
from the coast only several kilometres away and it was hard 
to imagine all the killing that had taken place in the area not 
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many years before. Where we stopped the country was flat 
and clear except for the odd shade tree. There were some pad-
dies, but the grey loamy soil in this area is not good for rice. 
About 100 metres in from the road stood a thatched cottage 
in a paddock of about 3 hectares. Young trees were planted 
which appeared to be struggling to grow. Outside the pad-
dock fence was a new small dam where four water-buffalo 
were cooling off. As we walked toward the house, several 
children came out and approached us shyly. The house was 
larger than that of Mrs Xiu but even more basic. 
A Vietnamese man came out of the house to greet us and I 
was introduced to Mr Dang Van Ba. Ba was wearing a light 
shirt and pair of long pants that evidently were his best. He 
was a very quiet person and his face was drawn and tired-
looking. His wife, an attractive woman of perhaps 40 years of 
age, was wearing the black, light peasant pyjamas. 
We went inside and Mrs Ba made some tea. The cottage 
had a dirt floor and almost no furniture, except for a table 
and chairs, several wooden beds and a little nook for cooking. 
There was very little else. The cottage had no stove and all the 
cooking was done over an open fire on the floor. The thatch 
on the roof was broken in several places and slivers of sun-
shine came through. 
We sat at the table near the entrance where the slight breeze 
was not enough to dry my sweat. When we were settled I 
began to talk to Ba of his days as a soldier. This is the record 
of conversation and it is not for me to make a judgment on 
the accuracy of all he said. 
He was born near Long My village in 1937 and was now a 
farmer with a wife and 3 children aged from 8 to 12. He had 
joined the army in I960 and his wife had also been a soldier in 
what he described as an artillery unit. They married in 1966. 
Ba's mother and father were shifted from their home in the 
outlying areas and had been forced into Hoi My by the Saigon 
Army. Ba thought that this was an attempt to restart the 
strategic hamlets. There was much opposition to these forced 
removals of people from their homes and land, and it created 
much hatred toward the Saigon government and the 
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Australian Army who were supporting them. The move into 
Hoi My caused great hardship for the people as they were on-
ly allowed to tend their fields during certain hours of the day. 
There was never enough time because of the distances they 
had to travel (at the speed of an ox cart). Their homes were no 
longer there having been destroyed by the Vietnamese and 
Austrahan forces. Some houses were physically dismantled 
and others were blown away by aircraft and Australian ar-
tillery. Ba's parents and the rest of the displaced people had 
to build homes with whatever material they could find as they 
had no money to buy any. 
Ba said that he was involved in many actions with the 
Austrahans and wa^ wounded in 1968 when his recon-
naissance patrol walked into an Austrahan ambush. He was 
hit in the chest and his comrades managed to get him out of 
the ambush and take him to the Long Hais where the D445 
had their bases. His wound took a long time to heal and he 
had been very ill with it. He said that the bases in the Long 
Hais were well stocked with medical supplies and there was at 
least one doctor on hand most of the time. Altogether it took 
one year for his wound to completely heal and even then he 
was still troubled by it. 
At that time Ba was the commander of the Hoi My 
guerillas. By 1972 the wound he had received was troubling 
him very much and it was decided that he could no longer 
carry on as an active soldier. He had moved back into Hoi My 
village and had done what work he could during the 
remainder of the war until the liberation in 1975. 
He described his unit as the Hoi My local force guerillas. 
They were at most times 25 in strength and were all local 
people who hved in their bases in the district and seldom mov-
ed from their area. They did not go to the Long Hais unless it 
was required. The area around Hoi My is mainly open rice 
paddies with areas of light bush on the gently rolling hills. 
This made it very difficult for them to find good places to 
store food and equipment and also very dangerous for them 
to move around, especially during daylight. They received a 
lot of help from the local people and were able to get into the 
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Hoi My hamlet at night, even though there was a Saigon Ar-
my outpost on the edge of the village. Ba thought the strength 
of the unit was about a company. He and his men had been 
able to get into the hamlets almost at will because of the help 
they received from the local people. He described moving into 
the hamlets as dangerous, mainly because of the mines and 
grenades that were placed as defences. However, he said, they 
were able to overcome these obstacles because the local peo-
ple would come to meet them outside and guide them through 
the obstacles. 
It was also dangerous because the Australians made many 
cordon-and-searches of the village, which, he said, were very 
thoroughly executed. The Australians did little damage to the 
people's possessions, he said, unhke the Vietnamese or the 
Americans. His unit of 25 men was quite well equipped and 
had AR 15s and one machinegun. Much of their ammunition 
was captured, but the administration as he described it, would 
send them supplies. They had no radio communications and 
would decide for themselves which actions to take. Although 
there were times when they were required by the main force 
units to participate in actions with them or to carry out special 
missions, mostly they were an autonomous unit working 
closely with the political cadres. They dug shelters in many 
places and also had many food caches. When on the move 
they would divide into two groups, but no smaller, except on 
reconnaissance missions. 
They did not ambush directly themselves, but would leave 
mines on tracks and wait close by. If the mine exploded, they 
would put in a quick attack on the disoriented troops and 
quickly leave. "We would place mines in front of your advan-
cing troops, and we also put mines down if we were moving 
away from being ambushed," Ba said. The fleeing group 
would always send men back to place mines or grenades. "We 
set mines around our base areas that we had recovered from 
the Australian minefield." This was when he told me of the 
Australian operation into the Long Hais in 1970. "We would 
set mines in front of your line of advance. Sometimes we 
would lay mines actually in sight of your people." 
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We sat talking for over an hour, while the children played 
outside and his wife and several other women chatted quietly 
among themselves. The time passed very quickly and there 
was still much that we could have discussed but we ran out of 
time. 
We said our goodbyes and Ba and his wife and children 
stood waving as we walked over their small dry field to the 
car. The buffaloes had moved from the waterhole and were 
grazing near the road. They snorted at us as we moved closer 
to them. Well at least that had not changed. The buffalo 
distrusted Europeans before and it seemed they still did. I 
wondered what Ba would tell his children about our meeting. 
The eldest was only born when the war was almost over. 
Would they be like the children in Australia who couldn't 
care less about the war and do not want to hear about it at 
school? Or will the pride and the heritage of the people like 
Ba carry on? He gave all he could for the revolution and now 
he has peace, but very little else. 
I sat looking at the small cottage on the empty fields as we 
pulled off and slowly travelled along the bumpy, neglected 
road. Good luck, my friend. You deserve it, and you certainly 
need it. 
From the home of Dang Van Ba we moved to Hoi My and 
met three members of the People's Committee. This was a 
general discussion and we sat around talking and drinking 
tea. All three of the people in the room had been members of 
the Hoi My local guerillas, the group headed by Dang Van 
Ba. According to them, their war had started in 1956. They 
said that after Diem refused to unify the country, they started 
much of what they described as political fighting, which was 
difficult, as they were not well armed. The Diem regime soon 
became very oppressive and began harrassing and imprison-
ing anyone who spoke out against it. The decree 10/59 gave 
province chiefs the right to arrest and imprison or summarily 
execute anyone who spoke out against them and also anyone 
who had been a member of the Viet Minh. They and many 
others became involved in the struggle against Diem and were 
encouraged by the uprising in Ben Tre, where almost unarm-
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ed the peasants took over most of the province and started to 
redistribute land. This was a good sign for them and it was 
after Ben Tre that they started to consolidate their weapons 
and equipment. In the early 1960s they had only a few 
weapons, but they became stronger very quickly. The more 
organised they became, the more weapons they captured from 
the Saigon Army. By the time the Australians came in 1966, 
they were well armed and had good supplies and equipment. 
But there was great disturbance for the people when the 
Australians moved into the province in 1966 and all the 
villagers from Long My had to move to the village of Hoi My. 
The Australians did not physically shift them — this was done 
by the Americans on the operations helping the Australians 
when they first came into the province. 
My check on this shows that the American 173rd Airborne 
Brigade conducted an operation codenamed Hollandia in the 
Long Hai/Hoi My area while the Austrahans were setting up 
at Nui Dat. In May they had conducted Operation Hardihood 
which involved the clearing of the Task Force base area, and 5 
RAR had been involved in that operation. When 6 RAR mov-
ed to Nui Dat from Vung Tau that move was also part of 
Operation Hardihood. As far as most of the Australian force 
knew, that was the end of the American role at that time. 
That was not the case. The 173rd completed Operation Har-
dihood on 8 June 1966 and commenced Operation Hollandia 
on 9 June 1966. They carried out their first night parachute 
landing in the Long Hai area and concentrated to the north of 
the Long Hai range around the area of Long My. For the 
Americans it was a very low-key operation and the after-
action report states: "This operation met only small guerilla 
elements who apparently were intimately familiar with the 
terrain." Nine Americans were killed and 68 wounded for a 
VC body count of 4. Although the operation was low key, the 
report states that the Americans still managed to fire off 3244 
artillery rounds, plus mortars. Planes also dropped a total of 
3210 tons of ordinance (bombs, rockets and the like) during 
the operation. 
The Hoi My committee people said the heavy American 
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bombing by planes and artillery had almost destroyed Long 
My and had killed 10 people. The people, in fear for their 
lives and with their homes destroyed, had no option but to go 
to Hoi My for safety. They said that in early 1967 Australian 
troops had come to Long My and destroyed the remaining 
houses and shelters. Troops were then stationed at Dai Quai 
(the Horseshoe position) and at times there were many in the 
area of Long My. The Saigon Army also had many troops in 
their military posts along the mined fence. 
In 1968 the people suffered again as American B 52s came 
and destroyed many areas around Hoi My when they dropped 
bombs on the area. This bombing destroyed many gardens 
and paddies and killed a lot of cattle. 
I produced a photo of one of the windmills the Australians 
had put in around Hoi My and there was great excitement 
when they saw it. Yes the windmill was still there but it was 
not working — it had been out of action for many years. Well 
before the "Liberation". According to Frank Frost, who 
wrote about the Australian involvement in Vietnam, many of 
the windmills had not been working from as early as 1969, 
especially in the Hoi My/Phuoc Hai area, because they were 
unsuited to the soil there. The sand in the soil was so fine that 
it remained in the water when the windmill was working and 
got into the pump system, causing the windmill to break 
down. 
Another good Australian idea gone down the tube. I have 
no doubt that everything of this kind that was done in Viet-
nam was done for the best motives. The failing seems to have 
been that we did not look deeply enough at the problem in the 
first place, and could never come up with a balanced, 
workable strategy — this applied to explaining the reasons we 
were there right down to putting in a windmill. Insufficient 
analysis led to wrong conclusions and therefore wrong 
policies. 
From Hoi My we went on to the village of Phuoc Loi and 1 
was introduced to Mrs Dong Thi Trinh. Mrs Trinh was a 
wonderful little wizened up old lady who sat crossed legged 
on the table while we were talking. She said that she was 76 
years of age and had been born in Phuoc Loi. She chattered at 
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an amazing speed and would get very cross when someone in-
terrupted her or tried to contradict what she said. I sat 
through the whole of the meeting trying not to smile as she 
scolded this one, or threw her arms around in frustration 
when someone said she was wrong about a certain point. She 
must have been almost deaf, as she spoke in a very loud voice 
that seemed strange coming from such a tiny little old lady. 
Mrs Trinh had lived in this spot before the Australians 
came but not in this house. Her other house had been 
destroyed by the Australians, as had many other houses in 
Phuoc Loi. I have been unable to find evidence of any 
Australian destruction in Phuoc Loi, but Mrs Trinh was ada-
mant that many houses were destroyed, mainly by artillery. 
When I asked if she had a family, she said that she had been 
married and had three sons. Her husband had been killed dur-
ing the French war right in the town of Phuoc Loi. He had 
been part of the revolutionary movement in the village and 
she had tried to carry on his work after his death. Her Hfe had 
been very hard and she had worked at many jobs to survive, 
but mainly she had existed by trading in fish and seafood. She 
would go to the coastal village of Lang Phuoc Hai to buy fish 
which she brought back and sold to the villagers and farmers. 
When the Australians came she continued with her pohtical 
work. When she said this, the others nodded their heads and 
confirmed that Mrs Trinh had been very involved in the 
political movement of the village. Many times she obtained 
food and supplies and took them herself or organised others 
to take them to the local forces. Once she organised and led 
the local people to demonstrate against the Saigon regime (no 
date). She was arrested by the Saigon Army many times: they 
knew her husband had been with the Viet Minh, they found 
out one of her sons was with the local forces, and they were 
aware of her own political activities. 
Of her three sons, one had been killed fighting with the 
D445 local battalion and the other two were still alive. The 
son killed had been her second son, his name Duong Van 
Lau. His revolutionary name had been Nhat. She said he had 
joined the revolutionary forces in 1962 and was with the local 
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battalion. He was killed by the Australians in October 1969, 
aged 34. She said he was in charge of a reconnaissance unit, 
but I am unsure whether that was his unit, or whether he was 
on a reconnaissance patrol when he was killed. 
She said that Australian troops brought his body into the 
village and dropped it in the market place early in the morn-
ing. Neighbours had come to tell her and she had gone to 
claim the body of her son. The Saigon Army had told her she 
was to take the body and bury it that day. This was impossible 
for her to do, so she had left her son there while she made the 
funeral arrangements. After the funeral the next day the 
Saigon Army came to her and wanted to know why she had 
not obeyed their orders. She tried to explain that it had been 
impossible for her to make all the arrangements for the 
funeral in such a short time, but they refused to listen. She 
was taken away and very roughly treated in jail for that day 
and night. Now she thumped the table with her hand and said 
contemptuously that the treatment she received did not worry 
her as she had been in jail many times and had suffered at the 
Army's hands before. The jail did not worry her but the loss 
of her son was the most difficult thing of all to accept. 
When asked about her other two sons she said that one was 
in the Saigon Army and the other was with us in the room. 
She called forward her eldest son who looked to be about 50. 
He appeared to be slightly retarded, which was probably why 
he had not been in the local forces. He said that he did work 
for them at times and had to move around the area because he 
was frightened of being conscripted by the Saigon Army. 
Huy, the Long Dat chairman, confirmed that her son had 
worked for the revolutionary forces at times. He did small 
things like bringing food and doing reconnaissance work. The 
other son still lived in Phuoc Loi and there was no animosity 
toward him. He had no choice, the Saigon Army took him. 
The strange part of this story was that her daughter-in-law, 
married to a conscripted soldier in the Saigon Army, had been 
wounded in the chest and head while she was carrying out 
"political work" in the local area. What a war. 
When it came time for us to leave, half the village must 
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have been outside. There was much laughter and joking and 
all the children came crowding around to have their 
photographs taken. It was a good feeling to have them there 
even though it made talking to people very difficult. We got 
into the car and made the slow journey back to Dat Do. 
In Dat Do, Huy informed me that the next day we would go 
to Long Tan village. He had a surprise for me there he said. 1 
hoped he wasn't going to be like Thang when he said he had a 
surprise and kept me in suspense all night. He didn't. He had 
found the Long Tan Cross that I had asked about on the trip 
in August. He did not elaborate on how he found it or where 
it had been. When 1 asked about the plaque that had been at-
tached to it he said that he did not have it then, but he hoped 
that it could be found in the next few days. I was at a loss to 
know how to take this news as there was no way that 1 could 
do anything with the cross. It was almost three metres high 
and solid concrete. How much it would weigh was anyone's 
guess, and there was no way that I could take it back to 
Australia. Huy asked if the cross was important, and 1 said 1 
thought it was, but could not be sure. I was certain that 6 
RAR would be interested and possibly the War Memorial in 
Canberra, but it was only a guess on my part. I certainly 
could not make any guarantees about it. 
After some thought I decided that perhaps the best thing to 
do would be to approach the War Memorial in Canberra and 
try to get something in exchange for the people in this district. 
God knows they were short of just about everything. When I 
asked Huy what they needed most, his eyes lit up. We hurried 
out to his car and drove to the hospital at Long Dat. I had met 
Dr Hong on the last trip and Huy asked him to draw up a list 
of medical supplies that he badly needed. This was how 1 
would approach the problem. To help the people, we would 
see if Australia would give some much-needed aid to Long 
Dat in return for the cross. 
Thang, Kieran and I sat in the hotel at Long Hai that night 
talking of the events of the day and wondering what the next 
few days may bring. 
The following morning we were up early and away to Long 
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Tan village, which is only three kilometres from where the 
Australian Task Force was established at Nui Dat. It was not 
then, and is not now, a large village. In 1966 there were ap-
proximately 1200 people living there and in 1987 approx-
imately 5000. In 1966 it was a very beautiful place with well-
constructed houses, all with their own little plots of land with 
gardens and many fruit trees. Long Tan had always been very 
helpful to the revolutionary forces and was classed as a 
liberated village by the VC forces and the province chief, Col-
onel Dat. Almost all the people who lived there had relatives 
in the local army and helped in any way they could. 
The people were shifted from the village before the 
Australians arrived in the province by the American 1st In-
fantry Division during Operation Abilene. Although there is 
no proof that this occurred at the request of the Australians, 
the evidence does point to that conclusion. The Australian 
Chief of the General Staff, General Sir John Wilton, had 
flown to Saigon in March 1966 for discussions with General 
Westmoreland, the American commander in Vietnam, about 
the placement and role of the new Australian Task Force. 
They decided on Phuoc Tuy on 17 March 1966. The 
Australian policy from those early days was to create a buffer 
zone 4000 metres around the Task Force that was free of 
villages and civihans. As noted. Long Tan was 3000 metres 
from the base, well inside the proposed buffer zone. It was 
also classified as a centre of resistance to the Saigon Army 
and in fact was designated a fortified VC village. 
When the Americans came to Long Tan on 6 April 1966 
during Operation Abilene they shifted the people from the 
village and told them they were no longer allowed to live in 
Long Tan. The Americans did not actually do this 
themselves. They surrounded the village and then sent in units 
of the Saigon Army. The after-action report for Abilene 
states: "The battalions took up blocking positions north and 
east of the town while ARVN elements completed evacuation 
of Long Tan village." Many people went to Dat Do and some 
to Long Dien — they became the forgotten ones. When the 
Australians arrived, there were no people in Long Tan; if 
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there had been, they would have been the responsibiUty of the 
Australians. When people tried to come back to Long Tan 
several months later, the Australians stopped them from com-
ing in even to work the fields. Several months after that, in 
late 1966, they did allow the people back to work their fields 
but the curfew was so restrictive that there was little work that 
could be done. Long Tan was not actually destroyed house 
for house as Long Phuoc had been, but the effects of artillery 
and neglect soon turned the village into a derelict village shell. 
I cannot remember going into Long Tan village during my 
time as a soldier in Vietnam, but another member of D Com-
pany 6 RAR, Barry Vassella, did. He said that when he went 
through the village in December 1966 it was a sad, broken 
area. The villagers were not allowed to return to live there un-
til after Liberation in 1975. 
In 1987 Long Tan was a thriving little community again. 
The streets were rough but clean, and many of the houses had 
been rebuiU in the original style. Many were made from 
hollow bricks that were then cement-rendered. There is a kiln 
in the district to supply bricks. The roofs are tiled, and so are 
many floors, using products made in Long Dat district. The 
striking thing is the quality of the workmanship. In Ho Chi 
Minh City the workmanship is rather slipshod. In Long Dat 
the tiling and the timber work is superb. 
The progress of the building has been rather slow as there is 
a shortage of materials. There were still a lot of houses made 
of thatch when I was there but the work was progressing 
steadily. In the centre of the village is a community rice mill 
and a large agricultural storage shed was almost completed. 
The people are exceedingly friendly and several young ones 
called out "Uc dai loi" meaning Australian. This friendliness 
actually impeded the work I wanted to do, as the whole 
village turned out for the visit and there were children, dogs 
and people hanging out of the doors and windows of the 
council house where we went to talk. 
Before going to talk to the village people we went into one 
of the sheds where, on the ground, lay the cross. I stood there 
looking at it but it really did not mean a thing to me. It had 
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been broken off from the concrete that had been poured 
around the base to hold it in place and there was a large frac-
ture about 30 centimetres from the bottom. Two pieces of 
round reinforcing rod protruded from the end. We stood it up 
against the wall to take some photographs and 1 found out 
how heavy it was. Now that they had found it, what was I go-
ing to do about it? The question worried me then and does 
now. It is still in Vietnam. The Vietnamese are willing to give 
it back to the Australians if they want it. On another trip in 
1989 1 saw the cross again at the War Museum in Bien Hoa 
City and was also privileged to see the replica cross erected in 
the plantation at Long Tan. 
When we went to the other council house there were 15 peo-
ple all sitting around a long table waiting for us, and at least 
another hundred outside. Many were standing at the doorway 
and others were leaning through the window openings. One 
thing I did not see in Long Dat district was glass. No one 
seemed to have glass windows, only openings and storm shut-
ters. During our talks there were probably five dog fights that 
caused a great deal of hilarity outside and had all the people 
inside looking around and making ribald comments. It was 
good for me because I had decided by this time that interviews 
with more than one person needed to be conducted in a way 
other than just by a general discussion. Unfortunately, when 
interviewing members of a group one by one, a lot of spon-
taneity is lost and it also means a lot of waiting for the others 
in the group who, in this case, sat staring out the window, 
waiting perhaps for the next dog fight. 
The many interviews all told much the same story of a life 
of fear, deprivation of basic human rights and personal suf-
fering because of the war. A selection of them is presented 
below. While 1 was unable to verify any of the precise in-
cidents the people reported, certain dominant themes within 
all the stories have been verified from Australian and 
American sources. 
The first person to speak was Mr Phan Van Hong who said 
that he was 69 years of age and had been born in Long Tan 
village. Hong was small and wiry, with grey hair and a neatly 
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trimmed Ho Chi Minh goatee. In 1966 he was married with 
two sons and two daughters. During the French war he had 
been with the security forces in Phuoc Tuy and when the 
Australians arrived in 1966 he had again gone into the bush, 
remaining with the revolutionary forces until liberation in 
1975 and relying on his family to help support him. 
When the Australians came, his family had to move to Dat 
Do and their house had been destroyed. His sons and a son-
in-law had also been in the local forces, which made it very 
hard for his wife and daughters to survive. No compensation 
was given for the 'loss of land or the destruction of their 
home. As he remembers it, the Saigon Army came about 
March 1966 and told them they would have to live elsewhere, 
with no assistance given. If they stayed in the village, they 
were told, jet fighters and artillery would kill them. 
In June the people tried to come back to Long Tan, but 
they would not stay because of the Austrahan artillery that 
fell on the area at all times of the night and day. This was ob-
viously a reference to Australian harrassing and interdiction 
fire. In late 1966 the people asked the Australians if they 
could return to their homes and were refused. The people 
could come back to work in their gardens and fields during 
the day, but there were severe time restrictions on when they 
could come. They were allowed in the Long Tan area only 
between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., which was not enough time to 
work the land, considering the hours of travel each way. 
Hong said this made it very difficult for his wife and 
daughters who had to work for other people like serfs. 
He proudly pulled up the sleeve of his shirt and displayed 
his upper arm. It was quite a sight and was obviously a bullet 
wound that had gone in one side and out the other. He said 
that when he had been in the rice paddies close to Long Tan in 
1969 he had been chased by a helicopter. While running to 
evade it, he was hit in the arm just as he reached the edge of 
the paddies. Bleeding badly and in pain he managed to get 
clear of the area before he became too weak. He met up with 
his own people who treated him. Both his sons who had been 
with the D445 were killed, as had his son-in-law. His 
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daughters were still living in the village, as was his wife. 
Mr Nguyen Van Nhom was about 70 years of age and had 
also been born in Long Tan village. In 1966 he was married 
with five sons and two daughters. Aged 50 then, he did not 
join the revolutionary army, but his five sons had all been 
soldiers with the local forces. When the Saigon Army shifted 
the people from the village he had gone to Dat Do. He 
estimated that there were over 1000 people living in Long Tan 
at the time of the evacuation. 
Life in Dat Do was very hard for him and his family — the 
only way to survive was to work for other people. They were 
exploited because of their plight and worked for very low 
wages. On many occasions they had no food or money. When 
the Austrahans did allow the people back to work their land, 
there was never enough time to be able to do much, and 
sometimes the Australians closed off the area for a week or a 
month and then the gardens and fields were worthless again, 
Nhom remained in Dat Do until 1975 when he returned to 
Long Tan to reclaim his land and rebuild his house. He now 
works for the Long Dat district committee and is a member of 
the Long Tan village committee. Two of his sons were killed 
and one lost an arm. Two still live in Long Dat district, as do 
his wife and daughters. 
Mrs Nguyen Thi Con, 69 years of age, was born in the Dat 
Do area and her husband who died in 1975, had been born in 
Long Tan. In 1966 the couple had four sons, the eldest two 
being away in the local forces. As her husband was very ill, 
she and her two sons had to work for other people in Dat Do 
to survive. They rented a small shack. 
In late 1966 the older of the two boys still with her was con-
scripted by the Saigon Army and sent away from Phuoc Tuy. 
In 1968 her fourth son, then 15, lost his hand when he was hit 
by Australian artillery while working in their garden at Long 
Tan. 
She called him forward, and he was very embarrassed by 
the attention. He was good-looking and about 30 years of 
age, and his arm ended about 5 centimetres above the wrist. 
He repeated what had happened in the incident. The son who 
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was conscripted into the Saigon Army was still alive and was 
back living in Long Tan. There appears no animosity toward 
him and the situation keeps coming up all the time. 
An old man, Mr Tan Van Mau, was also born in Long Tan 
village. In 1966 he was 57, married, and with one daughter. 
When the Australians came and the people were moved, he 
also went into the bush with the revolutionary forces. He had 
been a soldier during the war with the French. His wife and 
daughter had gone to Dat Do where they were lucky enough 
to have relatives. They were accepted by these relatives but 
life was hard and they had no money. They supported 
themselves by working for other people — there were very 
few ways to make a living and so many people displaced. In 
1968 his wife became ill and died. He worried about his 
daughter being on her own, but there was little he could do. 
She was helped as much as possible by the cadres but this was 
not very much. He managed to see her occasionally but there 
was little he could do to help her financially. 
He was not a soldier but was involved with political work 
with the cadres. This was a dangerous existence as they had to 
move from village to village, rallying and encouraging the 
people. They could never stay too long in the one place and 
spent most of their time in the bush. There were times when 
he went to the base areas of the Long Hais and several times 
he had been as far away as the Nui May Taos. 
He was wounded by artillery near Xuyen Moc in about 
December 1966. When he pulled up his shirt there was a long 
raised scar running from his armpit almost to the centre of his 
back. He now lives in Long Tan with his daughter and has 
rebuilt his house, which was destroyed in 1966. 
Mr Tran Tan Vui was 76 and born in Long Tan village. In 
1966 he was married with five sons and a daughter. He recall-
ed that the Saigon Army forced the people to leave and, when 
they attempted to return, the Australians stopped them. 
There was always artillery coming into the area, and troops, 
and the villagers were afraid to go back. 
He and his family moved to Dat Do where he managed to 
eke out a living. When they left Long Tan in 1966 they had a 
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good house but when he came back later in the year to work, 
the home had been destroyed. 
Four of his five sons were in the local forces, and three of 
them were killed; the other son died of an illness in 1968. Mr 
Vui said that he remained in Dat Do until liberation because 
the Saigon Army had continued to keep all the people away 
from Long Tan after the Australians left in about 1972 
(November 1971). He has since rebuilt his home in Long Tan 
and lives there with his only surviving son and daughter. 
The other stories were all much the same and I sat there 
fascinated by the sound of the voices and the looks on the 
people's faces as they spoke. The solemnity and the sadness, 
interspersed with anger, was interrupted several times by the 
dog fights, but it was a sombre time of remembering things 
that are probably better forgotten. 
Throughout these interviews, the man sitting beside me had 
been quiet and reserved. When I had finished with the others, 
Thang said, indicating this man, that there was one more per-
son I had better speak to. Thang and his sense of humour 
again. We shook hands and I was introduced to Mr Le Tranh. 
Thang looked at me slyly and said that Tranh had been the 
deputy commanding officer in the D445. He had also been at 
the battle with the Australians in the rubber plantation. I 
looked from one to the other and they were both smiling as if 
they had just pulled off a huge joke on me. I had to sit a mo-
ment collecting my thoughts in preparation for this en-
counter. If what Thang had said was correct, then this would 
be very important. In spite of all his jokes, I never doubted 
Thang by this time. 
Tranh was a small wiry man with a pleasant demeanour, 
beneath which lay a lot of confidence. It was easy to see that 
he was held in respect by all those in the room. He was born in 
Long Tan village in 1945, he said, and joined the army in 
1959. In 1961 he was transferred to the local D445 Battalion, 
which was then only two companies, and by 1966 he had risen 
through the ranks to a deputy platoon commander. He said 
that he had been involved in many actions against the 
Australians in the Long Hais, Baria, the Nui Dinh Hills and 
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in Long Khanh province. In 1969 he was promoted to com-
pany commander of C3 Company of the D445 and in 1972 
became the deputy battalion commander. 
In June 1974 he was transferred to the Staff Military 
School in Binh Long province for promotional training. 
When he finished his training course the following year, he 
became the battalion commander of Battalion 2, Regiment 3, 
new northern units. His unit took part in the final offensive 
on Saigon in April. 
After the liberation his unit was based in Ho Chi Minh City 
until May. The army then began to implement major reforms 
and cutbacks, and Tranh's battalion became part of the Army 
Economic Division, based in Phuoc Long province; they 
engaged in all sorts of economic work, from building roads to 
farming. Tranh was promoted to senior captain and became a 
staff officer at Divisional Headquarters, where he was 
welfare officer for his division. 
He voluntarily retired in December 1976 and went back to 
the village of Long Phuoc. When the border war with Kam-
puchea broke out in 1977 he tried to re-enlist but did not pass 
the medical test as he had been seriously wounded four times 
since I960. He came back to Long Phuoc and then to Long 
Tan where he now lives and works. 
According to Tranh the D445 was only a local battalion in 
1966 with a strength of only 200 to 250 men. This was broken 
down to platoons of 10 to 12 men, but with some of the 
mobile platoons containing 12 to 15. 
Tranh was at the battle of Long Tan and was wounded by 
artillery in the closing stages of the action. His was an in-
teresting story and confirmed what Colonel Hai had told me 
in Bien Hoa. The other fascinating side was that one part of 
his story was exactly the same as an incident related to me by 
Sergeant J. Miles (and described in my previous book. The 
Soldiers' Story). There was no way the two stories could be so 
closely alike when the Vietnamese knew nothing of our side of 
the story, except the little bits of information they heard from 
me. Jimmy Miles had this to say: 
The thing that sticks in my mind from that time was that one 
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group of Viet Cong were either carrying or dragging a 57 
millimetre recoilless rifle, which is an anti-tank weapon. One 
group of them looked back and saw the carriers, and I don't 
know whether they stopped to try to mount the gun to fire it at us 
or whether they wanted to drop it and get away, as we were fairly 
close to them at this stage. The gun was put on the ground and 
one of the armoured personnel carriers put on a great burst of 
speed and headed directly for the gun. I think the carrier ran 
straight over the top of it and the crew. 
Tranh said that his platoon was given the job of trying to 
hold the APCs on the edge of the rubber plantation. He said 
there was no way they were capable of stopping them as their 
unit only had several anti-tank weapons (no specific number) 
and two machineguns. They were there only to slow down the 
reinforcements. Tranh thought there had been 11 APCs in the 
advance across the river (there had been seven). He said that 
he and his men had tried to stop the APCs on the edge of the 
rubber plantation, but they had been too strong for them. In 
fact one had advanced quickly and run over one of his gun 
crew after they had fired a round and were trying to reload, 
they had lost one B40 anti-tank rocket and one DKZ (his 
description). Tranh said that he heard later that one of his 
crew, his friend and companion Thom, had been captured by 
the Australians but he was not sure whether it was that day or 
in the morning. Thom had never been heard of again. 
When Tranh moved away from the APC advance, he was 
wounded in the side and leg by Australian artillery. He was 
unable to walk so his companions carried him to the edge of 
the plantation out of the battle area. They then took him to 
one of their many aid stations where he remained for the 
night. Early the following day he was carried by his comrades 
to their bases in the Nui May Tao mountains — they were 
quite secure there and had a lot of medical supplies. 
His wound was not as severe as he had at first thought and 
he recovered well enough after about four months to par-
ticipate in active work again. He went on a reconnaissance 
mission with two others near what he called the Big Pagoda, 
in the vicinity of grid reference 460660. Here they ran into an 
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Australian patrol and there was a brief fire fight. Tranh 
managed to escape, but the two men with him were wounded 
and he had to leave them. He assumed they were captured. He 
became most distressed when telling of this incident for, as 
far as he was concerned, the two are Missing in Action 
(MIA). Whether they were killed in the ambush or sent to a 
prisoner of war compound run by the South Vietnamese is 
really irrelevant — they have not surfaced since 1975 and it 
seems unlikely they would still be alive. Again, this story of 
"the missing ones". There are literally hundreds of thousands 
of stories like this waiting to be told all over Vietnam. It really 
makes the American MIAs seem almost a very small chapter 
on the war. For every American MIA there are at least ten 
Vietnamese. 
I brought the subject back to the Australian presence and 
the tactics used by the Australians in an attempt to relieve the 
situation. When I asked what he thought of the Austrahan 
troops he said that even though they were puppet troops they 
had fought well. They had much better discipline and tactics 
than the American units he had encountered. However, with 
each encounter with the Australians their forces had learned 
lessons and developed tactics to foil the Australian units. 
Their counter-attack tactics became better and they would use 
the counter-attack to move out of ambush positions. One of 
the tactics they developed was to move groups with three men 
ahead of main columns. This way, if the first group were at-
tacked, the following group could counter-attack very quickly 
before artillery could be brought down; and the close tactics 
inhibited the effectiveness of artillery. They trained for dif-
ferent scenarios in their base camps although much of it was 
general training, not special tactics. 
He asked me if I knew of the two Australians who had been 
captured during the battle. I said that I had heard the story, 
but there was no confirmation of it from our side. I then ask-
ed him if he had seen the Australians and he said no, he had 
only heard the story that two wounded who had been cap-
tured were killed by Australian artillery as they were being 
carried from the plantation. I asked him to show me on the 
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map where he believed the Australians had been and he 
pointed to the Eleven Platoon position and said he heard they 
were killed toward where the Ten Platoon group had been 
stopped. He was a very competent map reader and had no 
hesitation in pinpointing any area. I asked whether the D445 
people had been the ones who were supposed to have picked 
up the Austrahans but again he was unsure. He had only 
heard the story. 
We sat at the table talking and laughing and discussing this 
and that aspect of the war in Phuoc Tuy. The time had come 
to depart and I was again reluctant to go. There was a feeling 
of camaraderie between us and 1 was to find that this is very 
strong among old soldiers in Vietnam. That I fought on the 
opposite side to Tranh does not matter: I had experienced 
some of the things he had experienced and this created a 
bond. Who but a soldier can know of the adrenalin pump 
during an action? Who else knows the moments of degrading 
fear, and the moments of elation and personal power when an 
enemy soldier is in your sights? These things are not common 
experiences and are spoken of only to those who are kin to the 
group, whether they be former friends or foes. 
Tranh asked me could I not stay in Vietnam. 1 replied that 
it was not possible. His eyes twinkled as he made a joke and 
said that if 1 decided to stay then perhaps I could work for 
him in the rice paddies at Long Tan: "You are a big strong 
man Terry and there is much work you could do here. 1 will 
feed you many chickens and perhaps we can find you a young 
wife." The chickens had become a standing joke since my trip 
in August as I had developed a liking for the way they cooked 
their chickens in Long Dat. I always devoured the whole lot 
and Huy and Thang always commented on it. It seemed the 
story of the chicken man had spread. 
I felt there was a good feeling when we left and for that I 
was very thankful. I had not known what to expect and the 
reception was something 1 will always be grateful to the 
people for. Before we went back to Long Dien, Huy said that 
he wanted me to meet his mother and to see the house that he 
had built for her. 1 was touched by this and accepted grate-
fully. 
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We went to a house set 20 metres back from the road. It 
was on about two hectares of land and surrounded by banana 
and fruit trees. There were several heaps of building material 
around and the house looked quite large. When we left the car 
and walked to the house, I began to see how nice it was. There 
was a large verandah on the front, the floor of which was 
tiled. Inside, I was introduced to Huy's mother and his grand-
aunt. I stood looking around, impressed at the interior of the 
house. 
There was no ceiling and this made the walls seem very 
high. A gable roof was supported by full logs standing 
possibly 4.5 metres high. These had been adzed to almost the 
same circumference and then stained and polished. The house 
was all one space as most Vietnamese houses in the provinces 
are, but several "rooms" were formed by bamboo screens. 
The floor was tiled with beautiful ceramic tiles. The 
atmosphere felt friendly and comfortable. Huy asked how I 
liked the house and I replied that I would like to have it in 
Brisbane, which was true. 
We sat down to tea with his mother. She is probably the 
person from those trips who remains with me most. It became 
very obvious quite quickly that Huy was very proud of his 
mother and that they were very close. She had a quiet and 
gracious air about her that immediately made her stand out. 
After arranging the tea, she sat at the table and we sat sipping 
and talking while the sky grew dark and the rain clouds bank-
ed ominously for the afternoon rainstorm. 
As related by Huy, she had two sons and her husband had 
died fighting the French in 1953. When the people were 
shifted from Long Tan by the Saigon Army and then denied 
access by the Australians, she moved to Long Dien where she 
had relatives. She came back later in 1966 as often as she 
could to work on the fields and the gardens, but this was very 
difficult as Long Dien is a long way from Long Tan. The 
house they had at Long Tan had been destroyed and had 
stood on the spot where we now sat. 
When the people had to move, no explanation was given to 
them. They attempted to come back soon after the Americans 
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had gone, but the Australians had forced all the people to go 
back to Dat Do or Long Dien. 
Huy's mother was fearful for the safety of her sons and she 
was afraid for them the whole time. Having sons in the 
revolutionary forces made it very difficult for her, as the 
Saigon Army knew of the family situation. They would often 
come and take her away and question her but she was never 
imprisoned. The Saigon Army also sent her many letters tell-
ing her to call back her sons to the government. She thought 
this was very funny that they should think that she would call 
back her sons to support the American puppets. "Vietnam 
belonged to the Vietnamese, not the government in Saigon 
who danced to the American tunes and who allowed the 
women to become whores for the GIs," she said. When I ask-
ed if she had been in prison she said quite calmly that she had. 
As it turned out, it was not the Vietnamese who had imprison-
ed her, but the French. While her husband was with the Viet 
Minh and during her involvement with the movement, she 
was imprisoned several times between 1950 and 1953, the last 
time for 18 months. 
Her quiet way and the strength that she exuded made it 
seem all so casual when she spoke of her life. Even when she 
spoke of the death of her son it was with an air of acceptance 
and quiet dignity. She did not see her son's body after he was 
killed in Long Hais, but she learned of his death very shortly 
after the event. She said there was no shortage of information 
about their families during the war. The local people knew 
very quickly who had been killed and who had been wounded. 
She came back to Long Tan in 1975 and the family built the 
house. She was happy to work in the garden and we went out-
side where she proudly showed me her plots of corn and in-
troduced me to the fruit trees and the pepper vines growing 
around the trees. The simple words she spoke as 1 was leaving 
had more impact on me than any of the other meetings I had 
in Vietnam: "I wish for no more war. Life is very hard and 
very lonely when you have lost a husband and a son. I have 
cried long and often at night for them, but they are gone and I 
will not see them or hear them again in this life." 
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When we got back to Dat Do that afternoon there was great 
excitement as we stopped the car. One of the officials spoke 
to Huy and he hurried into his office leaving Thang and 1 
standing beside the car not knowing what to do. Huy came to 
the door of his office and beckoned to us excitedly. 
Inside he pointed to a square brass plate on the table. The 
plaque from the Long Tan Cross. I had looked at the cross 
with no emotion but I could not say the same for the plaque. 
It was covered in scale and there was no way that anyone 
would know what it was, but sitting there on the table it had a 
strange and haunting presence about it. 
The plaque was really something I did not expect to see. 
When I had returned to Australia in August I had mentioned 
the cross and the plaque to several of the ex-members of my 
old company. Chiko Miller had gone back to Vietnam for a 
second tour in 1971 and had been at the training area at Van 
Kiep just east of Baria. He had been involved with the train-
ing of Cambodian troops and during a training exercise had 
gone back to the Long Tan rubber plantation. He had inten-
tionally diverted the patrol to look at the cross and told me 
that the plaque was gone then. He had naturally assumed that 
an Australian soldier had taken it, as by that time it was ap-
parent that the Australians were about to end their Vietnam 
commitment. 
Yet here it was sitting on the table in Huy's office. By this 
time I was excited myself and we set to work trying to clean 
the plaque without damaging it. After 30 minutes of careful 
work we could read the writing. It was the original plaque and 
we rubbed chalk into it to bring up the writing and then took 
several photographs. Huy asked me if I wanted to take it back 
to Australia with me and I said no. 1 am extremely sorry now 
that 1 refused the opportunity. My intention was to leave the 
cross and the plaque together, with the thought that it may 
help in getting the medical supplies for the Long Dat hospital. 
To date this has not happened. 
We sat down in Huy's office later and talked of the last two 
days. He was extremely pleased that all had gone off so well. 
As in Hanoi, there is no way that officials can say with any 
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certainty that they can arrange something productive. It all 
depends on how the people view the person they are to meet. I 
thought later that was probably the reason Tranh sat through 
all the talk with the other people before he decided to speak. 
The next day we were to leave Long Dat and go to Chau 
Due, which has been renamed again and is now Chau Thanh 
district to talk to the people there. We said our goodbyes and 
arranged to meet with Huy before we went back to Ho Chi 
Minh City. The two days had exhausted us all and when we 
got to the hotel we sat with the sea breeze blowing over us and 
drank several bottles of beer with no labels. The thought of 
going to Chau Due excited me because that was where the 
Task Force had been. Perhaps this time 1 would get to see the 
base at Nui Dat after all these years. 
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'^Mother, I Die" 
Long Phuoc and Hoa Long 
The next morning was an early start. Huy came to meet us 
and decided that he would also go to Long Phuoc and Hoa 
Long. As we drove toward the village I sat looking at the 
countryside and wondering what I was doing here. There were 
so many questions, but was it really worth the effort? Was 1 
imposing myself on these people in an attempt to justify 
myself or was it an ego trip for me? Who really cared about 
the whole damn mess anyway. It was too late for those 
academic questions as the car moved closer to the old town of 
Long Phuoc. 
Long Phuoc had been a large thriving village of over 3000 
people in 1966, before the Australians came, and was situated 
about 1500 metres from where the Task Force was established 
at Nui Dat. It had been a centre of resistance from the time of 
the French and was looked on as a liberated village by the VC, 
according to one of the local histories. This of course was no 
different from most villages in Vietnam at that dme. Long 
Phuoc, however, was unlucky enough to be just where the 
Australians wanted to locate their base camp and so it had to 
go. 
The Australian journalist Pat Burgess had been to Long 
Phuoc in 1965 and has since written several articles about the 
destruction of the village. When I became aware of how many 
times Burgess had written of Long Phuoc I knew that I was 
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not the only one who had been concerned at the destruction 
of the town. I was not appalled at the destruction of the town 
as such — that was a part of being a soldier — but what began 
to worry me about the exercise over the years was the 
rationale behind it. There was no logical connection between 
the destruction of the town and the purported aim of helping 
the South Vietnamese people. The two concepts were incom-
patible. How can you help the people by destroying 
everything they own? Of course this was not the way that the 
military mind worked. The choices for a military thinker were 
simple and very straightforward. "We are here. Our security 
is important. That village could be a threat, therefore it has to 
go. The people will understand because the issue is so 
simple." It may have been simple to the commanders of the 
Task Force but it lacked logic to the locals whose houses and 
property were destroyed, whose means of livelihood were 
taken away, and whose lives were placed in jeopardy. 
Burgess wrote an article about Long Phuoc in the Bulletin 
of 21 August 1976, ten years after it had been destroyed by 
Australian troops. He wrote: 
Camped among the groves of durian, banana and Hme I wrote in 
a despatch, "You could spend the rest of your life here, if the 
Australians and 'they', the Vietcong would let you". 
Long Phuoc was a village of deep, cool wells, of fishponds 
shaded by flowering, shrubs, of verandahs made for the children 
to play around and to shade the old from the Phuoc Tuy sun. 
In almost every yard there were wood shavings. It was a village 
of craftsmen who made their own furniture, who carved even 
their own candlesticks. It was also, it turned out, a village of 
riflemen . . . 
But they [Australians] still burned it. Onto the flames they still 
had to throw the hand-carved candlesticks, the old exercise book, 
the flimsy parasol, the tiny rubber thong. 
When the American 173rd Airborne Brigade mounted 
Operation Hardihood they shifted the people from Long 
Phuoc while they searched the area and cleaned out any 
resistance in the village. In one corner of the village they en-
countered strong VC resistance. On day one of the operation. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
152 A Soldier Returns 
according to their after-acfion report, two of their companies 
lost II killed and 21 wounded on the north-east corner of the 
village. The report makes no menfion of refugees from the 
operation, so it must be assumed that the Long Phuoc people 
were not considered as such. They were shifted from the 
village in order to keep them away from any fighting that 
might occur. In fact they attempted to return as soon as the 
Americans had moved away. 
Long Phuoc was a large sprawling village of well-
constructed houses surrounded by fruit trees and gardens. 
The job of destroying the town was given to 6 RAR and it was 
done with a vengeance in two weeks. I was on the operation 
myself and can attest that very little remained of Long Phuoc 
when we left. I can also confirm that at least one civilian was 
killed during the operation while she was collecting fruit. The 
6 RAR Battalion History records that "Some months after 
the operation the Government of the Republic of South Viet-
nam gazetted that Long Phuoc no longer existed, and its 
name was removed from the official record of existing com-
munities". Official battahon records report that 537 dwell-
ings were destroyed. 
The people were told to move and not come back. They 
went to Dat Do, Long Dien and Hoa Long, and received no 
compensation for the loss of their homes or their livelihood 
and no help with any sort of resettlement. They were just told 
to move and were then forgotten. There is no doubt that this 
move was an Australian initiative — Australian documents 
confirm it. A Current Civil Affairs Policy, paper dated 14 
June 1966, states: 
Comd 1 ATF has requested the Province Chief to arrange the 
complete evacuation of all civilians from the 1 ATF base camp 
area out to a radius of 4000 yards (excluding Hoa Long). See 
Annex P. This request has been met and the Province Chief has 
advised that all civilians will have conformed by 21 Jun 66. 
The Task Force at that time had only a very small Civil Af-
fairs unit and could do little to help these people. When ques-
tioned by me during an interview about the destruction of 
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Long Phuoc, Brigadier Jackson, the Task Force commander 
at the time, said that because of all the tunnels in the village 
the villagers had to be forced out. He said, "We were forced 
literally to move people out to destroy the diggings 
underneath their houses. We rather preferred to go do that 
than kill the villagers." When I asked about the word "reset-
tled" used in all the Australian documents and many books, 
he commented: 
Well I wouldn't say we had a resettlement program at that stage, 
it was too early in the piece for that. We had a civil aid unit to 
help these people and generally help the local populace. That was 
what our civil aid was all about. So from that point of view, yes 
we helped resettle them. But I wouldn't say at that stage of the 
game we had the resources or the knowledge or the ability to do a 
reseulement program. On the quesdon of compensation 1 think 
the Province Chief helped. But there was nothing that 1 know of 
from Australian resources. Unless you would say medical sup-
plies, but no actual, we'll build a house for you. We talked to the 
Province Chief, but his resources were limited too. The fact was 
that when you had civilians on a piece of terrain that was impor-
tant to you, you get rid of the civilians first and get on with the 
job and destroy what you have to destroy, and don't destroy the 
civilians. That is the thing we did right. I think we could have 
done more. 
John Donohoe, the civil affairs commander in 1966, also 
interviewed, looks back on the plight of the people from Long 
Phuoc with a great deal of regret. 
All those people from Long Phuoc were the ones who went into 
Hoa Long. Well a lot of them went into Hoa Long and there was 
no work for them. They weren't starving but they were bloody 
hungry and they were dirt poor. As for the compensation. The 
only money I knew of was when I came across a family that I 
knew had been kicked out, had nothing and was really battling. I 
would personally give them money or goods. Brigadier Jackson 
just had too many things on his plate. He had a big Task Force 
and there were just too many things on the operational side 
without worrying about civil affairs. 
The people of Long Phuoc certainly had no reason to be 
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joyful about the Australian presence in their province twenty 
years ago and I felt trepidation as the car turned into the main 
street. 
The town had been rebuilt and everywhere there were signs 
of construction and progress. Many of the houses had been 
built in the traditional style and the area looked the same as 
the day we had driven in to begin the destruction, except that 
now there were people about, many people on the streets, and 
children who came running when they saw the car. They 
followed us to the council hall, running and laughing behind 
us. At the hall a large crowd of people were standing outside, 
all smiling and very polite. When we went in there were at 
least 20 people to meet us and those outside hung in through 
the windows and the two doors. 
Introductions were made and tea was brought. I then had 
to explain to the people why I was there and what I would like 
from them. When I had finished there was silence in the room 
as they all digested what was said. One of the men had been 
delegated as spokesman and quickly we began to get down to 
the serious issues. His name was Mr Le Van Hon and I did 
not get to find out his position in the village hierarchy. He 
was about 55, with a Ho Chi Minh beard and a very confident 
air. He wore clean peasant clothes. 
In a very forthright manner he began by saying that, as 1 
was an Australian, he had two things to tell me of the 
Australians in Phuoc Tuy. One, he said, was bad and the 
other good. The bad point was that the Australians came to 
Nui Dat and created much destruction in Phuoc Tuy and 
especially Long Phuoc. They destroyed many things, the 
town and the houses. They destroyed many productive paddy 
fields and gardens, and many local people were killed by the 
Australian artillery and troops, as were many cattle. The 
good thing he had to say about the Australian troops was that 
they were orderly and disciplined. They never molested the 
women or the young girls and they did not steal from the peo-
ple as the Saigon Army and the Americans had done. For this 
he was thankful, but in no way excused the policies that were 
adopted and the harm that was done to the people and the 
district. 
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As Hon remembered, in 1966 the Americans had come first 
and shifted the people from Long Phuoc. They had forced all 
the villagers to move to other places. Then they bombed and 
used artillery on the town, and many houses were destroyed. 
After that operation the province chief. Colonel Dat, in 
charge of the Saigon Army in Baria, had said that if Long 
Phuoc remained then Baria would fall. After the Americans 
had left, the people tried to come back, but were prevented by 
the Australians. The Australians then completely destroyed 
Long Phuoc and the people were arrested if they went into the 
area. Hon said he thought it was an American plan, com-
pleted by the Australians. During the first few months after 
the removal and destruction of the town at least 10 people 
were killed by Australian troops and the Australians paid for 
the funerals, but there was never any money paid as compen-
sation for the loss of their homes and livelihoods. A small 
quantity of supplies was given to some people but it was not 
enough. It consisted of rice and dried fish. Many people were 
very hungry and were not allowed on to their own land to 
grow food. They also ran the risk of being killed if they went 
back to retrieve building material. This created much resent-
ment toward the Austrahans. 
There was a period of some months when the people were 
absolutely forbidden to go back to their land, and after that 
the Australians allowed them to go back during the day to 
work their fields and gardens. During the restricted periods 
several people went back into the area to retrieve possessions 
or to find strayed cattle. They were killed by the Australians. 
He also said there were several people killed while the 
Australians were completing the destruction of the town. 
Much destruction was also caused by the armoured vehicles 
running over the paddies and destroying the bunds, the 
gardens and the fruit trees. 
Many people had to squat on any vacant land they could 
find and build themselves small huts of straw and thatch. 
Most of their furniture and equipment had remained in Long 
Phuoc and was destroyed. Hon claimed that aU the people 
dispossessed were so poor afterwards that their children 
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received no education because the children had to work to 
help support the families. He said, "there were only several 
schools in Hoa Long, and we were the outsiders". 
They had only returned to Long Phuoc since Liberation 
and are now trying to build again all they had lost from that 
time. They may be able to rebuild, but he said there was 
nothing that could repay them for the wasted years and the 
loss of pride they had endured, or the innocent people who 
had been killed during the period. 
I sat listening to all he had to say and kept watching the 
changing emotions on his face. He went from sadness to 
resignation to anger and back to resignation. His voice had 
remained calm and controlled but by the time he had finished 
it was apparent that he was emotionally drained. He was not 
alone because I was feeling drained myself by that time. He 
gestured around the table at the people and invited me to 
speak to whomever I liked for verification of what he had 
said. Perhaps I am naive, but I did not require any verifica-
tion from the people. Still, I needed their personal accounts 
and so I began a round of interviews that left me shattered 
and depressed. Again they have the common theme of suffer-
ing and hardship caused by Australian policies. Blame the 
war or blame the Australian Army, in the final analysis it 
makes no difference, the suffering remains and the memory 
will never be wiped away. 
All the interviews are similar stories to those of the Long 
Tan people except that many more of the Long Phuoc people 
had relatives killed or wounded by artillery or Austrahan 
troops. This is because of the fact that many of them moved 
to Hoa Long, less than two kilometres from the Task Force, 
and tried to save their possessions and crops in the 1966 
period. I have only included one interview here because it has 
haunted me ever since. 
Mrs Tran Huu Su was 65 years old and was born in Long 
Phuoc. In 1966 she was a widow with two daughters, aged 13 
and 16. She lived in the family house in Long Phuoc and 
worked the family ricefield and gardens. At that time her 
house was a large timber dwelling, a very good house, she 
said. 
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When the Americans and the Australians came and forced 
all the people out, she went with many other Long Phuoc peo-
ple to Hoa Long. She had no relatives in Hoa Long, which 
made it very difficult for her and her daughters. There was no 
compensation given for the loss of her house and livelihood 
and so with the help of her daughters she built a small thatch-
ed house on a piece of vacant ground on the outskirts of the 
town. They found enough timber to make a small wooden 
bed and they all slept together in that. She said the hut was 
very small and there was hardly room for anything else once 
the bed was inside. 
For the first few months no one was allowed back into the 
area of Long Phuoc, so there was no way they could work 
their land. They had to work for low wages for other people 
when they could in order to survive and received no help from 
the Australians. At times they barely had enough to eat. Mrs 
Su's brother was killed during this time when he returned to 
Long Phuoc to salvage some of his possessions. She said, 
"My brother, after we were forced to move, went back to 
Long Phuoc in order to salvage some building material in 
order to build another house. We heard that he was killed by 
the Australians. We recovered his body and buried him in 
Hoa Long." 
In late 1966 the Australians allowed the people of Long 
Phuoc to go back and work their land, but there were restric-
tions that made things very difficult. She and her daughters 
began to work their paddy and garden, as well as working for 
other people in order to hve. In Long Phuoc by this time there 
was nothing left of the town. It had been completely 
destroyed. 
In early 1967 she and her eldest daughter were returning to 
Hoa Long from Long Phuoc after working in their garden. 
They heard the sound of shooting close by and were very 
afraid, so they ran to get away from the area. She had been in 
front of her daughter and heard her call out, "Mother, 1 die. I 
die". When she turned her daughter was on the ground 
bleeding badly from the chest. She ran back to her but before 
she reached her an Australian patrol had emerged from the 
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bush and surrounded them both. The Australians attempted 
to attend to her daughter and bandaged her wound but she 
died while they were doing this. 
Mrs Su carried her daughter back to Hoa Long and attend-
ed to the funeral arrangements. There was no help from the 
Austrahans. 
She and her surviving daughter continued to live in the 
small shack and to eke out a living as best they could. In 1968 
she became very ill, which made life even more difficult for 
the daughter, who then had to try to help her mother as well 
as do heavy work in the fields. 
After 1975 mother and daughter rebuilt their house in Long 
Phuoc and they now live there along with the daughter's 
family. 
When all of the interviews were finished, we went outside 
to the car and said our goodbyes to the people. Driving away 
from the town was a relief as I had been deeply disturbed by 
what I had heard. I kept telling myself that even though I 
knew what they were saying was basically correct, the lack of 
respect accorded to these people from the Australian military 
machine could not have been so bad. There must have been 
some compassion on the part of the military toward these 
people. I was to find out later that what they had told me had 
an even more sordid side to it. 
As we drove from Long Phuoc to Hoa Long the thought of 
Mrs Su telling of the death of her daughter kept coming back 
to me. "Mother, I die. I die." If she was telling me Hes she 
was the most convincing liar I had ever met. 
One of the people I had been trying to find was the woman 
who had been at the centre of the infamous "water torture" 
allegations that had received much publicity in Australia in 
1968. I really had not expected her to be alive, but had per-
sistently shown her photograph to every official from Ho Chi 
Minh City to Long Tan. When I showed it to one of the Hoa 
Long officials he looked at me in surprise and informed me 
the lady was his cousin and that she lived in Hoa Long village. 
A meeting was arranged and we went to her hamlet and 
stopped the car on the edge of the dirt road. Everyone 
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aUghted and we walked down a narrow shaded track until we 
came to the house of the lady. The house was made of straw 
and mud approximately three metres square. A small crowd 
of villagers stood around outside and children were chattering 
excitedly about this unusual happening. As I made my way 
towards the crowd at the house, a woman, quite tall for a 
Vietnamese, stepped out of the doorway and came to greet 
me. 
Her face was instantly recognisable from the 1966 
photographs of her that 1 had with me in my briefcase. As I 
took her hand which she offered in greeting, a small, strained 
smile pulled up the corners of her mouth and she turned and 
ushered me into her small, impoverished home. 
I had been trying to trace her since 1986, and now 1 was at 
last meeting her. She had no idea that twenty-years back she 
had become quite well known in Australia. The water torture 
case was widely reported in the media and there had even been 
a poem written about the woman. 
She sat me down at her small table and an old woman sat 
near her and her husband behind. The skin on her face was 
stretched taut from the strain of the meeting and she said 
quietly and with great dignity, "It was a terrible time for 
me". Barely perceptibly, she shuddered as the memory 
returned. Her small brown hands were clasped tightly, the 
knuckles white, as she stared abstractedly at the table. 
The story of this woman has remained to this day one of 
the most controversial events concerning Australia's involve-
ment in the Vietnam conflict. Different versions of what 
actually happened abound and no-one, at the time, or since, 
seems to have been able to complete the picture accurately. 
Pat Burgess in his book Warco, stated that the woman had 
been captured by D Company 6 RAR, but I had been in D 
Company myself and could not recall the incident. I did some 
checking and found that the unit that captured the woman 
was in fact B Company 6 RAR, the date 24 October 1966. 
Robin (Spike) Jones was a section commander in B Company 
and remembers capturing her in a cave on the southern side of 
the Nui Dinh hills mass while on a three-day patrol. The com-
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pany also found a radio and other equipment in another cave. 
According to Jones's recollections, it was almost dusk when 
the woman was found and too late to call in a helicopter, so 
she had been bound for the night and flown to Nui Dat the 
next day. That was all he knew of the incident undl the story 
broke in the papers in March 1968. 
Interpretations of the events that followed including the 
water torture, vary in severity according to who is telling the 
story. But the important thing is that it was admitted by the 
minister for the Army at the time that some form of water 
torture was used, contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Conven-
tions, in order to make the woman talk. In his statement to 
parliament Lynch admitted that the incident did happen, but 
that it was not severe. The matter was closed. 
I was now going to hear the story from the woman herself. 
As she began to speak, she seemed to be experiencing a dread-
ful vision. She spoke quietly, and as she did so, her eyes 
moved slowly from her hands to my face and then to the 
others in the room and slowly back to the hands, tightly clen-
ched. It seemed as if she was fighting desperately to stop the 
hands from moving, but knew she was losing the battle. She 
stopped struggling with them only once during the whole 
time, when the pain of the memory overwhelmed her and two 
small tears welled up in her eyes. Blinking valiantly to hold 
them back, but to no avail, she quickly wiped the palm of her 
hand across her eyes and continued speaking as if the momen-
tary loss of composure had never happened. The words of the 
Warrant Officer administering the torture, as reported in a 
newspaper article, came back to me, "The bloody bitch is 
tough. I can't break her". What the soldier had failed to ap-
preciate was the dignity of the woman. 
The following is her account to me of what happened. I 
have also included the recollections of Lieutenant Johii 
O'Halloran, the patrol leader who captured her. 
Her name was To Thi Nau and she was born in the village 
of Hoa Long in 1943. She joined the revolutionary movement 
in 1964. In 1966, at the time of her capture, she had been part 
of the Chau Due District Company and had been serving in a 
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Women's Propaganda and Medical Unit. The company's 
main job was to move around the Saigon Army (ARVN) units 
and try to influence the soldiers to desert to the Viet Cong. 
They also assisted the Chau Due Company in many ways and 
acted as couriers and information gatherers. 
The day she was captured she had been in the Nui Dinhs, 
which she described as the Nui Thi Vai hills, and had been 
there to report to a small unit of the VC Main Force 274 Regi-
ment which was operating in the area. When the Australians 
were seen, the small unit of the 274 quickly left the position 
and moved further up into the hills. She moved from the 
camp into a small cave, hoping that the Australians would not 
find her. They did, however, and brought her to the surface. 
By then it was almost dark and she accompanied them until 
they stopped for the night, when she was tied up until morn-
ing. She was then flown out by helicopter, by which time she 
had lost all hope and did not know where she was taken or 
how long it took. 
John O'Halloran remembers that 5 and 6 Platoon of B 
Company 6 RAR saw one of the VC soldiers and attempted 
an assauU on the camp. About 30 shots were fired and there 
were no casuahies from either side. They then searched the 
camp and saw a wire leading into a small cave in the rocks. 
O'Halloran's company commander ordered him to send two 
men into the cave; two privates, Kerry Rooney and Mick Bir-
chell, volunteered for the job (both were later killed during 
the battle near Hoi My in February 1967). O'Halloran said 
Birchell and Rooney told him they found the woman stretch-
ed out on the roof of the cave looking down on them hke a 
cat. He cannot remember whether the radio was in the same 
cave as the woman or not but assumes that it was. 
O'Halloran was ordered to take the woman further up the 
hill to a helicopter landing area. He thinks, although he is not 
quite sure, that the whole of his platoon went with him. The 
going was heavier than anticipated, and as he could not make 
it to the landing zone before nightfall, he harboured for the 
night. He kept his men on full alert and tied the woman's 
arms to one of his arms and her legs to one of his. Captor and 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
162 A Soldier Returns 
captive, and an interpreter, spent a very uncomfortable night 
trying to keep the rain out of their small shelter. In the morn-
ing the helicopter arrived and the woman was taken away. 
O'Halloran recalls that when the smoke grenade went off to 
signal the helicopter the woman did not flinch, but when she 
was blindfolded and taken to the helicopter she started to 
tremble and shake violently and could hardly stand. 
To Thi Nau said that during the night she spent with the 
Australians she was treated well and was not hurt or abused in 
any way, except that the Vietnamese interpreter told her that 
if any Australian were shot by her people that night she would 
be killed. 
When she was taken, blindfolded in the helicopter, she was 
almost sick with fear. At Baria, where she believed she was 
taken, she was tortured by Australian soldiers. When I told 
her she was taken to Nui Dat, she was adamant that she had 
never been there. I had to show her the photographs to con-
vince her, and then she shook her head in bewilderment. She 
was taken into a room or a hut (tent) and Australian soldiers 
began to question her. They said she had been a radio 
operator. She knew nothing about radios — the radio had 
been left behind by the 274 Regiment soldiers and she thought 
it had been found in a cave about 50 metres from the one she 
was found in. She said she had never been able to speak or 
understand English. She was then questioned about the VC 
units in the area. When she said she knew nothing of the VC 
units, the Australians became angry and poured water down 
her throat. They were shouting at her in English and the inter-
preter was shouting at her in Vietnamese. By this time she was 
ill from fear and the water, and was close to fainting. 
When she kept saying that she knew nothing of the VC 
units, one of the Australians threw her on the floor and two 
others held her arms out while she thinks a Vietnamese held 
her legs. She was blindfolded but thought from the feel of the 
hands that Austrahans were holding her wrists. An Australian 
then started to pour soapy water down her throat until she 
was choking. She thought she was sure to die. The soap and 
water were making her sick and she was scarcely conscious 
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but the Australian and the Vietnamese still kept screaming at 
her. Then she fainted. When she came around the treatment 
started again. She has no idea how long this went on as she 
had lost all track of time — it might have been one hour or 
four hours, she said. Her words were that when she was close 
to death they finally stopped. She was then forced to sign a 
document but she had no idea what it was. She thought it was 
in English and the Vietnamese told her what it supposedly 
said: that she had been captured in the Nui Dinh hills with a 
radio, that she was a Viet Cong, and had been questioned. 
After she signed the statement, she was blindfolded again and 
taken away. 
A journalist eyewitness to the incident, John Sorell, wrote 
an article describing the event in the Melbourne Herald on 8 
March 1968, after the Army minister had denied the allega-
tions in parliament. 
1 first heard of the girl when I was tipped off that an Australian 
patrol had captured a girl operating a transmitter in the hills east 
[west] of Nui Dat. 
The girl was brought back to the Task Force by helicopter for 
questioning. 
She arrived gagged, blindfolded and wearing a loose black 
jacket and long black pants. She had been ill several times in the 
helicopter flight and had to be half dragged, half carried to the in-
terrogation tent. 
The girl was very thin and obviously had not had much food in 
the last few days. 
She was terrified. When they took off the gag and the blind-
fold, she started to cry hysterically. 
The questioning was under the control of a warrant officer. 
He was a big blond man. 
He dragged the girl into the tent and bound her by rope to a 
chair. 
1 watched from outside the tent. 
I remember him saying. "Don't worry, mate, this little bitch 
will talk by the time I'm finished with her". 
Then he asked a soldier to get him a bucket of water. 
An interpreter asked the girl to give information about the Viet 
Cong units. 
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The girl refused to talk. Then the torture began. 
The girl's head was held back over the top of the chair and the 
warrant officer began to pour water down her throat. Another 
soldier prised open the girl's mouth. The girl immediately began 
to choke. Tears poured from her eyes. 
The water was poured into her mouth from an army field pan-
nikin. After several minutes the torture was stopped. The girl was 
close to fainting. She was asked in vain to give information. 
Again she refused and the water treatment started once again. 
Then I was noticed in the group around the tent. The soldiers 
were obviously embarrassed that an outsider was witnessing the 
torture. 
I was asked to move away as the girl started to scream. The 
soldiers lowered the tent flap as the "questioning" continued. 1 
watched five yards away. 
After about half an hour, the tent was opened and the warrant 
officer walked out. 
He was angry. I can recall him saying: "The bloody bitch is 
tough. I can't break her. But give me half a day and I'll have her 
talking. There are better ways than using water". 
The girl who had fainted was then carried to the POW com-
pound at the camp. 
To Thi Nau thinks she was taken to the prison at Bien Hoa, 
but she said it could have been anywhere. Wherever it was she 
was in a small solitary cell and was tortured twice a day every 
day by Vietnamese while Americans watched. For days she 
was tortured by water and was sexually abused using elec-
tricity. During this "very terrible dme" she had to sign many 
statements, but by then she neither knew nor cared what they 
were. 
After something like 10 days at Bien Hoa she was transfer-
red to what she thought was the General Department of 
Police in Saigon. There she was taken to a room and beaten 
so severely that she was unable to move for several days. By 
then the questioning had stopped, but the beatings continued 
regularly for six months, after which they became less fre-
quent. 
After 12 months she was transferred to Thu Due prison in 
Saigon where thankfully she was treated like an ordinary 
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prisoner and never beaten. She spent twelve months there, 
too, after which she was released and returned to Hoa Long. 
When she came back she had to go to Baria to show her 
release certificate, promise she would stay in her village and 
never follow the Viet Cong again. The police watched her 
closely and often came to her house to check on her 
movements. When 1 asked if she had ever followed the VC 
after her release she shook her head fearfully and her eyes 
grew wide at the thought. 
In 1971 she married and later had two children, but her 
husband died of an illness in 1976. She married again in 1984 
and her life now is very hard. She lives in Ap Tay hamlet in 
Hoa Long village and the family makes a living from the few 
fruit trees they own and from doing whatever work they can 
find for other people. Their tiny mud hut home has a straw 
roof and a dirt floor. There is very little furniture except the 
small table and chairs and several ornaments. 
1 sat looking at her, her husband, and the people crowded 
around the entrance to the small hut. I thought again of old 
Mrs Xiu looking at the blood-stained hootchy and thinking of 
her son. Once again I had to confront the fact that we were 
supposed to be the good guys, and yet we let ourselves slip 
over the edge. We can make the excuse that the treatment 
meted out to Mrs Nau was not really excessive and if anyone 
should be blamed then it is the South Vietnamese. But we 
were the ones who handed her over to them and then we relin-
quished responsibility, knowing that something very severe 
would happen to her. We knew all about the brutality of our 
ally and anyone who says we didn't is not telling the truth. 
Pat Burgess in his book Warco (1986) quotes journahst John 
Sorell as saying, "We all knew the Vietnamese used torture — 
the enemy, as weU as the army of Thieu and Ky". Yet we 
handed over literally hundreds of people to the South Viet-
namese and never even asked what happened to them after 
that. If they were butchered or tortured or thrown in the 
"tiger cages" of Con Son island then that was nothing to do 
with us. 
I closed my notebook and walked away from Mrs Nau's 
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tiny decrepit little house and cursed myself for coming back 
to this place and having to confront these issues. I could never 
change them, so what the hell was I doing here. As I drove 
through Hoa Long, the quesdon kept running through my 
mind. 
At the Hoa Long council house we were met by several of 
the village committee. Hoa Long was the nearest village to the 
Task Force and was the only one allowed to remain inside the 
4000 metre area the Task Force had declared forbidden to 
civilians. Hoa Long was made up of four hamlets spread over 
a wide area. Pat Burgess, in the Bulletin article of 21 August 
1976 compared Hoa Long with Long Phuoc, saying, "Hoa 
Long was as ugly, as mean a village as you would find 
anywhere in the so called Repubhc". It certainly did not 
improve in the twelve months I was in Vietnam. According to 
other writings and the recollections of Australian troops who 
served there later, it remained a mean and ugly place and 
offered resistance to the Australians till they left in November 
1971. 
The northern edge of the village was situated only 800 
metres from the southern side of the Task Force. It was to be 
the model village that would succumb to the benevolence of 
the Australian presence and would see the error of their ways 
in supporting the VC forces. This did not happen. Hoa Long 
condnued to be a village of women, children and old men and 
always supported the VC. 
Australian policy continued the harassment of the village 
by continual cordon and search operations, putting the peo-
ple in cages and always apprehending some people as VC 
suspects. As the Australian frustration at the lack of results in 
Hoa Long began to grow, the policies toward the people 
became harsher. Bodies were left for public display and on 29 
February 1968 it was reported in the Australian that 
"Australian Task Force officers urged a tougher pacification 
policy in the villages which persistently harboured Vietcong". 
The discussion got off to a good start and there was much 
amusement that an Australian soldier should be there asking 
their opinions of the time. We started off by me asking what 
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help the Australians had given to the people of Hoa Long. 
There was much laughter at this: according to these people, 
no help was given. The work the Australians did in Hoa Long 
was never what the people really needed, they said. I asked 
about the market the Australians built in Hoa Long and again 
there were peals of laughter. They said the Australians had 
built what they described as the "big house", which had been 
used as a re-education centre by the Saigon Army. At night it 
was a detention centre. The people who had known links with 
the revolutionary forces were forced to go there at night. 
They had to bring their own food and bedding and were 
guarded by Saigon Army soldiers from dusk until daylight. 
They said the Australians made life very hard on the people 
of Hoa Long because there were many cordon and searches of 
the area. Many times the Australians would send a light plane 
over the village during the early morning hours to tell the 
people there would be a search of the village and to remain 
indoors. All the people then had to go to one area where they 
would be kept all day behind wire enclosures. During these 
searches there was always someone arrested and taken away 
to Baria for questioning. This made it very difficult for the 
local VC forces to come into the hamlets, but nevertheless 
their people did many times. 
They said the Australians were hated more as time went on 
because of their behaviour toward the Hoa Long people. First 
they destroyed many houses in Long Phuoc and Long Tan 
and displaced the people with no compensation. Later they 
started the village searches and the curfews. Then they started 
to drop the bodies of the local VC soldiers in the market 
place. The families were allowed to claim the bodies to bury 
them, but the Austrahans then made much trouble for the 
relatives because of their obvious VC Unks. Members of the 
family were usuaUy arrested and sent to Baria and held 
sometimes for up to six months. They claimed that many were 
badly treated during this confinement. Many relatives were 
consequently afraid to claim the bodies of their relatives. The 
local people then set up a committee which they called the 
"Good Friends Committee", members of which would then 
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request permission to bury the bodies on humanitarian 
grounds, so shielding the relatives from any recriminations by 
the Australians and the Saigon Army. They also said bodies 
were left in the rice paddies close to the village and some 
people were killed attempting to retrieve them for burial. 
They also said that sometimes mines or grenades were left 
under the bodies. 
They were angry at the Australian involvement in the pro-
vince. Australian and Vietnamese people had never hurt each 
other, they said, so why did Australian troops come and cause 
so much hardship and suffering? The people of Hoa Long did 
not hate the Australian people but they hated the Australian 
troops very much. Many local people were killed and injured 
by Australian troops, artillery and mines, and only about 30 
per cent of the rice paddies could be worked. Only the paddies 
close to the village could be worked because of the curfew, 
which was from 5 p.m. to 7 a.m. They said that anyone who 
came back late was arrested and questioned and also ran the 
risk of being killed in an Australian ambush. 
Most of the people killed in the 8 RAR ambush in August 
1970 were from Hoa Long. After the ambush the Australians 
cordoned off the area and no one was allowed in. They then 
buried all the bodies in a big pit that they dug in the paddies 
with a bulldozer. (There is a photo in the 8 RAR History of a 
small bulldozer at the site.) 
We then talked of the incident of the ARVN training group 
who went out on a night exercise without ammunition and 
were ambushed by the VC. They all laughed at this incident. 
Australian records show that there were 11 killed, 27 wound-
ed and 184 missing from this exercise. I remember being on 
several patrols into the area near the base of the hills trying to 
pick up any of these people who might be hiding, waiting for 
relief. As far as I know none of them was ever found. Mr 
Thuan who was an ex-D445 member said that they had all 
been captured and had all become VC soldiers. In fact one of 
them was the party secretary in Chau Pha village. 
Mr Thuan from then on did most of the talking. He was 
evidently very well respected by the others in the room: he was 
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never interrupted and the others seemed to hang on his words. 
He spoke with a quiet authority and was very open in his com-
ments. He also had a great sense of humour and had all the 
Vietnamese laughing and shaking their heads in amusement at 
some of the things he said. 
He commented that the local people did not have any warn-
ing of the Australian Task Force setting up at Nui Dat. The 
Australians just moved into the area and took over. There 
were several farming families at Nui Dat who were ordered to 
move off their land where they grew pepper and coffee. 
Thuan's parents were one of these famihes. He said that his 
father was told that he would get compensation but the 
Saigon Army got most of the money. The procedure was that 
the people had to make up a document which would then be 
stamped by the Saigon Army and then present it in Vung Tau 
for payment. There was much laughter and shaking of heads 
when he related this incident. "My father made the paper and 
was told to take it to Vung Tau. My father had never been 
past Hoa Long and did not even know where Vung Tau was". 
He said that many people were in the same predicament. 
Many months later when the people did get to Vung Tau, 
the Saigon Army made much trouble for them and they 
finished up receiving only several hundred piastre where they 
should have received several thousand. According to Mr 
Thuan the people from Hoa Long did not receive any com-
pensation from the Australians directly. Those people who 
had property resumed or damaged along Route 2 were paid 
compensation, but only through the Saigon Army in Baria. 
His recollections are that after the Austrahans left the base 
in late 1971 the Saigon Army then used the area. He then 
turned to the defoliant spraying and said that after 1968 the 
Americans sprayed Nui Dinhs at least once every two months. 
In Hoa Long area there were many birth deformities and many 
people, especially ex-soldiers, had skin diseases and cancer. 
Two of his friends had died recently from skin diseases. 
His sense of humour came out again when I asked if the list 
1 had of D445 leaders was correct. He looked at the hst of the 
four main officers and said they were correct. He asked the 
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date on the hst and I said it was 1966. He then had all the 
people laughing when he said that the Australians had not 
achieved much in six years, as all except one were sdll alive 
and the one who had died, Sau Chanh, had died of illness. 
When we finished the meeting we went outside to go to the 
Task Force at Nui Dat. I had felt uncomfortable about the 
Hoa Long meeting for some reason and the lack of good will 
towards me was made obvious at the end when one of the 
people refused to shake my hand. I was left no doubt about 
how the people of Hoa Long felt about the Australian 
presence in their area. 
The northern edges of Hoa Long looked no different from 
my memories of twenty years before. There were still many 
families who appeared to be living in very poor conditions 
and there were very few signs of any building work in pro-
gress. We came from the outskirts of Hoa Long and the Nui 
Dat rubber plantation stood silent and forlorn in the mid-
afternoon heat, waiting for the rain. At the edge of the old 
Task Force area were two white-brick columns that had 
evidently been gateposts. 
The Nui Dinhs stood sad and forlorn, bare of any fohage, 
looking like a plucked chicken carcass. 
It was depressing to look at them and stand in that deserted 
rubber plantation surrounded by the memories of the splen-
did vision that had gone terribly wrong. I remembered the 
same 1976 article by Pat Burgess already mentioned in which 
he spoke of the 5 RAR commander's dream for Phuoc Tuy 
when the Australians first arrived: "The colonel's dream had 
taken in even Hoa Long. It might be a dirty war elsewhere in 
Vietnam but here in Phuoc Tuy it was going to be different" 
(Bulletin, 21 August 1976). Different? How could it be dif-
ferent. We were the same as the Americans. We walked into a 
war we didn't know a thing about and tried to use old lessons 
on a new foe. The Vietnamese were rewriting the rulebook, 
while we condnued to use our tired old methods in the hope 
that we could intimidate the people instead of giving them 
something to follow. We may have caused them to suffer and 
to be afraid, but a lot of ordinary people in Phuoc Tuy had 
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convinced me that we could never have broken their will if we 
had stayed in Vietnam for twenty years. 
The silent Task Force rubber plantation was a symbol of 
broken ideals and shattered dreams and in the sombre after-
noon light it appeared as if the plantation looked mournfully 
at the bare, decaying, polluted slopes of the Nui Dinhs. There 
was nothing there. The signs of the thousands of Australian 
troops who had passed through were erased from ah but the 
memories of those who had'been there. In places the planta-
tion was overgrown and the trees were rough and had not 
been thinned. We came to the intersection where the rubber 
stopped and there in front of us stood the small insignificant 
treeless feature of Nui Dat. There were several houses on the 
slopes and it seems that the coffee and pepper farmers have 
returned. The road down to the old 6 RAR area was broken 
and overgrown and at the creek the erosion had washed away 
half the road. The driver pushed on only because of my urg-
ing. When we started up the slope, there were tracks that had 
been roads, but I was slightly disoriented. We finished up at 
what had been the C Company, 6 RAR lines in 1966 and I 
could look over to the old D Company area. 
We walked over the area — there was nothing there. The 
driver wanted to return to Baria and I agreed, as there was 
nothing in that silent lonely place to make me want to stay 
any longer. Why had I wanted to come here anyway? I knew 
why, but did not want to admit the fact to myself. It was 
because Nui Dat had been the place where I had experienced 
something good and something bad. The good was the 
memory of the mates I had served with and the bad was the 
folly of our commitment. Nui Dat had shattered long-held 
assumptions and ideals, for myself, for the Australian Army 
and for the government who had sent us there. Nui Dat was 
the symbol of misplaced trust in our "great and powerful 
allies" and of our inability to see that there were legitimate 
aspirations other than our own. 
I had seen Nui Dat again and the short visit was more than 
enough. As we moved back to Baria it really was at last left 
behind me. There was no doubt in my mind about that. I had 
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finally purged myself. I had clung to the false hope for over 
twenty years that "they" had not died for nothing. Now 1 
could squarely face the fact that they had, and for some 
reason it lifted a weight from my shoulders. No more ifs or 
buts. At last my perspective was as clear as I could ever hope 
it to be. For the first time it was unclouded by false hopes and 
uncertainty. 
A week later as the plane lifted off I said goodbye to Viet-
nam for what I thought would be the last dme. An alien land 
and an alien culture that had pulled and pushed at me for so 
long. No one can hope to come to terms with that strange and 
beautiful country and that even stranger war which served up 
good Australian manhood. But at least I could now look 
inside myself without being confused and afraid by shadows 
that I could not understand. Although the faces of the village 
people would disturb me, at least they were out of the 
shadows at last. 
"Mother I die, I die", said Mrs Su as she stared into a 
vision somewhere far behind me. And the only thing she 
could not understand was why. Silly ignorant woman. It's all 
so simple. Why can't you understand? You stood in the way 
of more powerful interests and you were supposed to stand 
aside, as others have had to do for centuries. Even though 
your people refused to stand aside and won, you've still really 
lost. Those powerful interests will never forgive you and will 
keep you in poverty for the rest of your life to appease their 
own egos. You are still "the missing ones". 
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A Time for Reassessment 
The flight back to Australia was not a good one for reflec-
tions. Remembering what the village people had to say made 
it difficult to think of anything else. Surely what they had said 
to me could not be entirely correct. Surely there must have 
been some help or compassion on the part of the Australian 
Army toward these people, the innocent victims of the war. 
Even the military mind must have made some effort toward 
restitution and help for all they had lost. 
Not only were the stories from the villagers proven to be 
correct, but there was an even worse side to the Australian 
presence which I was to discover later from documentary 
evidence released for the Agent Orange inquiry. A war 
atrocity, by any definition, was committed on the people of 
Phuoc Tuy. There is much hard evidence to support the claim 
that the policies adopted by the Australian Army there 
resulted in the deaths of many civilians. There was also con-
siderable destruction of the villagers' private property with no 
compensation or genuine "resettlement". 
Added to this were the deaths of many villagers who walk-
ed into ambush positions or who were in the wrong place at 
the wrong time; and the Army acted in all too many cases in 
an arbitrary manner that actually forced the local people into 
the arms of the VC. 
The Long Phuoc and Long Tan people told the stories of 
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the destruction of their homes and the deprivation of their 
livelihoods because of Australian policies. They also told of 
the shelling of innocent people. Although I have not been able 
to verify particular instances in Australian documents I have 
been able to verify that these things did in fact happen to 
these people. The disturbing fact of the matter is that it ap-
pears Australians fired artillery on to civilians carrying out 
their daily tasks in order to survive. It was a feature of the war 
in Vietnam that such bombardments might be used as a way 
of deHvering a message to the people in "no-go" areas. When 
soldiers fired the guns they often had no idea of their target. 
The rounds left the guns and exploded out of sight and many 
times out of sound of the gunners, leaving them to wonder 
what they were firing at and what were the results. 
The quesdon must be asked whether the firing of ardllery 
on to the peasants was at odds with official policy. The Divi-
sion in Battle Pamphlet No. 11 Counter-Revolutionary War-
fare 1965, concerning Civil Mihtary Action states: "The prin-
ciples of humanity prohibit the use of any degree of violence 
not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War is not 
an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles." 
The following records of the Task Force signal-log messages 
are difficult to reconcile with this principle. These records are 
available at the Austrahan War Memorial Archives in 
Canberra (AWM 181. Message Forms. HQ 1 ATF, Com-
manders Diaries, 1-30 September 1966, Box No 2). The 
following are for the month of September 1966 only. There 
are many more of similar notations throughout the period of 
Australian involvement. 
Serial Date Time From Message 
48 12 0730 AVN Two buildings under 
construction in Long Tan 
488659.489657. Arty to fire some 
rounds. 
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Serial Date Time From Message 
HI 13 1105 ALO 3 people at Long Phuoc heading 
north on trail 50 metres from 
road. They are carrying baskets 
on poles. GR 452651. Arty 
[artillery] engaged. Smoke 
followed by HE. 
113 13 1120 ALO 3 cattle 461659 North of road, 
west of river between Long Tan 
and Long Phuoc.470654 people 
(2) working fields. Engaged by 
artillery. 
114 13 1132 ALO Herd of cattle at 465653. 
Engaged by artillery. 
789 25 1242 ALO Numerous people in Long Phuoc 
on main road travelling both east 
and west. Arty engaged. 
923 28 1209 ALO People walking east into Long 
Phuoc YS 438639. 15 cattle and 
one man at 469654. 8 people/ 
cattle south of Long Tan 485652 
moving north. Remarks. Arty 
engaged. 
ALO stands for the Air Liaison Officer, which was the 
small army spotter plane that flew over the area reporting 
movements. These messages clearly refer to civilians. 1 would 
suggest that even if VC were mixed with them it is against all 
humanitarian principles to act in this arbitrary manner. Even 
the people in the villages did not suggest that the Australians 
knowingly fired artillery on to civilians, and yet the records 
suggest they did. I kept thinking of the young man with his 
hand missing and his story that he was working in the rice 
paddies and was hit with artillery. Also the stories from Long 
Phuoc of the fathers and brothers who were killed by artiUery 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
7 76 A Soldier Returns 
while minding their catUe, or going back to Long Phuoc to 
collect things from their old homes. 
The disturbing fact is that it was the Austrahan policy that 
made these people attempt to go back to their own areas. If 
there had been some help for these people then they would 
not have needed so desperately to go back, but there was no 
help given to them. The only means available to these people 
to live was their gardens, fruit trees and rice paddies. Yet it 
was the Australian Army who adopted the policy of refusing 
them access. A "Civic Acdon" document dated 14 June 1966 
states: 
Access to the recently destroyed fruit growing village of Long 
Phuoc (YS 4464) is prohibited to civilians. At a time which is tac-
tically suitable, 1 ATF will allow limited access for the harvest of 
fruit crops. Vietnamese police will make a strict check on all 
civilians (and their ID documents) wanting to visit the area. 
These people had no choice, their homes were destroyed, their 
means of livelihood forbidden them and no help with resettle-
ment was ever given. As Brigadier Jackson stated in the 
previously recorded interview, "I wouldn't say at that stage 
of the game we had the knowledge or the resources or the 
ability to do a resettlement program". When I asked the first 
civil affairs commander, John Donohoe, if he was aware of 
the extreme hardship the Task Force had imposed on these 
people he said, "Was I ever. I cried tears for them, believe 
you me". When questioned if the Task Force was aware of 
the plight of these people and whether any specific aid or 
compensation had been given to them, he said, "Only when 
we came across them and we saw their plight. The civil affairs 
didn't know much about them." 
When asked in 1987 how he felt about the use of the word 
"resettled" in describing their treatment Donohoe had this to 
say. 
They were just given a pat on the bum and told to go and look 
after themselves. They certainly weren't resettled as we know it. 
Resettled is supporting someone until they are able to support 
themselves and that certainly was not done to my knowledge. It 
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may have been done in a few minor cases by the Vietnamese 
bureaucracy but not to my knowledge. 
The Long Phuoc people were never to receive any help 
from the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy. They and the Long 
Tan people remained "the forgotten ones". Even the visible 
ones in Hoa Long, right at the door of the Task Force were 
not given help. 
When the Task Force finally did get a separate Civil Affairs 
unit, they also forgot the Long Phuoc people under their very 
noses. John McDonah, the commander of the Civil Affairs 
unit arrived in Vietnam around the end of June 1967, 12 
months after the people had been moved and their homes 
destroyed. He said he knew there had been a village at Long 
Phuoc and he thought all the people had gone into Hoa Long. 
When 1 said only 1450 of them had gone there he expressed 
surprise. He did not know where the rest of them were. He 
said: "The sad part was that by the time I got there the Long 
Phuoc thing was out of the road." Perhaps "swept under the 
carpet" would have been a better expression. He went on to 
say: 
Up until the Tet Offensive, [1968] nothing was done specifically 
to help the Long Phuoc people. 1 certainly knew they were there 
somewhere. It does sound like they were all forgotten. And of 
course this is one of the problems of changing the force. If we had 
continuity then someone would have said that we should be doing 
something for these people. But we were just sort of setting up so 
that the next blokes could get on with the job. 
Even when the people were allowed to go back into the area 
to work, the curfews made hfe impossible for them. Another 
Australian document "Population Control Hoa Long", 
dated 17 September 1966, further supports the stories of the 
people I had interviewed. It states in part: 
(1) Access to Long Phuoc will be permitted only on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays. 
(2) Civilians will be permitted in the area on those days only bet-
ween 0730 hrs and 1600 hrs [4 p.m.] 
c. Construct a double dannet perimeter fence around Hoa Long. 
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d. Co-ordinate and control the movement of civilians out of Hoa 
Long. 
e. Ensure civilians moving out of Hoa Long are issued with a pass 
agreed to by 1 ATF. 
f. Ensure civilians moving out of Hoa Long are not in possession 
of foodstuffs, medicines, money or other supplies valuable to the 
VC. 
g. Prevent civilians moving from Hoa Long to Long Phuoc except 
on authorized days. 
h. Take punitive action against civilians found disobeying regula-
tions. 
Another problem that the Long Phuoc people I spoke to in 
1987 seemed to be unaware of was the fact that defoliant had 
been used on the area just after the village had been 
destroyed. John Donohoe stated, when I asked him how he 
felt about the pohcies toward the people: 
Well in fact I did have a bit to say about this. It was obvious to me 
that it was going to create problems because Vietnamese work 
funny hours and they don't own watches and they only travel at 
the pace of a bullock cart. And in many cases it was useless as 
they had started to use defoliant on a lot of the area even at that 
time. You couldn't explain to the people that even if they did go 
back there was nothing that would grow there probably for the 
next five or six years. It was pretty sad for them . . . It was 
stupid . . . stupid. They don't work that way. They all knock off 
at lunch time, but they start at daylight and then do a few hours in 
the evening. 
The Task Force was well aware of the suffering caused to 
the people because in early 1967 a survey report was received 
from a specially trained team of Vietnamese. The report, 
dated 25 February 1967, is 22 pages and details the hardship 
of Hoa Long. Just two of the responses show the problems of 
the people concerned but there is page after page of such com-
ments. 
One 60 year old male respondent said: "Australians forbid people 
to go to work in the field. If who (sic) goes there secretly, he will 
be frightened by the helicopter then be captured and brought to 
the district town. Here we only live on agricultural produce, now 
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we are forbidden to go working in the rice field. What do we live 
on? On these days we are allowed to go working in the fields twice 
a week, but we must come back by 4 p.m. If he who comes back 
late, will be blamed and his identity card will be seized and he will 
be on fatigue for two three days. This harvest is only obtained 
3/10." One 24, 25 and 60 year old female respondent said that 
since Australian Army stationed here people and cattle are in 
hunger, agricultural labour is forbidden. 
Toward the end of the report it is stated: "One 40 year old 
female respondent, complained, 'People from Long Phuoc 
moved here in great number. Wells are too little, I think that 
in the dry season, people will die of thirst.' " One of the con-
clusions in the report written by the team states: "We find 
that the residents are longing for trading and cultivating 
freely, for the defence and aids of the GVN and army. 
Especially Long Phuoc refugees they still have no dwelling. " 
The italics are underlined in the original report. Most of 
this report was ignored and the people of Long Phuoc never 
received any substantial aid from the Australian Army that I 
can discover. 
On the killing of civilians, there is no record 1 can find 
about the kilhng of Mrs Su's daughter. However, there are 
many examples of civilians being killed; for instance, on 14 
August 1966: "Contact report 140625.GR 395660 3 VC ? 
States not sure whether civilians or not. None were carrying 
weapons". Another disturbing one is the Special Air Services 
patrol who killed three civilian woodcutters on the sole 
evidence that they ducked for cover when a plane came over. 
Considering the way that planes and helicopters fired on 
anything that moved, it was really no wonder. Yet this was 
the reason for their kilhngs. A situation report on enemy 
forces from 6 RAR dated 13 December 1966 states: "8 Oct YS 
275745 SAS killed two unarmed men cutting wood who were 
thought to be VC as they hid whenever a plane went 
overhead, a third arrived and was killed also." Tenuous 
evidence on which to take three men's hves. And just how 
were they killed? They must have been knifed or garrotted, 
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silently, or else the other man would not have come back to 
them. The report clearly states they were unarmed. 
The worst case I have found to date was the 2 RAR ambush 
that went horribly wrong in October 1967. A platoon from A 
Company had laid an ambush outside the restricted 4(K)0 
metre area — the civilians must have thought they were allow-
ed to move there. The timing was 7.36 a.m. and was late for 
civilians to be going to work. This is related directly from the 
after-action report by the platoon commander and the com-
pany commander. 
The pltn had laid an ambush on a track when noise and talking 
were heard. Subsequently a group of 16 people walked into the 
ambush. The leading Vietnamese saw the machine gunner and 
pointed at him with his shoulder carrying stick. The machine gun-
ner took the stick to be a weapon and opened fire. The remainder 
of the patrol then opened fire, catching most of the group as they 
ran back south. After 2-3 minutes firing I ordered cease fire when 
I heard a woman cry out. I moved forward and found that what 
we had all thought to be weapons were in fact shoulder carrying 
sticks. We then evacuated all dead and wounded. 
Terrain. Thick bamboo and old paddi fields with grass 4-5 metres 
high. VisibiUty 25-50 metres. 
En. First sighted 50 metres. 16 civihans. First fired at 15-20 
metres 
En cas. 4 dead. 6 wounded. 3 captured. 
Docs and weapons captured. Nil. 
Lessons learned. The great difficulty identifying civilians from 
VC in close country. 
Coy. Commanders comments. 1. The ambush was well laid and 
executed. The actions of the pltn commander were entirely cor-
rect, unfortunate as it was for the civilians concerned. 
2. Pltn commander is to be commended for his control of the 
situation and his rapid evacuation of the wounded. 
"Unfortunate as it was for the civilians concerned" — the 
woodcutters did not even get that much sympathy. 
The Task Force knew all about the suffering they were 
causing to the people but condnued to ignore the ones who 
needed their help the most, the Long Phuoc and the Long Tan 
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people. I can only imagine the rationale was they were sup-
posedly VC supporters so why help them. But who could tell 
VC in Vietnam. If they were VC they certainly remained so as 
a result of Australian policies. Why would they not support 
the VC? Why on earth would they support a government and 
a foreign military machine against their own people when 
they were subjected to such treatment? 
Another decision in 1967 that caused great hardship was 
the movement of over 1000 people from an area designated 
Slope 30. This was to the north-west of the Task Force near 
the Hat Dich area, home of the 274 Regiment. The people 
were told by loudhailer they were to stay indoors for a census. 
They were then herded on to trucks as their homes were 
destroyed and forcibly taken to a refugee village that the 
Australians established near the Binh Ba plantation. This was 
Ap Suoi Nghe, which was to become supposedly the best 
refugee viUage in Vietnam. I have never seen this village or 
spoken to the people but it became a hell-hole of a slum, ac-
cording to the reports and soldiers I have spoken to about the 
place. 
A glowing press release was put out to explain this 
marvellous project in Australia: "In appearance the model 
village set out on a ridge line south of the French-owned rubber 
plantation at Binh Ba is not unlike a neat Australian housing 
subdivision." Someone has handwritten on the copy of the 
release available from the Archives the notation, "who's kid-
ding who". Photos and a video I have seen of Ap Suoi Nghe 
give stark evidence which contradicts the press release. 
Two village chiefs and their deputies were murdered by the 
VC in quick succession despite the proximity to the Task 
Force. Crops would not grow because of defoliant used and 
the poor ground. The people were abused by their own 
government officials and money supposed to help them was 
taken by corrupt administrators. The land they were sup-
posedly given they could not sell. Hardly land ownership, as 
the press release quotes Brigadier Graham. People who 
could not read or write were required to fill in many forms 
and for this they had to pay the officials to do it for them. 
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The Task Force was officially not responsible for the village 
even though it was an Australian initiative. The blame for the 
failure was always put down to the inefficiency of the South 
Vietnamese. This, legally, absolved the Australians of blame 
but hardly helped the people who had lost their homes and 
livelihoods. 
In April 1971 a survey report by a team of Americans and 
Vietnamese described Ap Suoi Nghe as "a village of the 
poor". After 10 pages the report concluded: "The attempt to 
move people to a 'western' type hamlet structure is depressing 
for those who visit Suoi Nghe. It is virtually a hamlet without 
a soul". Lieutenant Colonel Gradon, the CO of the Civil Af-
fairs unit, wrote on 10 April 1969: "1 ATF has no official 
responsibihty for Suoi Nghe, but we have lingering moral 
responsibility, and a military interest." 
Another facet of Australian policy where the wrong infor-
mation was recorded was the confiscation of the rubber plan-
tadon at Nui Dat. Ian Hutchinson, wridng on "The Red Rats 
of Phuoc Tuy" in the Australian Army Journal, April 1968, 
stated: "Neither the Nui Dat plantadon nor other plantadons 
which are located in Viet Cong controlled areas are at present 
being worked by rubber tappers, and subsequent loss of in-
come to owners is reimbursed by war claims payments." This 
statement is utterly wrong. The owners of the plantation at 
Nui Dat received no payment for the loss of the plantadon 
during the whole time of the Australian presence in Phuoc 
Tuy. When the Australians left in 1971 they had not been paid 
one cent. 
According to a file of over 200 pages that I have obtained 
from the Australian Foreign Affairs Department, the struggle 
for the claims of these people went as high as the prime 
minister of Australia. Demonstrations were held in Saigon 
and several vitriolic newspaper articles sought to help the four 
owners of the rubber plantation at Nui Dat. The case started 
out with four people claiming compensation for the confisca-
tion of their land and eventually ended up as 55 people who 
had land confiscated or destroyed around the Nui Dat area 
and who received no compensation from the Australian Ar-
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my. Legally the army was within its right under the Terms of 
the Penlaterzd Agreement of 1950, but this did not help the 
people who had lost their livelihood. To say, as Hutchinson 
did, that the people were compensated is absolute nonsense. 
The case of the compensation for the Nui Dat plantation 
gives the lie to the official reasons we were in Vietnam. 
The pubhc declarations by the Australian government at the 
time were that we were there at the invitation of the South 
Vietnamese government. This was not actually so. We were 
there because of the Americans and we gave little thought to 
the Vietnamese. When Australia decided to station troops in 
Phuoc Tuy, it was after discussions with the Americans, not 
the Vietnamese. This was why the people had so much trouble 
trying to claim their compensation. 
According to the legal position of the Australian Army, the 
confiscation of the land at Nui Dat was covered under the 
Terms of the Penlateral Agreement of 1950, which was 
extended to the Australian forces in Vietnam by the ministry's 
notes of 7 June 1963 and 30 June 1964. In March 1966 a 
decree was issued by the government of South Vietnam set-
ting up an Inter-Ministerial Committee to look into land com-
pensation acquired for military installations (IMREC). But 
the Vietnamese government claimed the Australian Army had 
moved on to Nui Dat and began clearing the area for their 
camp before approval had been given. A letter from Brigadier 
General Dong Van Khuyen, dated 7 April 1969, states: "The 
Australian Army has occupied, made use and cleared proper-
ties of land owners at Nui Dat Phuoc Tuy, before the RVN 
Government grants them permission." 
An indication of the sort of thinking by Australian govern-
ment officials and the army towards the ordinary people of 
Vietnam is highhghted by the comment of Lt Colonel K.L. 
McPherson, who wrote in December 1970: "All the peti-
tioners were VC sympathizers at the time." What bearing 
does that have on a compensation claim? How do you class a 
sympathizer? The classic example is a handwritten note, 
dated 25 February 1971, in which a bureaucrat accused an 
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Australian Embassy official of being biased in his attempts to 
help the people obtain their rightful compensation. The note, 
written on the back of correspondence, states: 
Mr Timmins. It appears from all your notes on file that you bear a 
biased sympathy for the landowners. This is a problem for GVN 
not for the Australian Government. The owners (probably VC) 
know this quite well and are only trying to blackmail us. (hand-
written signature unreadable) 
By 1971 there was still no compensation and the heat had 
been turned up considerably. So much so that a cable was sent 
to the Australian Embassy in Saigon telling them to get the 
prime minister "off the hook". "The Prime Minister's 
Department has asked for a memorandum which would get 
the Prime Minister 'off the hook' and leave it to you to pro-
vide the landowners with their reply." This was dated 8 
February 1971 and signed D.J. Kingsmill, for the secretary. 
The extent of damage to the local people's property and the 
economy is shown in the minutes of the Vietnamese Inter-
ministerial Committee of Real Estate and Provincial Commit-
tee of Investigadon, dated 31 January 1969. 
When arriving in the spot the Committee recognized that the 
whole area of 950 hectares had been levelled by Australian troops 
to build their military camps and structures, so that there were no 
longer fruit trees or other properties belonging to the owners. 
Nevertheless, the Committee has made inquiries with villagers 
living in the area, the latter said that before the action, this area of 
950 hectares had been all plantations of industrial and fruit trees, 
on which there had been buildings. 
So much for Robert O'Neill's statement that the Task Force 
had been placed so as not to "dislocate the economic life of 
the province by taking up agricultural land". 
One of the extraordinary things about my trips back to 
Vietnam and the stupidity of the Austrahan Army's atdtude 
to the people was finding out that it had been written about in 
1968. John Rowe, the Task Force inteUigence officer during 
1966-1967 wrote a novel called Count Your Dead. There are 
striking similarities between aspects of this novel and the 
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Australian Task Force in Vietnam in 1966-1967. Rowe resign-
ed from the army after the publication of the book. 
The story is about a fictitious American Brigade but 
follows the first twelve months of the Task Force very closely. 
The setting of the province is without doubt Phuoc Tuy and 
the positioning of the American base is the same as Nui Dat. 
He describes Route Three which runs through the province. 
"Through my rice basin, then through all the rubber planta-
tions until it reaches the main highway north". Route Two 
ran from the province capital of Baria north to Xuan Loc. 
Around Baria were the rich ricefields and north were the rub-
ber plantations of Nui Dat, Binh Ba or Gallia plantation and 
then the large Courtenay plantation that ran into Long Khanh 
province. The opposing VC forces were also the same as those 
facing the Australian Task Force. 
As 1 see it we've got one, sometimes two Main Force VC 
regiments basing up in the province; one mainly up here near the 
Vinh Duong province boundary and the other up in the corner 
here in the Due Binh war base area. We've got the usual VC pro-
vince battalion, VC district companies and guerrillas. 
In Phuoc Tuy there were two regiments of the VC 5 Division. 
One base was in the north-east corner of the province in the 
Nui May Tao mountain range. The other base was in the 
north-west of the province in the Hat Dich area and both of 
these regiments regularly moved into War Zone D. There was 
also the local D445 Battalion and the district companies. 
Close to the fictional base was the village of Dong Tuy 
which the Americans, after talking with the province chief, ^ 
decided to destroy. This was a village with strong VC links 
going back to the days of the Viet Minh and contained 3000 
civihans. "We fire artillery in there to frighten VC but they 
escape into tunnels. We must destroy all the tunnels." 
Close to the Task Force was the village of Long Phuoc con-
taining 3000 people. The Australians decided to completely 
destroy the town, because of its VC links going back to the 
days of the Viet Minh and because it was designated a "for-
hfied village". It was also full of tunnels. 
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In the novel the Americans sent one of their companies out 
to decoy the VC main force into a battle. The Task Force sent 
one company out into the rubber plantation at Long Tan, 
knowing intelhgence reports indicated large concentradons of 
VC in the area. 
Rowe also has the Americans inflating the body count from 
his fictional battle. "They were surprised to discover how 
readily the grossly exaggerated body count figure had been 
accepted by the battalion". He also had a piece that closely 
parallelled the previously mentioned thoughts of my own of 
the body count jumping very quickly. 
"Hell with the firepower we've applied and the firefight you've 
been in, you must have killed hundreds of VC". 
"Yes sir I'm damn certain we must, but about twenty-three 
bodies is all —" 
"Well you'd better organize a more thorough and comprehen-
sive count pretty damn quick." 
How did the body count at Long Tan go? From twelve to 
fifteen at 9.40 a.m. to 100 by 10.20 a.m. when we were only 
securing the area. 
The fictitious American junior officers wanted to follow up 
the enemy, but were told no. Colonel Townsend of 6 RAR 
wanted to follow up, but was refused permission to advance 
more than 1000 metres. 
The main character in the novel was an officer who became 
the intelligence officer in charge of civil affairs. Rowe was the 
Task Force intelligence officer and had a lot to do with John 
Donohoe the civil affairs officer. 
Rowe brought in a Frenchman who managed the plantation 
very close to his fictitious Brigade. The Binh Ba or GalHa 
plantation house was only 5 kilometres from Nui Dat and was 
managed by a big Frenchman who often entertained the Task 
Force officers. 
The most striking similarity is when Rowe reveals that his 
fictional intelligence cum civil affairs officer had been given a 
report by The Census Grievance Team. The report was made 
after "153 interviews with Province villagers and refugees". 
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That reaUy is an amazing coincidence because the report on 
Hoa Long was carried out by a "specially trained team of 
Vietnamese". They interviewed "111 respondents : 87 local 
residents and 24 refugees". Rowe then quotes 6 of the inter-
views all of which are amazingly similar to the passages 
quoted early in this book from the report given to the Task 
Force dated 25 February 1967. 
The fictional American forces fired artillery into the fic-
tional village of Dong Tuy. 
Even though Dong Tuy had been declared a forbidden twenty 
four hour zone, many of the ex villagers had returned there, 
attempting to harvest what they could of their ripened fruit crops, 
before the rot destroyed them . . . The artillery may have had 
some deterrent effect, but the only demonstrable result had been 
the discovery by a patrol of a badly wounded old woman with her 
right arm blown off, together with the corpse of her husband and 
grandson of perhaps ten years of age. Understanding the compell-
ing reasons of lost homes and hunger that drove the villagers to 
return, Morgan felt strongly that the best solution would be to 
allow them to do so, but under stringent control and curfew 
restrictions. 
It seems that this bears too close a resemblance to interviews 
with the vihage people of Long Phuoc and the Army 
documents supporting other actions to be a mere figment of 
Rowe's imagination. 
The Austrahan Army in Vietnam followed policies that 
created enormous hardship and suffering for the local people 
of Phuoc Tuy. Granted, war itself is an atrocity, but there 
was no need for the mindless brutality toward the civihan 
population. Our war was to fight the VC, not the people. If 
we say the VC were the people, we are then admitting that we 
were fighting against our own beliefs, as our rationale was to 
help the people. In fact the war could never be won without 
the support of the people. Yet by our first actions in Phuoc 
Tuy we ahenated — directly — over 8 per cent of the province 
population — permanently. 
When we moved into Phuoc Tuy we were going to do the 
job differently from the Americans. We thought we had the 
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experience from Malaya, but this was a false assumption. In 
Malaya the British were the government as well as the 
military. When government action was required to con-
solidate military gains or soften the brutality of the army's 
actions, then it was done. In Vietnam there was no way that 
anyone could control the corrupt government in Saigon. 
The government we were supporting continued to alienate 
its own population and the allied forces supporting them 
became locked into an ever-increasing spiral of frustration 
and violence. The people became the enemy and the merry-
go-round went faster and faster until at last we had to say, 
STOP. We could not even pacify Hoa Long, right on our 
doorstep. When the frustration got to the point of dumping 
bodies in the market place or dragging them through the 
villages in sight of the children, then we really had no option 
but to leave. Whatever military gains were made were lost 
very quickly by the Saigon government. It really was a no win 
situation, and 500 Australian boys paid with their lives for the 
stupidity. 
If people questioned what was going on, they were branded 
as Communists or accused of being unpatriotic. The Army 
even imposed strict censorship so people in Australia would 
not be aware of the situation. Denis Warner, the respected 
war and Asian correspondent, wrote an article in the Brisbane 
Courier-Mail of 6 January 1971 under the heading "Army's 
Bamboo Screen on the Task Force". It was a scathing attack 
on Army pohcy. 
I was instructed that I had no authority to talk to any Australian 
servicemen, on duty or off. 
Such restrictions gravely complicate, though they do not 
entirely prevent, the collection of information. 
They also constitute the most blatant attempt to impose censor-
ship at source that I have ever encountered in any Army in any 
war at any time. 
This I might add includes World War II, the Korean War, the 
Indo China War, the Vietnam War, the wars in Laos and Cam-
bodia, the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation, the Colonel's 
Revolt in Indonesia, the September 30 incident and some sundry 
other revolts and upheavals over the past quarter of a century. 
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The Australian Army in Vietnam antagonised the local 
people it was supposedly trying to help, journalists trying to 
report the war and even the supreme commander of Allied 
Forces in Vietnam, General Westmoreland. Westmoreland 
had a healthy respect for the Australian fighting man but 
became exasperated at the performance of the Task Force in 
Phuoc Tuy. He flew to Nui Dat in February 1967, six months 
after the Long Tan battle and let the Task Force senior 
officers know of his displeasure at their performance. This 
has never been admitted by the army and in 1988 when 1 inter-
viewed Malcolm Eraser, who was the minister for the Army 
from 1966 to 1968, he bluntly told me that he did not believe 
me. The following is from Westmoreland's official diaries, 
dated 3 February 1967, obtained from the National Archives 
in Washington DC. 
1 then departed for the Australian Task Force where 1 called on 
Brigadier Graham, the new commander, for the first time. The 
Australians are very inactive and 1 learned that they are about to 
rotate their two battalions which means they will be virtually 
ineffective for over a month. Out of a 4600 man task force they 
are able to put only six companies in the field. They have a large 
base to defend which requires two companies. I expressed to 
Brigadier Graham my disappointment and subsequently in talking 
to the Australian Ambassador and General Mackay on his depar-
ture, and to General Vincent on his arrival, I expressed my con-
cern that very little combat power was being generated by the 
4600 man force. Furthermore 1 suggested that they might want to 
change their rotation policy which I thought would allow them to 
increase their combat power with the same total number of troops 
and at the same time have them in a fighting posture for twelve 
months. The Australians were a little shocked by my comments 
but 1 explained that in all fairness to the command and to their 
reputation, this observation should be known. 
If the ambassador and General Vincent were told per-
sonally of Westmoreland's displeasure, then it seems unlikely 
that Fraser, the minister for the Army would not be inform-
ed. Yet Fraser told me he did not believe the fact. If he did not 
know of Westmoreland's comments, then the Army must 
stand accused of not keeping the minister informed. As this 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
190 A Soldier Returns 
informadon has never been related for over twenty years we 
can only assume that those who knew were not about to 
publicly disclose the fact. 
So what did it all add up to for myself and all the others 
who served in Vietnam? For me there is still the contradic-
tion. There is anger and shame that I could have volunteered 
to be a part of a policy that inflicted so much suffering on a 
small and struggling country and its people. Yet there is still a 
certain amount of pride that is really the knowledge that I was 
not found wanting, and the thought of all the people I met 
and served with. That bond holds even to this day and pro-
bably always will. 
What I am hoping for from this work is further questioning 
within the Army itself about the course of action it took in 
Vietnam. To look at our mistakes and admit them is not 
something we should try to hide from. If we made mistakes, 
let's bring them out in the open so there can be a lesson for 
the future, because there really is no guarantee that we may 
not be embroiled in something similar again. If we are, then 
perhaps we can mix some compassion and common sense into 
the turmoil. Compassion is not a dirty word and it certainly is 
not incompatible with the Army as an institution. 
This is the reason I have mentioned the killing of the 
wounded VC after the Long Tan Battle. The Army has 
vigorously denied this claim from the time it was first publicly 
made in a book in 1968, yet the proof is there in the Army's 
own records. There is nothing vindictive in me mentioning 
this. If it is there in the records it will be found by someone 
else at a later date. I do not condone the killings, but I under-
stand how they happened and I will state here that I would 
have done the same thing at the time. I was only 15 metres 
from the men who pulled the triggers on two helpless VC 
wounded and at that time I wanted to kill every VC or Viet-
namese in Vietnam. However, when the heat of the moment 
has passed, the soldiers who pulled the triggers have a long 
time to reflect on their actions. We must make sure this sort 
of thing will never happen again, not only for our future 
enemy but for the peace of mind of our veterans. 
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The strange part about things is that although in many 
ways 1 blame the Army and its bureaucracy for the policy 
decisions they made, in others I can see the difficult position 
the Australian government placed them in. The Army did not 
choose to go to Vietnam, it was an Australian government 
decision. When they arrived in Vietnam there was little help in 
policy direction from the Australian government and so the 
Army virtually had to make their own rules as they went. Yet 
they were constantly tied by the political constraints imposed 
on them from Canberra. Here again is another contradiction 
in my feelings about the Vietnam experience. But the sym-
pathy 1 might have for the problems faced by the military 
command is overidden by the stories of the peasants of Phuoc 
'TUf. 
So what are the main issues of importance? For me, as is 
obvious, the important issue is the effect of the Australian 
Army role on the people of Phuoc Tuy, the people we were 
supposedly in Vietnam to help. But it seems we are missing 
the point and are beginning to glorify events out of all pro-
portion to their importance. We are looking at Vietnam as a 
military campaign, which it was not. A military campaign is 
to destroy your enemy. Our war was to help America gain the 
political settlement it wanted. This does not mean that the 
war was any less vicious, it only means the outcome could 
never be clear cut. So now we are concentrating on the bat-
tles, rather than the policies in order to justify and glorify our 
own position. But false glory is as bad as false pride and can 
give a distorted view of history. 
Let us admit our shortcomings as well as our good points 
and strive for the honesty and integrity that are the catchcries 
of our society. The honest man who can stand up and admit 
his mistakes is a respected person; and so is a nation. General 
Phuong said to me in Hanoi that "perhaps Australia too, will 
have to confront hs own image". Perhaps the time is now, 
while Vietnam veterans are still lucid enough to speak. 
As 1 finish this work I look back on an array of memories 
and the words of my friend Dy keep coming back, "We had 
no choice. The choices were imposed on us." Next time, let's 
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give some choice to those we are supposedly fighting for, 
because by our actions in Phuoc Tuy we took away the right 
of the people to choose. We gave them only one option and 
that was an impossible one for them to accept. 
I will always remember the calm and dignified Mrs Ngo Thi 
Loc when she said that she wishes for no more wars — the 
death of her husband and son was a heavy price to pay. In 
Vietnam today her life will never be easy, but I hope that she 
sees no more wars and can enjoy her grandchildren in peace, 
in the land afflicted by killing and injustice for so long. 
An old Vietnamese fable concludes with the words, 
"Violence rarely shows true strength", something for us to 
ponder in the future. 
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